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Abstract

The Legitimacy of Global Legal Governance: Institutional Power and Human Rights Bias in
International Criminal Justice
by
Martin J. Burke

Advisor: Thomas G. Weiss

As global legal governance institutions exercise increasing coercive power, including through the
prosecution and incarceration of individuals, such institutions require greater legitimacy. An
essential but often overlooked source is the right of the accused in mass-atrocity trials to
effective legal protection, which constitutes a “legal legitimacy” based on liberal norms of
criminal justice. The two most important sources of legal legitimacy are: “legality,” that is, the
non-retroactive enforcement of crimes and punishment; and “defense parity,” institutional and
procedural guarantees of substantive equality between the defense and prosecution before and
during trial. The dissertation argues that the implementation of defendant rights and the quality
of fairness thereby achieved by trials are weakened by the effect of two political features of
international criminal justice: institutional power and human rights bias towards prosecution.
First, institutional power is exercised by states and intergovernmental organizations through the
creation and modification of the structural and procedural rules that shape the legal interaction
between the major participants in trials—judges, prosecutors, and defendants and their counsel.
iv

Second, these political actors demonstrate a bias towards successful prosecution, as a projection
of the victim-focus of the international human rights protection regime into criminal justice.
These issues are explored through case studies of the Yugoslavia tribunal and the International
Criminal Court. The effect of these factors on the pre-trial and trial dynamic between the
prosecution and defense is to generate significant weaknesses in the ability of defense counsel to
adequately represent their clients. International criminal trials are as a consequence significantly
less fair and legitimate than is commonly presumed.
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Introduction
Global governance1 “continues to become a salient, albeit contested, political concept,”2 with
international institutions exercising significant influence over decision-making in policy areas as
varied as security, finance, the environment, and criminal justice. These processes have
substantial normative implications. This is especially the case for that subset of global legal
governance institutions related to criminal justice. International tribunals potentially exercise
enormous power over individuals—provided with the authority to remove the liberty of
defendants for decades. The dissertation argues that assessing the legitimacy of such institutions
requires an examination of the substantive and procedural law which underpins the fairness
towards defendants that is the hallmark of liberal legal standards of criminal justice. This
constitutes a “legal legitimacy:” the legitimacy inherent to the operation of a legal system
through the implementation of liberal legal norms.
In exploring legal legitimacy, the research demonstrates that the criminal law processes
utilized to determine guilt or innocence within international courts are not isolated from political
interference from the states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) which create them and
whose cooperation such courts require for their operation. This lack of separation between legal
process and the political goals and preferences of state and IGO actors influences the trial and

1

Global governance is “the maintenance of collective order, the achievement of collective goals, and the
collective processes of rule through which order and goals are sought.” See James N. Rosenau, “Change,
Complexity, and Governance in a Globalizing Space,” in Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and
Democracy, ed. Jon Pierre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 175.
2
Richard Higgott and Eva Erman, “Deliberative Global Governance and the Question of Legitimacy:
What Can We Learn from the WTO?” GARNET Working Paper No: 53/08, August 2008,
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/garnet/workingpapers/5308.pdf.

1

pre-trial dynamics between the prosecution and defense, potentially undermining the validity of
trial outcomes and the legitimacy of the process of determining guilt or innocence.
High standards of legal justice, free from political influence, are necessary for maintaining
the integrity of the fundamental principle of genuine trials: the presumption of innocence of the
defendant. Trials operating without effective legal guarantees risk descending into political show
trials. Nevertheless, the states, IGOs, and international human rights organizations involved in
international criminal justice tend to advocate successful prosecution while paying inadequate
attention to the legal rights of defendants.
This ultimately undermines some of the primary objectives of prosecution within the
international human rights regime: deterrence, recognition of victim suffering, and transitional
justice. Trials which experience political influence run the risk of undermining the search for
truth and accountability that is at the heart of criminal justice, and may find innocent people
guilty.
In determining the significance of research on legal fairness in international prosecutions, an
important question is whether the weaknesses in legal legitimacy explored in this research have
led to miscarriages of justice. The answer is twofold. First, in the sense that justice is
conceptualized in the research, the answer is “yes:” whenever standards of fairness fall
significantly below those examined here, and the accused has not been given adequate
opportunities to defend him- or herself, justice has not been served. As stated by European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR), procedural inequalities themselves constitute violations of legal
justice.3 Requiring evidence of actual prejudice undermines the value of these rights—a violation

3

ECtHR, Lanz v. Austria, no. 24430/94, January 31, 2002, 58.

2

is the wrong itself. Wrongful conviction would be a further—moral—violation stemming from
the normative rights violation.
Second, in the more substantive meaning of miscarriage of justice as actual harm or wrongful
conviction, the answer remains “yes.” In many instances it is difficult to determine the extent to
which violations of rights have led to wrongful conviction. An external appeals process provides
one of the strongest avenues for determining this, yet appeals processes at international courts
are heard by chambers sitting within the structure of the original convicting court (the chamber
of first instance) and are subject to the same procedural limitations and political influences as
those chambers. Determining wrongful conviction also ideally requires assessing the impact of
evidence on the judges hearing a case. This is also very difficult to assess.
Nevertheless, weaknesses in legal legitimacy at international courts have on occasion
demonstrably affected the outcomes of trials. A prominent example, discussed in Chapter 4,
involves the conviction of General Tihomir Blaškić of Croatia by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Croatian government refused to hand over
potentially exculpatory evidence to the general’s defense team, being reluctant to cooperate with
the court for fear of legitimizing its prosecution of one of the commanders in the country’s war
of independence from Yugoslavia. Within days of his conviction in March 2000, the
government, realizing that its political stance had backfired, released thousands of pages of
documents to the court,4 some of which were utilized in his appeal. The ICTY appeals chamber
subsequently determined that Blaškić had been wrongfully convicted on 16 of the 19 charges,
reducing his sentence from 45 years to nine.
4

Gregory S. Gordon, “Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and
Limitations,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 45, no. 3 (2007): 678-9.

3

Despite these issues, scholarship within international relations (IR) has tended to overlook
the importance of criminal procedure to assessments of the legitimacy of global legal
governance. Partly responsible is an underappreciation of how legal theory, or jurisprudence, can
contribute towards a better conceptualization of how legal processes shape the legitimacy of
legal institutions. The dissertation utilizes a jurisprudence that facilitates our understanding of
legitimacy within criminal justice institutions by placing legal procedure and the role of the
defendant at its heart—with the defendant and their counsel conceptualized not as passive agents
but as central actors in criminal justice.

Examining the role of politics in shaping legal processes
The role of power in shaping the nature, trajectory, and legitimacy of global governance is
increasingly explored within IR.5 Meanwhile the effect of power on the legitimacy of trials
through defendant rights at international tribunals remains underexplored. The dissertation
addresses these lacunae in IR’s understanding of criminal law and procedure, the role of the
defendant, and the effects of power on legitimacy.

5

See especially the contributions to Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds., Power in Global
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also the contributors to Jennifer Clapp
and Doris Fuchs, eds., Corporate Power in Global Agrifood Governance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2009); Molly Ruhlman, Who Participates in Global Governance? States, Bureaucracies, and NGOs in
the United Nations (London: Routledge, 2014); Rita Abrahamsen, “The Power of Partnerships in Global
Governance, Third World Quarterly 25, no. 8 (2004): 1,453-67; and Andrew Hurrell, “Power and
Legitimacy in Global Governance,” paper at workshop on global governance, Princeton, February 2006,
www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/normative/papers/Session4_Hurrell.pdf.

4

The research demonstrates that the states that create and maintain international courts wield
“institutional power”6 in relation to criminal defendants which shapes the legitimacy of trials.
This is power exercised through the creation and modification of the structural and procedural
rules that shape the legal interaction between the major participants in trials—judges,
prosecutors, and defendants and their counsel—including what charges can be brought against an
accused, and how investigations and trials can be conducted. The effect of this power over the
ability of defendants to gain a fair trial is shaped by the self-interested decision-making processes
of states, interstate bargaining during treaty negotiations, and states’ conceptualization of
international justice. There is an overemphasis in international criminal justice on the justice of
prosecutions, rather than that of the fairness of trials. This leads to success being perceived in
terms of the number of convictions, not by the strength of structural and procedural protections
for defendants from the power imbalance criminal courts create between the defense and
prosecution. The, largely powerful and Western, states which have been most responsible for
creating international tribunals tend to perceive international criminal justice as an extension of
the international human rights regime, which has led to a laudable focus on victims—on
recognition and justice for them—which has had the effect of weakening protections for
defendants.
Other relevant factors are the massive scope of international trials (especially those of top
leaders), driven by the need to satisfy victim groups and for narrative construction purposes; the
tribunal rule changes adopted to respond to UN and state pressure to speed up trial proceedings;

6

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59,
no. 1 (2005): 39-75, and “Power in Global Governance,” in Power in Global Governance, ed. Barnett and
Duvall, 15-17.
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the incoherent hybrid nature of procedures; and lack of concern with the defense function by the
creators of the court, partly due to a lack of understanding of the role of the defense. The
dissertation demonstrates that the exercise of institutional power and systematic human rights
bias towards successful prosecution have generated a level of legitimacy through fairness
towards defendants in international criminal justice that is less robust than is generally claimed
within the academic literature.
The limited appreciation of the role of defendants and their legal rights is responsible for the
common narrative among historians and political scientists of the development of international
criminal justice as one of a good but flawed start followed by immense progress in terms of
fairness towards defendants and thereby justice served, to a state of genuine fairness today. The
trial origins of international criminal justice at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at
Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at Tokyo are
assumed or claimed to demonstrate morally acceptable levels of trial fairness towards
defendants, but institutional and judicial process issues of fairness towards defendants are rarely
discussed.7 When problems with these tribunals’ fairness are analyzed, the focus is largely on
selectivity of defendants chosen to stand trial (the “victor’s justice” argument), and the
prohibition on defendants discussing alleged Allied crimes.
The retroactive enforcement of crimes against peace and crimes against humanity at these
courts has also been explored,8 but rarely the institutional and procedural fair trial rights of
7

E.g. Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 533-5;
Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); and Robert E. Conot, Justice At Nuremberg
(New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1983).
8
E.g. Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law
Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 36-47. Legal scholars, however, have addressed

6

defendants.9 The only judicial fairness issues frequently raised are the lack of an appeals process,
and the partiality of the judges.10 In the end, it is commonly accepted that despite the tribunals’
faults the Allies eventually chose the legal justice of genuine criminal trials over the political
justice alternatives proposed at the time for the Nazi and Japanese leadership—show trials or
firing squads.11
High levels of fairness are presumed to characterize the re-awakening of international
criminal justice after the Cold War, with the creation of international and hybrid (international–
domestic) courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).12 It is
generally accepted that the fair judicial processes which are assumed to operate in liberal
democratic states also do so fully within international courts, and the latter’s guilty verdicts
therefore represent international justice served.13

the trial fairness at Nuremberg, including, Tonya, J. Boller, “The International Criminal Court: Better
than Nuremberg?” Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 14, no. 1 (2003): 279-314.
9
An exception is Dan Plesch, Human Rights After Hitler (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, forthcoming), which more extensively discusses issues of fairness towards defendants, and
concludes that standards were reasonable.
10
Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 83-4. IMTFE judges William Web and Delfin Jaranilla had participated
in the Australian War Crimes Commission investigations into Japanese atrocities, and had been a prisoner
of war on the infamous Bataan Death March in the Philippines in 1942, respectively.
11
E.g. Richard Goldstone and Adam Smith, International Judicial Institutions: The Architecture of
International Justice at Home and Abroad (London: Routledge, 2009), 40-64 (even though legal
professionals, their analysis follows the standard narrative and has little to say about trial fairness); Dan
Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN (London: I.B. Taurus, 2011), 101-11; and Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay
the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2000), 147-205.
12
E.g. David J. Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse Than War: Genocide,
Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009).
13
E.g. Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 2nd ed. (New
York: The New Press, 2002), 391-2; David P. Forsythe, “‘Political Trials’?: The UN Security Council and
the Development of International Criminal Law,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International

7

In contrast, the dissertation challenges not only this narrative, but the assumption that global
legal governance institutions are able to perform broader human rights and political functions
while maintaining sufficient standards of fairness. Arguably the concern with victim rights
manifested by international prosecution has swung the pendulum too far towards ensuring
successful prosecution, undermining the rights of defendants. The political goal of historical
narrative construction may also weaken those rights, especially in the case of high-profile
accused, such as Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić, where Western states and
international prosecutors may be keen to present a particular political narrative which
delegitimizes the defendants’ actions while legitimizing those of their international political
rivals.

The research’s contribution to IR scholarship
In challenging the narrative of fairness within the evolution of international criminal justice, the
research does not propose a new answer to an old question, but rather poses a new question in IR
scholarship: How does the legal power dynamic between the individual—in this case
defendants—and global legal governance institutions and their creators shape the legitimacy of
international criminal courts? Other institutional and procedural input and output criteria
discussed in Chapter 2—including autonomy, representativeness, and accountability—are also

Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 492; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Perennial Conflict Between International
Criminal Justice and Realpolitik,” Georgia State University Law Review 22, no. 3 (2006): 557; and
Richard Goldstone, “The Crime Prevention Potential of the International Criminal Court Depends Upon
its Credibility and the Support it Receives from Governments and Especially those of States Parties to the
Rome Treaty,” in Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H.
Steinberg (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2016), 213-19.

8

acknowledged to be important sources of legitimacy, but legal fairness towards defendants is an
overlooked source.
The dissertation contributes to IR research by utilizing legal theory to address two specific
lacunae in the literature on the legitimacy of global legal governance: the manner in which law
itself generates legitimacy as a distinct social structure and process, leading to a focus on legal
principles and criminal procedure; and the importance of analyzing the role of the principal
individual in criminal trials, the defendant. The project also contributes to the literature on
institutional power by exploring the political effects on defendant rights of the decision-making
power of states and IGOs in the establishment and modification of the rules of international
criminal tribunals.14
To address these weaknesses, the dissertation analyzes the intrinsic qualities of liberal legal
practice which generate fairness towards legal subjects through their effect on the trial process.
These qualities are argued to be a necessary but not sufficient source of legitimacy. In terms
utilized by José Alvarez to describe approaches to the democratic legitimacy of global
governance, the argument in the dissertation—legal legitimacy through liberal norms—is
institutional, vertical, and liberal:15 the dissertation focuses on global governance institutions and
their relationship to individuals, and it takes a substantive and procedural human rights-based
approach to the source of legitimacy. Utilizing legal theory, the dissertation argues that law
14

The literature on institutional power includes examinations of international criminal justice, but not of
the impact of rule-making power on legal fairness. For other research on institutional power and tribunals,
see, e.g., L. Rush Atkinson, “Knights of the Court: The State Coalition Behind the International Criminal
Court,” Journal of International Law and International Relations 7 (2011): 66-103.
15
José E. Alvarez, “Introducing the Themes: Introduction to Symposium on Democratic Theory and
International Law,” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 38 (2007): 159-74. Instead of
institutional, approaches can be sociological; instead of vertical, horizontal (relationship with other
institutions); and instead of liberal, based on representativeness or participation. See the first section of
Chapter 2 of the dissertation for a more detailed discussion of these terms.

9

embodies a distinct social structure and process, whose impact on criminal defendants is central
to a determination of the legitimacy of courts. The research utilizes legal theory to identify and
examine the most important features of a criminal justice system to its legitimacy through fair
trials: these features, which constitute the research’s dependent variables, are “legality” and
“defense parity.”
Legality is the extent to which the standards enforced by a court have achieved the status of
law. This involves determining to what extent laws are being enforced retroactively, and the
level of clarity and specificity in a law that enables it to effectively communicate to individuals
what specific behavior is prohibited. Legality is concerned with the substance of crimes, in this
case the mass atrocity crimes of international criminal justice—genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. The international laws prohibiting these crimes were largely
developed by states over the course of the twentieth century, due to a concern with the protection
of the rights of all individuals, and especially victims.
Defense parity consists of the level of structural and procedural protections provided to
defendants before and during trial, in order to ensure a fair trial in the light of the institutional
advantages enjoyed by legal authorities, exercised through the prosecution, in relation to the
accused. In contrast to legality, the core protections of defense parity are derived from domestic
criminal law procedure, are concerned solely with the rights of the accused, and underwent far
less international legal evolution during the Cold War. Such protections have instead largely
been left to post-Cold War international courts to develop in an ad hoc fashion.
Legality and defense parity are implemented by courts and so enable an exploration of the
legal power dynamic between individuals, the primary institutions of global legal governance,
and the states and IGOs which create their rules and shape criminal investigations. They also
10

enable an examination of the two primary components of international criminal law: legality is a
principal feature of substantive criminal law, and defense parity of criminal procedure.
The project explores these criteria of legal fairness in relation to two case studies of
international courts which represent distinct sources of authority and political context: the ICTY
and the ICC. The ICTY has jurisdiction over a single conflict and was created by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, while the ICC has potentially global
jurisdiction and was created by states through a treaty process. The research demonstrates that
the practice of courts in relation to defendants is characterized by continuing significant—and in
some aspects worsening—weaknesses in terms of institutional and procedural fairness towards
defendants. These problems are significantly due to the institutional power of states as exercised
through the creation of the structural and procedural rules of international tribunals.
This power influences fairness through the impact on rule-making bargaining of three
primary political factors. First, the structure and operational rules of international courts creates
dependence on the support and cooperation of external actors—especially states and IGOs. This
leaves tribunals vulnerable to manipulation for state ends and to the concerns of states, and
harms the parity in investigations by the prosecution and defense teams.
Second, the conflicting dynamic between the major protection focus of the international
human rights regime (that of victims) and that of criminal justice (defendants) has led to
insufficient attention by states in the construction and operation of courts to the provision of
adequate protections for defendants. This has been exacerbated by an insufficient placement of
importance and understanding of the role of the accused and defense counsel by states, the UN,
international juridical actors (judges, prosecutors, and court staff), and human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). While a poor understanding of the role of defense is
11

also prevalent at the domestic level, its consequences are exaggerated at the international level
due to the effect of the political goals and concerns of states in relation to international trials.
This has weakened both legality and defense parity.
Third, there has been significant political pressure on courts by their funding states to
decrease the length and cost of trials. This has led to rule changes that have undermined aspects
of defense parity. States have tended to privilege legitimacy through the perceived effectiveness
of speedy trials over the normative legitimacy of legal fairness. The dissertation’s exploration of
legal protections for defendants complements the extensive and growing body of IR research on
such normative sources of legitimacy in international law as the content of laws; non-legal
inputs, such as transparency and accountability; and institutional outputs such as the
effectiveness of institutional decision-making.16

The importance of research on global legal governance
Defendant rights constitute a significant component of tribunal legitimacy and of the power
dynamic within the international system between its traditionally dominant collective actors—
states and IGOs—and individuals. The individual has been increasingly acknowledged and
incorporated into international law since 1945—especially through the development of
international human rights and humanitarian law—and global legal governance is recognized as
a key component of this development.17
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See Chapter 2 for a discussion of these sources of legitimacy within international criminal justice.
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and Global Governance,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616
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International criminal law is inherently at odds with the rest of public international law in
several ways. The purpose of the latter is the collective self-regulation of the international
behavior of states, whereas that of criminal law is shaping the conduct of individuals and
punishing non-compliance, especially through imprisonment. General public international law
applies largely to states, with the two primary exceptions being piracy—outlawed for over 200
years—and rebel groups in armed conflict.18 There has traditionally been little accountability for
individuals for breaches of international law,19 and state responsibility is civil, not criminal—it
carries no penalties such as imprisonment for officials, only the duty of reparations. In addition,
traditionally a state’s obligations under international law are not absolute, but are dependent
upon similar compliance by other states—this is the principle of “reciprocity” in international
law.
In contrast, international criminal law is a mixture of international humanitarian and human
rights law with domestic criminal law that provides for individual accountability.20 International
humanitarian law proscribes certain behavior during armed conflict and consists of over 90
treaties. The post-Nuremberg broadening of international criminal responsibility to include
actions outside of and during armed conflict against one’s own citizens reflects the incorporation

Governance 7 (2001): 19-23; and Thomas G. Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance and Global
Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 795-814.
18
The civil war provisions of international humanitarian law—Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II—apply to all belligerents. The Security Council has applied
wide-ranging targeted sanctions—e.g., arms and oil embargoes, and travel ban—on such non-state actors
as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (1993-8).
19
The recent and controversial exception is the Security Council’s targeting of individuals—in
government and non-state groups—with sanctions but without a process to determine wrongdoing. For
example, it applied wide-ranging targeted sanctions—including arms and oil embargoes, and a travel
ban—on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in resolutions 864 (1993), 1127
(1997), and 1173 (1998).
20
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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of international human rights law. This individualization of international law is a profound
change that broadens the subjects of international law from states, denies immunity to state
officials for international crimes, and introduces punishment. Furthermore, international criminal
obligations are an important aspect of the modern international legal movement towards absolute
community obligations owed to all—international criminal obligations are not dependent upon
reciprocal behavior by others.21
The operation of criminal justice within a liberal legal system is inherently concerned with
protecting the individual against the domestic power of the state. Mediating between that
protection and the external goals of the state continues to be a struggle in global legal
governance. Nevertheless, the role of the principal individual in criminal trials, the defendant, is
little explored in political science research on the legitimacy of courts. In addressing this, the
study contributes towards understanding the political dynamics behind the process of
incorporating the individual into the international legal system.
The research also attempts to deepen our understanding of the dynamics within the
international human rights regime by exploring how the conflicting legal and political goals of
international criminal justice harm as well as promote human rights. International prosecution
advances the rights of the victims of gross human rights abuses—by acknowledging suffering
and providing accountability, for example. However, the political goals of powerful, especially
Western, states in creating and cooperating with such courts conflict with the need to maintain
fair standards for defendants in order to achieve justice for victims through accurately
determining guilt.
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Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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The appropriateness of international prosecution for mass atrocity crimes is also questionable
because it assumes individual criminal responsibility, positing that there is an applicable analogy
to be made with domestic prosecution for such crimes as murder and rape. However, mass
atrocity crimes tend to result not merely from individual actions but from social norms, and often
political and social structures, that are at least permissive, if not encouraging, of attacks on the
victims, who are frequently from another identity group, which the perpetrators see as an enemy.
The dissertation questions whether the political goals of international prosecution—individual
accountability, victim recognition, narrative construction, delegitimizing perpetrators, and
peacebuilding—make international criminal justice an appropriate vehicle for promoting human
rights in the wake of mass atrocity crimes.

Organization of the dissertation
Chapter 1 explains the project’s argument, including the contribution of legal theory to IR, and
the dissertation’s research design. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical background to the study by
exploring the relationship between political science and legal approaches to examining the
legitimacy of global legal governance. It explores the utility of legal theory to understanding the
nature of law as a set of distinct social processes and structures.
Chapter 3 examines the domestic and international development of legality and defense
parity, and their relationship to the evolution of criminal justice. First it examines how legality
and defense parity developed as core components of criminal justice at both the domestic and
international levels. It then explores the evolution of international criminal justice, including the
changing role and protections for defendants. The final section analyzes defense protections at
the first modern international criminal tribunal, the IMT at Nuremberg, in more detail in the light
15

of these developments. This provides an overview of indicators of defendant protections and the
influence of institutional power in order to enable a comparison to the standards of current courts
in the case studies, and to critically analyze the narrative of international criminal justice in
relation to the empowered role of the defendant.
Chapter 4 examines legality and defense parity at the first post-Cold War international
criminal tribunal, the ICTY. It begins with an overview of its origins and the political and legal
reasons to establish an international court after a hiatus of almost 50 years, and how these issues
influenced the initial decisions relating to the project’s fairness criteria. These issues are then
examined as the court has developed, as trials have proceeded and as state and UN political
concerns have come to bear on the court’s operation. The chapter analyzes the ways in which the
dynamic between the prosecution and defense at the tribunal have been shaped by the
institutional power of states and the UN Security Council.
Chapter 5 approaches the issues explored in Chapter 4 in relation to the first permanent court,
the ICC. It has been in existence for nine years fewer than the ICTY, and as of October 2016 has
completed six trials. The chapter demonstrates how the institutional power of states in
establishing the court, and its distinct relationship with state members, have impacted the defense
protections the ICC provides, and how these protections have been shaped by the legacy of the
ICTY.
The conclusion, Chapter 6, illustrates the disconnect between the general narrative of fairness
in international criminal justice and the research indictors of legal legitimacy as demonstrated in
the dissertation. It summarizes the case findings as to where legality and defense parity have
been most problematic, and the political influences on courts that are responsible, and how these
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influences differ due to the distinct political and historical contexts and interactions associated
with each court.
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1 The Legal Fairness Legitimacy of Global Legal Governance and
the Influence of Institutional Power
IR research on the legitimacy of global legal governance has to date little studied the legal rights
and procedures that underpin trial fairness, or the role of defendants in the criminal justice
system. It has also thereby not adequately accounted for how political actors influence fairness
towards defendants. Sources of political influence include the institutional power of states in
agenda-setting through the creation of the rules that structure international criminal tribunals; the
state goal of delegitimizing enemies and rivals through the stigma of crime; the huge scope of
international trials, especially those of high-profile leaders due to pressure to satisfy victim
groups and to construct a conflict narrative; the methods adopted to respond to pressure by states
and the United Nations (UN) to speed up trial proceedings; and a lack of apparent concern with
the defense function by the creators of the court, due to poor understanding of the role of the
accused and defense counsel in criminal trials.
The dissertation utilizes legal theory to structure an examination of the legal rights and
procedures that shape the fairness of international trials towards criminal defendants. It
demonstrates that in creating and modifying the rules which shape the operation of international
criminal tribunals, states exercise what Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval have labeled
“institutional power” over defendants—the socially diffuse power of spatially and temporally
distant political actors to influence those operating within international institutions through
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setting the rules of the game which structure the environment within which they must act.1 In
bargaining over the creation of structural and procedural rules states attempt to “lock in” their
conceptions of justice and fairness2 to the functioning of a court. This conception tends to
privilege the role of victims to the detriment of that of the accused, particularly through
inadequate attention to the structural and procedural balance between the prosecution and
defense that is required for fair trials.
The attitude of tribunal actors towards the accused also shapes trial fairness. Prosecutors are
an arm of the international criminal justice system, tasked with finding justice, not simply
proving the accused guilty, and yet their utilization of the political advantages of their position
leads to further imbalances in the courtroom dynamic between prosecution and defense. These
advantages include access to diplomats and to IGOs such as the UN Security Council. The dual
role of prosecutors exacerbates the shortcomings in states’ conceptions of justice as the latter
provide pre-trial support to the prosecution that is far less frequently available to defense
counsel. The powerful state and IGOs actors that are involved in the creation of courts, and
support their operation, also demonstrate a bias towards aid to the prosecution and a resistance to
aiding the defense. Examples include the United States, France, and the United Kingdom within
the Security Council in relation to the ICTY; and the European Union in relation to the ICC.
These power dynamics all shape the ability of the accused to gain a fair trial.

1

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59,
no. 1 (2005): 39-75, and “Power in Global Governance,” in Power in Global Governance, ed. Michael
Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15-17.
2
Ethan B. Kapstein, “Power, Fairness, and the Global Economy,” in Power in Global Governance, ed.
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 82.
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Approaches by legal scholars that focus on the distinctive properties of law have “no
counterpart among political scientists, who have shown little interest in the legitimacy of
international law as such.”3 In IR, the legitimacy of law is largely explained as stemming from
generic characteristics of institutions;4 the substance of laws;5 democratic input criteria such as
accountability and transparency;6 or managerial output criteria such as effective problemsolving.7 The dissertation essays a remedy to this situation through an analysis of the role that
distinctly legal processes play in understanding the legitimacy of global legal governance.
Also undervalued in IR is the importance of understanding the role of criminal defendants to
the legitimacy of international courts through the fairness of their trials. Human rights
approaches to international criminal justice focus on the role of victims and tend to neglect that
of defendants, or effectively write them off as war criminals. The protection of the basic rights of
individuals against bodily harm is one of the primary functions of criminal justice in a liberal
legal system. However, when crimes occur it is often overlooked that such systems have a
normative and legal obligation to protect the human rights of all legal subjects—not just those of
ordinary citizens and the victims of crime, but, importantly, those of criminal defendants too.
The latter are commonly conceptualized in international human rights discourse as criminals
3

Daniel Bodansky, “Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations,” in Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff
and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 324.
4
Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
5
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.
6
Jan Wouters and Nicolas Hachez, “Transitional Societies and the Rule of Law: A Benchmarks
Approach,” Working Paper No. 47, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Catholic University
Leuven, March 2010.
7
Jason Ralph, “Anarchy is What Criminal Lawyers and Other Actors Make of It: International Criminal
Justice as an Institution of International and World Society,” in Governance, Order, and the International
Criminal Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court, ed. Steven C. Roach (New York:
Oxford University Press), 133-53.
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whose impunity needs to end. The importance of the accused and their counsel to the legitimacy
of criminal justice is insufficiently recognized. As acknowledged by Judge Patricia Wald of the
ICTY: “A vigorous, un-intimidated, knowledgeable defense is the sine qua non of a fair trial.”8
IR scholars, even those trained as lawyers, rarely have expertise in criminal law and
procedure, and thereby lack an adequate understanding of the role of the accused during criminal
trials and the function of defense counsel. For the legitimacy of global legal governance to be
better understood, research requires a conceptualization of law that adequately takes into account
the role of liberal legal norms, and the roles of lawmakers and legal subjects in legal governance.
The dissertation assesses legitimacy by analyzing institutional and procedural issues that
contribute towards fairness for defendants by providing them with protections from arbitrary
enforcement of law, and opportunities to prepare and conduct a trial. It also explores how this
fairness is shaped by the relationship between the accused (and defense counsel) and various
juridical actors (prosecutors, judges, and court staff) and political actors (states and IGOs). In
relation to the latter, according to Theodor Meron courts require greater autonomy for their
legitimacy than other types of IGO,9 and this applies not just to the sort of institutional autonomy
already explored from IR and comparative politics perspectives,10 but independence from
political inference in the role of courts in protecting the rights of the accused.

8

Patricia M. Wald, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some
Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an international Court,” Journal of Law and Policy 87 (2001):
102, quoted in Colleen M. Rohan, “Protecting the Rights of the Accused in International Criminal
Proceedings: Lip Service or Affirmative Action?” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International
Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 289.
9
Theodor Meron, “Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals,” The
American Journal of International Law 99, no. 2 (2005): 259-69.
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Jonas Tallberg, “The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational
Influence,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no. 5 (2000): 843-64; and John Merrills,
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The research utilizes the “political jurisprudence” of American jurist Lon Fuller to assess
legal fairness.11 This approach conceptualizes the nature of law in the political context of a
liberal democratic legal system,12 rather than being an “analytical jurisprudence”—much more
common in legal philosophy—which claims that political context is irrelevant to the nature of
law.13 Fuller’s understanding of law provides a valuable theoretical foundation for the analysis of
legal sources of legitimacy within global legal governance.
Fuller developed an approach to explaining the legitimacy of liberal legal systems that relies
upon the distinctive qualities of fair legal process—fair in the sense of equitable in process and
likely to generate fair outcomes, especially through diminishing arbitrariness. His insights, which
the project applies to global legal governance, include: a social and political conception of law,
especially the relationship between law, morality, and law’s cosmopolitan aims of respect and
inclusion; and his criteria of fair legal process and their embodiment of the human rights aspects
of the criminal rule of law.
Based on this understanding, discussed further below and in Chapter 2, the research
examines the extent to which the laws enforced by international criminal tribunals conform to the
two core aspects of legal legitimacy: the “principle of legality,” and the institutional and
“International Adjudication and Autonomy,” in International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy:
Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order, ed. Richard Collins and Nigel Defense
White (London: Routledge, 2011), 160-77.
11
Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). Other relevant
works by Fuller include “A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin,” Villanova Law Review 10, no. 4
(1965): 655-66; Anatomy of the Law (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1968); “Law and Human Interaction,”
Sociological Inquiry 47, nos. 3-4 (1977): 59-89; and, with Kenneth I. Winston, “The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication,” Harvard Law Review 92, no. 2 (1978): 353-409.
12
Dan Priel, “Lon Fuller’s Political Jurisprudence of Freedom,” Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, part
of a symposium on “The Morality of Law at 50,” Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 55/2013 (2014): 127.
13
For an especially prominent example of analytical jurisprudence see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).
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procedural requirements for attaining a balance between the powers of the prosecution and the
defense in the pre-trial and trial phases—here called “defense parity.” Legality requires that laws
are not enforced retroactively in order to justify prosecution and punishment for an act that was
not illegal at the time of its alleged commission. According to legal scholar Cherif Bassiouni,
legality has several purposes central to the achievement of the normative and legal goals of
criminal justice: “to enhance the certainty of the law, provide justice and fairness for the accused,
achieve the effective fulfillment of the deterrent function of the criminal sanction, prevent abuse
of power, and strengthen the application of the rule of law.”14 Defense parity requires that the
accused be provided with institutional support and procedural guarantees to enable sufficient
opportunities for argumentation to ensure an adequate defense—that is, a reasonable chance to
refute the prosecution’s case. Parity is an essential component of the defendant’s right to a fair
trial through achieving adequate opportunities for legal representation.
These two core aspects of legitimacy through legal fairness are central to the emergence of
the doctrine of the protection of the individual (favor rei, in favor of the accused), which
challenged the dominant approach to criminal law in Medieval Europe as a form of community
retribution—favoring society over protecting the individual (favor societatis).15 In this sense, the
justice for defendants of which legality and parity are central elements developed in conflict with
the substantive justice of identifying and punishing alleged perpetrators—criminal courts
originally developed as institutionalized mechanisms for legitimizing an arbitrary or politicized
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application
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determination of guilt. In liberal democratic states today, in contrast, legal fairness for defendants
is indispensible to a legitimate realizing of substantive justice.
The core features of legal fairness also provide practical guarantees for the two primary
protection functions of criminal justice characterized by liberal legal norms: fair notice of what is
prohibited (legality) and fair adjudication of presumed breaches of law (defense parity).16 They
also aid in exploring the power dynamic between individuals (the accused) and global legal
governance institutions. Furthermore, legality is an important aspect of the dynamic between the
accused and those who create and interpret laws—states, IGOs, and judges—while defense
parity is an aspect of the interaction between the accused and the prosecution (and also involves
states and other non-judicial actors).
The dissertation does not claim to provide a holistic explanation of the sources of legitimacy
within global legal governance. The research acknowledges that there are other procedural (or
input) sources of legitimacy—including aspects of democratic process such as transparency and
accountability, and institutional sources such as judicial autonomy. There are also numerous
substantive (output) sources of legitimacy, including the number of individuals tried, the
deterrence value of prosecutions and their impact on transitional justice. The argument here
focuses on the distinctive qualities of legal procedure that generate legitimacy. This is a
particularly understudied area in international relations and legal scholarship.17
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Paul H. Robinson “Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality,” University of
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The chapter begins by explaining the relationship between fairness towards defendants and
legitimacy, and the central role of legality and defense parity as indicators of legitimacy. The
first section also argues that the institutional power of states in creating tribunal rules is a vehicle
for their political goals to shape defendant rights. In the second and third sections, the chapter
explains the variables and indicators of legal fairness utilized in the research, and those relating
to institutional power and the role of political influences on legal fairness. Finally, the reasoning
behind the choice of the research’s case studies is explained.

The argument: Legal principles as a fundamental source of legitimacy
This section argues that a utilization of legal theory will enable IR scholars to more effectively
understand legitimacy within international institutions. In the research, the approach of jurist Lon
Fuller provides the normative basis for identifying certain features of law as fundamental to the
legitimacy of global legal governance. There are two primary ways in which Fuller’s theory has
previously not been well understood, and has therefore been underappreciated, both by
international legal and international relations scholars. The first is that it does not constitute a
purely legal theory, as common supposed, but a “political jurisprudence” because it aims to
conceptualize the nature of law and its effects in a particular political context—that of a liberal
democratic legal system.18 This makes it distinct from dominant approaches to theorizing
international law, which claim to conceptualize the operation of law regardless of the nature of
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Two exceptions, both from legal scholars who have identified the political nature of Fuller’s
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the polity a legal system is embedded within.19 This contextualization enables the use of Fuller’s
approach to explore how the practice of law within global legal governance institutions
contributes towards their legitimacy.
The second area of misunderstanding is to assume that his legal principles are simply a
checklist of how to establish and sustain a legal system—that they constitute the requirements of
the rule of law.20 The approach instead has a broader aim: to understand how the operation of
law in a liberal legal system is characterized by a reciprocal relationship between legal
authorities and legal subjects. Subjects’ obligation to obey the law is matched with legal
authorities’ obligation to adhere to principles of liberal legal practice.

The distinct relationship between law and legitimacy
A normative standard of legitimacy is one with a moral basis that enables a principled critique of
authoritative institutions and structures, as opposed to a descriptive legitimacy approach, which
is based on breadth of consent or acceptance.21 The normative standard argued for here is based
on legal principles that protect individual liberty in relation to the coercive power of criminal
justice institutions.
Assessments of the legitimacy of international institutions, including courts, tend to focus on
general

institutional

criteria,

especially

autonomy,
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inclusiveness or participation.22 Missing from such assessments is an examination of the features
of law as a distinct social structure and process, which is largely because IR and international
law scholars tend to consider themselves involved in distinct and separate endeavors, with their
own theoretical approaches and methods—and so the former tend not to analyze the components
of law qua law. The relative dearth of research by IR scholars into international law was
examined in recent research on interdisciplinary by Adam Irish, Charlotte Ku, and Paul Diehl,
who found that of almost 300 articles published in seven prominent political science journals
between 1990 and 2010, fewer than five percent involved research on legal issues. They also
found no upward trend towards cross-pollination over this period.23
One consequence of this disciplinary distance is an understanding of international law by IR
scholars primarily as a form of institutionalization of rules.24 Rationalists, such as structural
realists and institutionalists, tend especially to adopt an “external perspective” of determining
law by what states do—which risks conflating law and its effects on state behavior.25 Legal
scholars are generally far more likely than those in IR to adopt an “internal perspective” on how
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international law’s subjects see themselves bound.26 However, even legal scholars rarely apply
jurisprudence consciously to an examination of international legal issues.27
As global governance institutions and structures increase in terms of their number, influence,
and impact on individuals’ lives, the need for them to be legitimate—for their power to be
authoritative and generate a sense of obligation—is of growing importance, as is the need to
understand the sources of that legitimacy.28 This is especially true for criminal justice institutions
and processes, as they have the authority to exert the most coercive influence over individuals of
any governance institution in peacetime.
The individualization of international law is a profound change that broadens its subjects
from states, denies immunity to state officials for international crimes, and introduces
punishment. In beginning to directly address individuals as subjects, and to impose coercive
sanctions on them, the international legal order is starting to take on some of the primary
characteristics of a domestic legal system, something it had not done before 1945. This makes
the application of jurisprudence developed to examine domestic law even more relevant and
potentially valuable in understanding the nature of the international legal order and its
legitimacy.
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To understand the legal legitimacy of global legal governance, it is essential to apply a
conceptualization of the nature and operation of law that is distinct to a liberal political context,
as opposed to an “analytical” jurisprudence, which claims to understand law in any political
context. As stated by Andrew Hurrell: “legitimacy is a political concept and like all political
concepts it is quite literally meaningless outside of a particular historical context and outside of a
particular set of linguistic conventions and justificatory structures. To paraphrase Ronald
Dworkin, legitimacy has no DNA.”29

The principles underlying legal legitimacy
Fuller provides a structural approach to law—one that focuses on the form that law takes in a
liberal legal system: authoritative general rules.30 His approach encapsulates “the morality of the
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules”—a description which
captures the relationship between the interaction of legal authorities and legal subjects, and
legitimacy.31
The implementation of rules in a liberal legal system requires certain procedural and
structural principles that constrain legal authorities.32 These principles demonstrate respect for
the autonomy and agency of legal subjects by authorities, and thereby generate a distinctly legal
29
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source of legitimacy.33 Without these principles, law devolves into the mere imposition of orders
in a hierarchy—and is no longer governance through general rules. The principles constitute an
“ethos” for legal authorities—that is, they are a normative duty required by the form of law.
Their value to the legal subject is a moral one by making consistent and coherent, and thereby
fair, demands that enable freedom of social interaction through stable expectations.34
There are eight such principles, which Fuller labels promulgation, clarity, consistency,
feasibility, constancy, generality, non-retroactivity, and congruence. They are all concerned with
law-making and legal interpretation, except for congruence, which concerns the administration
of law.35 They are not conceived of in binary terms, but can be examined along a spectrum of
adherence by authorities. No liberal legal system is expected to completely satisfy all the criteria;
indeed Fuller called any such ideal-type system a “utopia of legality.”36
The first five are necessary to the effective and legitimate functioning of a liberal legal
system, but also contribute towards the effectiveness of giving orders in a hierarchy.
Promulgation, or publicity, requires that the contents of a law be made available to those subject
to it, so that they can adapt their behavior accordingly, and so that there is opportunity for public
33

Fuller’s approach, Benedict Kingsbury argues, invokes “legality,” which is to make a particular claim
to legitimacy, one that depends on adherence by legal authorities to principles of democratic legal
practice. Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law,” The European
Journal of International Law 20, no. 1 (2009): 39.
34
Rundle, Forms Liberate, 136. These principles reflect and enable efficiency in implementation of a
government’s policies (i.e. they enable law to be effective)—as positivists such as Hart and Joseph Raz
argue; see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979). However, by enabling the treatment of legal subjects as responsible agents they also embody
fairness towards them, and so are inherently normative, constituting an “inner morality of law.”
35
David Luban argues that most of Fuller’s criteria—including non-retroactivity—are not procedural but
substantive, in that they are “content-based conditions” for law. See Luban, “The Rule of Law and
Human Dignity,” 5. While Luban is right that Fuller’s criteria have direct content implications, they are
constraints or minimum requirements for the processes of the creation, interpretation, and application of
law, and as such are procedural in nature.
36
Fuller, Morality of Law, 41.

30

scrutiny and criticism.37 Clarity requires that a law’s substantive prohibitions avoid ambiguity, so
as to more effectively communicate the intent of legislators.38 Consistency requires that a law
avoid conflicting provisions and contradicting prior law.39 Feasibility requires that a law is
realistic, not asking the impossible of its subjects—further enabling the law to act as an effective
guide to conduct. Likewise, constancy through time requires that a law not change its
prohibitions so frequently that its subjects have insufficient ability to adjust their behavior.
The other three principles—generality, non-retroactivity, and congruence—are not necessary
to giving and obeying orders in a hierarchy, do not improve its efficacy, and cannot be expected
by subordinates in such a relationship. These principles are distinct to the creation and operation
of law, and are an essential source of law’s normative value to legal subjects.40 First, laws should
be general, that is, written to apply to a class of people—they are not bills of attainder aimed at
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criminalizing the prior acts of specific individuals or groups. “Generality” is not a feature of
contention in international criminal law and so is not examined in the dissertation.
Non-retroactivity and congruence are explored in more detail below as these are the central
characteristics of legal fairness relied upon to construct the research’s dependent variables of
legality and defense parity, respectively. Non-retroactivity is a requirement that a law not be
enforced in relation to conduct that occurred before the law was created. Non-retroactivity
applies constraints on law-making and prosecution which limit three means of legal control over
an individual in relation to when a prosecuted act was committed. It prohibits: i) prosecution for
an act committed before the law was created, ii) punishment greater than allowed in law at the
time of commission of the act, and iii) a court’s jurisdiction over an individual for courts
established after commission of the prosecuted act. Non-retroactivity is the core of what is
known as the “principle of legality” in criminal law, which is “a requirement that the specific
crimes, punishments, and courts be established legally—within the prevailing legal system.”41
The purposes of the principle of legality are: protecting individual human rights; promoting
the legitimacy of governance; protecting the structure of liberal governance—the separation of
powers—by delineating the lawmaking authority of relevant institutions; and encouraging
effectiveness in the purposes of criminalization (especially retribution, incapacitation, and
deterrence).42 Retrospective legal enforcement does not enable law to act as a guide to conduct,
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and therefore does not respect the agency of legal subjects, capable of adapting to established
rules.43 Such enforcement can be used by governments to persecute rivals through the court
system. Non-retroactivity also generates legitimacy for law by protecting the separation of
powers by restricting avenues of authoritative rule creation by the executive and judiciary.
The last principle, congruence, “the most complex of all,”44 requires that legal authorities’
actions be consistent with—not in breach of—already existing law. Congruence is the most
important principle or constraint to maintaining the “existence of a relatively stable reciprocity of
expectations between lawgiver and subject” that is the basis of legal legitimacy.45 Congruence
embodies constraints on authorities’ administration of the legal system, by which authorities act
to maintain the credibility of the system that is constructed through their adherence to the other
seven principles. Various procedural and institutional constraints constitute aspects of
congruence, especially in relation to the functioning and practice of courts, such as judicial
review, and due process trial protections for defendants. Congruence is explored in the research
through the lens of “defense parity,” which incorporates core due process protections as well as
structural issues that shape the ability of the accused to gain an adequate defense.
The application of these two fundamental principles of liberal legal practice enables the
application of law to embody the fundamental values of human rights: freedom, through self-
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imposed constraint on arbitrary treatment by legal authorities, and equality of treatment.46 The
dissertation argues that this approach can be applied at the international level to assess the
legitimacy of global legal governance by exploring the extent to which international criminal
tribunals demonstrate this reciprocal relationship towards subjects—specifically criminal
defendants—through adherence to these principles.

Research variables
The following section explains the normative and empirical basis for examining legality and
defense parity in the case studies as the key components of legal legitimacy through the
protection of defendants. It then explains the reliance in the research on the concept of
institutional power to encapsulate political influences on legal fairness.
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Dependent variable 1: Legality
The principle of legality is arguably the most essential and basic tenet of law; in liberal legal
systems it is “the most fundamental requirement of natural justice.”47 Legality contains three
main requirements: that there is no retroactive criminal enforcement, no retroactive punishment,
and no retroactive jurisdiction created for courts.48 First, non-retroactivity of crimes requires that
lawmakers do not enforce a law in relation to a situation that occurred before the law came into
effect (no ex post facto application),49 and therefore do not prosecute individuals retroactively.50
Second, non-retroactivity of punishment requires that no one be penalized more harshly than the
law allowed at the time of the prosecuted act.51 Third, non-retroactivity of court jurisdiction
requires that a court prosecuting an individual was endowed with this legal authority before the
occurrence of a prosecuted act, thus prohibiting the construction of special courts for the purpose
of trying specific crimes or expanding an existing court’s jurisdiction for that purpose. The
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normative justifications for the significance to legitimacy of non-retroactivity of crimes and
punishment are explained below: these are the aspects of legality explored in the research.52
Non-retroactivity of crimes is a core requirement in distinguishing criminal law from mere
retribution: law is essentially that which has been previously prohibited by a source of governing
authority. It is also an indicator of legal legitimacy through its role in the protection of
individuals (legal subjects). Non-retroactivity is not only a central requirement of criminal law,
but without it there is no law, per se, only retribution: “[T]he essence of legality is that a person
should reasonably be able to tell what laws will be applied to her or him, and the rest of society
should be able to determine if such laws are being applied arbitrarily to her or him.”53 While the
legitimacy of the prohibitions contained within international laws can be questioned, as such
laws are not created by directly representative legislative bodies (except the European
Parliament), the variable of legality captures the liberal features of predictability and consistent
constraint on lawmaking, and does not judge the legitimacy of the content of laws per se.
The two primary functions of non-retroactivity of crimes in relation to protecting the
individual are that it provides fair notice to legal subjects of what is prohibited, and acts as a
constraint on government abuse of power. Fair notice requires that laws are publically
promulgated when passed so that the prohibitions they contain provide a reasonable expectation
of what behavior is legal.54 This justification is driven by one of the primary functions of
52

Non-retroactivity of court jurisdiction is a more contentious source of normative force as there are
plausible arguments that defendants should not expect international impunity when they are accused of
illegal acts. Author conversation with legal scholar Charles Sampford, St Andrews, Scotland, March 22,
2013.
53
Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 408.
54
Fair notice through the promulgation of laws is effectively “constructive notice”—the legal fiction that
subjects know of a law because it has been publically announced by a governance institution, and

36

criminal law: to act as an authoritative guide to socially acceptable conduct.55 The nonretroactive enforcement of law also enables all legal subjects to observe that those prosecuted
knew their conduct was forbidden by law.56
Non-retroactivity of crimes also acts as a constraint on government abuse, by inhibiting
exploitative and arbitrary action by the state. This is especially important as the coercive power
of the state is directly implicated in criminal law, which exercises its authority in this area with
the highest sanctions—imprisonment and, in many jurisdictions, execution. Non-retroactivity of
crimes also helps maintain a separation of powers. By ensuring that laws must be created by a
body with legislative authority, rather than an executive or the judiciary, it helps limit the ability
of these other authorities to usurp legislative power. In a liberal political system this function
takes on added significance, as the legislature is the only body (in which at least one chamber is)
always directly elected, and thereby directly representative.57 In this sense, non-retroactivity of
crimes also promotes the maintenance of individual freedom.
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Non-retroactivity of punishment, like that of crimes, is not just a negative right, preventing
certain state action. It also encourages positive rights, including consistency of punishment and
thereby equitable treatment before the law, and respect for the autonomy of the individual by
limiting excessive punishment. Until a few decades ago, non-retroactivity of punishment was
often overlooked as a source of significant individual rights, on the basis that individuals should
only be protected by non-retroactivity while they are deemed innocent. Once they have been
found guilty, protection in determining sentencing was thought less important—it “affects only
proven criminals.”58 Consequently non-retroactivity of punishment, or “nulla poena” in legal
terms, has often been seen in domestic legal systems as “the poor cousin of nullum crimin [nonretroactivity of crimes].”59 This has changed over the last half century, as, especially Western,
states have come to view nulla poena not merely as a negative right of freedom from arbitrary
government coercion, but as a requirement of “positive justice,” in that it promotes consistency
in criminal sentencing, helps to protect judicial autonomy (as it guards the judiciary from
political pressure to determine the sentence of individuals of executive concern), and thereby
protects the integrity of the legal system and the public perception of justice.60 Without nulla
poena, criminal punishment would risk becoming totally individualized, diminishing the
protection of individuals before the law and likely leading to broad inconsistency in sentencing.61
David Luban claims that the arguments in favor of the centrality of non-retroactivity of
crimes and punishment to the legitimacy of criminal justice given above do not apply at the
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international level.62 Fair notice is argued not to reasonably apply to such outrageous acts as
genocide—that is, those that may be considered intrinsically wrong due to their egregious nature
(crimes that are mala in se, or “wrong in themselves,” such as murder). Society does not require
these acts to be formally criminalized with specific penalties for individuals to realize that they
are wrong: that is, they are not mala prohibita acts, those that are considered wrong only because
they have been criminalized (such as, arguably, consuming marijuana). In addition, some
extreme atrocity circumstances may not be foreseeable and yet may occur in such a way as to
make non-retroactive prosecution under international criminal law impossible, and therefore
non-retroactivity undesirable. Both of these arguments were used to justify the Nuremberg and
Tokyo prosecutions for crimes against humanity by the lawyers and politicians who constructed
the courts.63
It is argued here that, to the contrary, at the international level as at the domestic, nonretroactivity of crimes and punishment are essential to the realization of individual human rights
and to limit the coercive authority of governance institutions. Fair notice and constraint on
government abuse of power are relatively minimalist criteria of legal fairness in that, while they
provide human rights protections, these are procedural rather than substantive. In addition, while
they originate with liberal conceptions of the rights of individuals, they rely on an unambitious
ideal of fairness in the treatment of individuals: protecting criminal defendants from arbitrary
and exploitative action by the coercive power of authoritative institutions.64
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By providing fair notice at any level of governance, non-retroactivity of crimes exhibits
respect for the worth and autonomy of the individual—the core of international human rights
law. It also ensures community awareness that only those responsible for an atrocity (including
co-conspirators and those with command responsibility), will be held criminally accountable—
that is, that there will be no collective punishment. In addition to providing notice of legal
prohibitions to individuals, non-retroactivity of crimes provides notice to states of their duty
under treaty and customary international law to prosecute or extradite for prosecution those
individuals in their territory accused of relevant crimes, and to prevent those crimes from
occurring. This applies, for example, to states that have ratified the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,65 and the 1984 Convention Against
Torture.66
Nevertheless, non-retroactivity has been a contentious source of legitimacy. The individual
legal justice of which it constitutes part is in tension with the collective societal and political
justice desire for vengeance that occurs in many post-conflict environments. Legal justice may
appear to value procedural protections for criminal defendants above the moral drive to punish
offenders. Non-retroactivity in fact is central to the concept and practice of legal justice—to its
privileging of adjudication by law above vengeance by the state or community. Before the
modern advent of international criminal justice, retributive justice after international conflict
took the form of political or social justice—vengeance against the leaders, and often whole
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population, of the losing side. Such collective punishment by victors has run the spectrum from
perhaps the most infamous early documented occurrence of genocide—the destruction of the
Phoenician civilization at Carthage after its defeat by Rome in the Third Punic War (149146BC)67—to the economically crippling reparations imposed on Germany after World War I by
the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.
The argument that non-retroactivity is a barrier to punishing atrocities invokes a continuation
of the community justice challenge to legal justice. Political and legal justice are distinct in
various ways, including that political justice is legitimized purely by the outcome—have the
losers been punished for perceived wrongdoing against the winners, and punished severely
enough to satisfy the emotional outrage of the winners and victims? In contrast, while successful
prosecutions are important, legal justice is also crucially dependent for its legitimacy on the
fairness of its procedures. Procedural protections for individuals at the state and international
levels constitute a core aspect of the replacement of collective punishment through private
vengeance with the individualization of punishment through public prosecution—the substitution
of public for private justice.
Nevertheless, the idea that non-retroactivity is not, or should not be, a principle of global
legal governance “remains popular today among supporters of international criminal law as a
means to control and punish the worst of the worst in human behavior.”68 By failing to
distinguish adequately between legal and political justice, defenders of the former ignore not
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only that which makes legal justice distinct from mere vengeance, but also undermine a key
source of the legitimacy of global legal governance institutions for criminal justice.
In terms of the government abuse argument for non-retroactivity at the international level, the
weakness of the institutions that constitute international criminal justice mean that such abuse is
widely seen as much less likely. However, as with political authority at the state level, global
governance institutions exercise one of their greatest coercive powers over individuals within the
realm of criminal justice. For example, the first international criminal tribunals of the modern
era, the IMT at Nuremberg and the IMTFE at Tokyo, sentenced 12 and 7 defendants to death,
respectively. And while there is no death penalty at current international tribunals, they can still
impose substantial custodial sentences.69 Adherence to the non-retroactivity of crimes makes it
more difficult for international courts, and the states and international organizations that
authorize them, to use legal means to legitimize their desire for political retribution. On a related
note to the governance abuse issue, non-retroactivity also helps to maintain a separation of
powers at the international level by ensuring that international courts do not exceed their
authority by creating new crimes under their jurisdiction and that the crimes they do prosecute
have broad state support.70
Arguments in favor of adherence to the non-retroactivity of punishment at the international
level rely on similar arguments. Punishment, according to Emile Durkheim, is central to the
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construction and maintenance of norms within society,71 and institutions of international law can
perform similar functions within international society.72 Non-retroactivity of punishment protects
individuals from the arbitrary, inconsistent, and abusive exercise of coercive authority by global
legal governance institutions. Inconsistent sentencing also diminishes the normative value of
prosecuting a crime: those with lesser punishments appear to have escaped full justice, those
with greater may appear to have been treated unjustly, and inconsistency increases the perception
that political considerations have tainted the legal process.
All told, non-retroactivity provides important protections for privileging the individual under
international law. This is a profound shift from the traditional era of international law, where the
individual was purely subordinated to the state. Indeed until the post-1945 era, under
international law the individual had no legal personality, which is “a prerequisite for the capacity
to bear rights and obligations,” according to José Alvarez.73 This change is indicative of a shift
from purely community to individual rights in the international system, challenging the
preeminence of the community at the international level—including in terms of standards of
justice.
Antonio Cassese, first president of the ICTY (1993-7) and of the hybrid (domesticinternational) Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2009-11), has acknowledged that legal fairness
through non-retroactivity of crimes (nullum crimen sine lege) is now seen as more important in
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international criminal justice than the political vengeance of trials with weak protections for the
accused, which featured so heavily at Nuremberg and Tokyo:
In ICL [international criminal law], for many years courts have applied nullum crimen as a
doctrine of substantive justice, that is, a doctrine whereby the legal order must primarily
aim at prohibiting and punishing any conduct that is socially harmful or causes danger to
society, whether or not that conduct has already been legally criminalized at the moment an
act took place. The paramount interest is defending society against any deviant behavior
likely to cause damage or jeopardize the social and legal system. Hence this doctrine favors
society over the individual. Only in recent years has this doctrine been replaced by nullum
crimen sine lege as a doctrine of strict legality.74

Dependent variable 2: Defense parity
This section explains the primary components of defense parity and why it is an essential source
of legitimacy for global legal governance institutions for criminal justice. Protecting criminal
defendants during prosecution at its most fundamental requires applying the core criminal law
principles of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof lying with the prosecution.
Their implementation requires rights to ensure the defense has adequate opportunities to attempt
to refute the prosecution’s case. It is argued here that institutional parity and procedural
guarantees for defendants, collectively termed “defense parity,” constitute the fundamental rights
to ensure adequate opportunities to respond to the prosecution’s case. This acknowledges the
essential role of defense counsel in criminal trials. As stated in relation to the US system: counsel
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“serve as the necessary advocates of defendants’ rights. By fulfilling that role, they vindicate
limits the Constitution imposes upon government power, and assure that the adversary justice
system functions correctly.”75
The two primary aspects of the rule of law are procedural due process and defense
“opportunities for argumentation.”76 Both directly address the rights of criminal defendants and
constitute components of Fuller’s principle of congruence. In the context of a criminal trial, the
purpose of due process and opportunities to argue is to attempt to equalize the resource and
structural advantages of the prosecution, in order to enable the accused to present an adequate
defense. The prosecution is supported by the authority and financial and legal resources of the
state, which provide enormous advantages in pre-trial investigations—gathering evidence and
locating witnesses, for example—and during the conduct of a trial. Defendants require
counterbalancing advantages and procedural protections.
Prosecutors at international courts maintain many of these institutional advantages, including
greater financial resources,77 usually greater access to state territory to investigate crimes, and
much greater cooperation in gathering evidence from state authorities, IGOs such as the UN, and
human rights NGOs. In addition, when states are hesitant to cooperate with an international
criminal investigation, such intransigence tends to benefit the prosecutor and so provides a
further hurdle to mounting an effective defense.78
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“Equality of arms” is a fundamental legal principle whose purpose is to address these
advantages of the prosecution as an arm of legal authority. As criminal law is practiced in the
globally dominant common and civil law systems—the legal basis for all purely international
tribunals79—equality of arms does not encompass the right to substantive equality between
defense and prosecution, but instead a right to confront the prosecution on equal terms.80 This
requires courts to provide institutional and financial resources to the defense, such as immunities
and privileges to facilitate investigation, and public provision of counsel. It also requires two
primary evidentiary procedural guarantees: prosecution disclosure of evidence to the defense
before trial (including exculpatory material), and the “right of confrontation”—that is, the right
to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.81
There is also one area where parity between prosecution and defense could arguably make a
significant difference to trial fairness, but tends to be overlooked in analyses of defense
protections, and is not typically considered as aspect of equality of arms: the institutional
structure of a judicial system.82 Structural parity within the institutional framework of a legal
system between prosecution and defense addresses distinctions in power between legal
governance institutions—and their agents, in this case prosecutors—and their legal subjects. The
concept of structural parity also acknowledges the co-equal function of defense counsel in the
Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate,
2013), 279-82.
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administration of justice, as stated by the American Bar Association: “A court properly
constituted to hear a criminal case must be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the judge
(and jury, where appropriate), counsel for the prosecution, and counsel for the accused.”83
The practice of civil and common law domestic legal systems has been to establish an office
of the prosecutor as an official court body. In many such system, including that of the United
States at the federal and state levels, court systems have also established an office to represent
defense counsel within the legal system’s institutional structure. In most US jurisdictions this is a
public defenders’ office, which is responsible for allocating and paying for legal representation
for defense, as well as representing defendants’ interests within the court system. All
contemporary international courts have followed this practice with regard to prosecutors—all
have an office of the prosecutor—but they have been far more inconsistent in regards to defense
counsel, as explained in the case studies.
The term “defense parity” is used in the research rather than “equality of arms” to distinguish
the standards that are applied in the dissertation and those associated with the latter term. In
omitting structural issues, equality of arms is too narrow to provide defendants at international
tribunals with reasonable opportunities for argumentation. Structural parity is important in
shaping the dynamic between prosecution and defense in decision-making forums within
international courts, including in relation to such important areas for a fair trial as budgetary and
procedural change. Defense parity in the research does include more typical equality of arms
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procedural standards in relation to the gathering and presentation of evidence at trial: disclosure
of prosecution evidence and cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.
However, the research also recognizes that the prosecution has a different task than the
defense, and in some ways a more difficult one: to conduct forensic and other investigations in
order to justify an indictment and to construct a case against the accused at trial. Absent the
support provided to domestic prosecutors by police and allied investigatory structures, personnel,
and resources, prosecutors at international courts require additional resources in relation to
defense to carry out this task. Therefore resource issues are not explored in the research, and the
term “defense parity” is not meant to indicate that broad equality is expected between the parties
in all areas to demonstrate fairness. The term expresses the requirement specifically for structural
parity and evidentiary procedural guarantees.
In contrast to the position taken here, Richard Goldstone, the first chief prosecutor of the
ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), when asked by the author
about equality of arms, argued that it can never be achieved in a criminal trial, whether domestic
or international, due to the numerous resource and institutional advantages held by the
prosecution. Instead of equality he believes that courts should strive to achieve “adequate
representation.”84 This position is problematic because while strict equality is not achievable—
nor desirable, due to the need for resources for international prosecutors to enable them to
investigate crimes, for example—defense parity and adequate representation are not mutually
exclusive, or different points along a spectrum of fairness to the defense, with the latter
presenting a lower standard that courts can more easily be expected to achieve. The dissertation
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argues that adequate representation cannot be achieved unless there is pre-trial and trial parity for
the defense in terms of institutional support and procedural guarantees to balance the inherent
institutional advantages enjoyed by the prosecution. The specific elements of defense parity
explored in the research are delineated in the indicators section below.
Defendant parity is an essential source of the legitimacy of a liberal criminal justice system
because it contributes towards four of such systems’ primary normative, practical, and political
purposes: truth determination, moral retribution, a fundamental human right, and constraining the
coercive power of public authorities over individuals. First, the primary practical function of a
trial is to determine the truth in relation to an apparent breach of law, in order to establish the
facts of a potentially criminal act and the criminal culpability of the defendant. This function
cannot be achieved if the defendant has inadequate protections from the power of the state as
exercised before and during a trial, as, without a reasonable opportunity to refute the
prosecution’s case, the defendant is much more likely to be erroneously found guilty. Second,
moral retribution is severely inhibited by restricting defendants from presenting a sufficient
defense. There is no moral or social justice in finding an innocent individual guilty through trial
standards that undermine the determination of truth.
Third, defendant rights are justified as inalienable legal rights in a cosmopolitan
understanding of universal human rights.85 Elements of a “constitutionalization” of the
international system can be seen in the international right to a fair trial, as an expression of the
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growing role of the individual as a global citizen.86 Fourth, defense parity has distinctly political
implications, acting as a limitation on the power of the coercive authority of legal governance
institutions. Without a serious attempt to achieve and maintain defense parity, trials can be—and
are constantly—misused at the domestic level by political authorities worldwide to delegitimize
political rivals and enemies.
For these reasons defense parity is central to the modern concept of legal justice, as opposed
to the retributive justice of punishment of perceived offenders in order to satisfy popular and
state outrage at the commission of egregious acts. Reasonable protections for the accused before
and during trial distinguish criminal justice from community vengeance. Similarly, at the
international level, the trial right of defendants to institutional and procedural parity is central to
the legitimacy of criminal justice. International criminal justice and its legitimacy tend to be
centered on the trials that courts conduct.87 Its underlying international human rights and
humanitarian norms “build their legitimacy from the bottom up, by the fairness of their
proceedings and the moral power they project.”88 Therefore protecting the accused from the
arbitrary exercise of power by legal governance institutions is the most fundamental aspect of
ensuring a fair trial consistent with the liberal legal principle of congruence with the rule of law,
and with the dignity and human rights of the individual.
Such concern is only heightened by the inherently political context within which
international courts operate. Rather than being created by legislative bodies, as is usual in the
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domestic democratic context, they are established by the representatives of state executives: by a
single state (e.g. the IMTFE), groups of states (the IMT and the ICC), or IGOs (the ICTY and
ICTR). Therefore at the international level, defense protections assume the extra burden of
counterbalancing the potential perception of political bias by significantly inhibiting the ability
of authorities to use the judicial processes to delegitimize opposing states by prosecuting their
leaders. This is especially important to provide the judicial process with broad international
legitimacy in a post-conflict environment in which a court is primarily prosecuting individuals
from one group—such as Nazis at Nuremberg and Hutus at the ICTR.89

The independent variable: Institutional power
The dissertation argues that the institutional power of states has significantly shaped defense
protections. Following Barnett and Duval, power is defined in the research as “the production, in
and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own
circumstances and fate.”90 Institutional power involves the socially diffuse or indirect use of
power by political actors to control others through authority to establish and modify the
resources, and structural and procedural rules within which global governance institutions
operate. As described by Barnett and Duval, “the conceptual focus [of institutional power] is on
the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the
rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or
non-actions) and conditions of existence of others, sometimes even unknowingly.”91 The

89

Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, 191-231.
Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 8.
91
Ibid., 15.
90

51

dynamic operates through spatially and temporally diffuse relations of power whereby A (in the
dissertation largely states) establishes the conditions within which B (criminal defendants and
their counsel) operate.92
Not all actors exercise power equally, with more powerful states tending to be more
influential in generating rules consistent with their material interests and normative values. The
institutions created therefore tend to reflect the preferences of the most powerful states within the
bargaining forum that create them. However, such institutions are not epiphenomenal as the
bargaining processes resulting in rules usually reflect a compromise between multiple actors,93
and such issues as asymmetries of information between agents (international institutions) and
principals (rule creators, largely states) create opportunities for autonomous action.94
Principal-agent theory’s explanation of how agent autonomy is enabled by asymmetries of
information and differing interests between agents and the principals that delegate authority to
them95 may appear to provide a productive avenue for exploring the effect on judicial actors of
rule-making for international tribunals by states. However, the dissertation does not focus on the
autonomy of judicial actors per se—an area already well-explored in the literature on
international criminal justice.96 Instead the lens of institutional power is a more appropriate tool
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for the purposes of the dissertation, which examines the effect of rule-making on the
implementation of the rights of certain judicial actors (defendants and counsel), rather than the
extent and effects of tribunal autonomy.
The dissertation argues that the manner in which institutional power relations operate within
global legal governance, between the states that create tribunals and actors within them, weaken
the tribunals’ legitimacy by impairing the ability of the accused to gain an adequate defense.
States have enormous influence on the operation of international courts, and the fairness they
afford to defendants, through the negotiating processes that lead to the establishment and
maintenance of courts. States’ institutional power has been exercised through decision-making in
various legal environments, including: temporary alliances, such as that which created the
London Charter of the IMT; the UN Security Council, creating the ICTY in resolution 827; and
within treaty-negotiating forums such as the Rome Conference that created the statute of the
ICC.
States have also created rules of procedure and evidence for some courts, and other
subsidiary rules documents, such as definitions of crimes. They have also been responsible for
changes to the rules of some courts. The extent to which powerful states have been able to
exercise an unequal role in shaping rules has varied by forum. At the London Conference after
World War II, for example, only powerful states had a direct role in constructing the IMT’s
rules. The rules for the ICTY established by the Security Council were especially influenced by
the legal preferences of the United States as a powerful permanent member willing to devote
significant resources for this exercise, including in terms of legal expertise. The ICC statute was
(2008): 33-63; and Erik Voeten, “International Judicial Independence,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives
on International Law and International Relations, ed. Dunoff and Pollack, 421-44.
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also substantially influenced by US preferences out of concern by other participants to ensure the
US delegation signed the statute at the end of the Rome Conference. However, subsequent rule
changes have not been shaped by the United States, or other such powerful global actors as
Russia and China, as they have not ratified the statute and are therefore not members of the
forum responsible for rule changes, the Assembly of States Parties.
The role of institutional power in shaping defense protections is a result of states’ material
and normative interests, including their concern to limit the power of courts, and to delegitimize
other political actors. Also relevant to state decision-making in constructing courts is their
particular conception of justice. This tends to privilege the political justice of prosecution over
the legal justice of protecting defendant rights, and is influenced by the non-legal goals of
international criminal justice, such as transitional justice and historical narrative construction.97
Especially the international trials of high-profile military and political leaders can tend to
constitute “political theatre,” primarily concerned with political goals rather than punishment,
which is “almost an afterthought.”98 This focus partly stems from the normative issue of the
inability of any punishment for perpetrators to fit the enormity of their mass atrocity crimes, and
therefore the trial process rather than the punishment must bear the burden of providing justice to
victims. The political functions of international trials, and their potentially distorting impact on
the legal dynamic, means that there is even more pressure than in the domestic context on the
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fairness towards defendants to carry the burden of the international criminal justice system’s
legitimacy.99
Three goals and concerns of states in relation to international trials are explored in the
research as explanations of state decision-making in relation to the establishment and
modification of court rules; all of which tend to be much weaker or absent within liberal legal
governance at the domestic level. First, the goal of transitional justice through ending impunity
and protecting victim groups leads to conflict between the primary protection focuses on
international criminal justice: protecting victims and criminal defendants.
Second, since Nuremberg international courts have self-consciously possessed a historical
narrative creation function,100 whose methods of gathering and presenting historical material it is
argued sometimes diverge from the standards for evidentiary procedures necessary for fairness
towards defendants. Third, state and UN concern with the cost and length of international trials
has led to pressure on courts to reduce both in ways that disproportionately affect the defense.
These problems are exacerbated by a weak understanding of the nature of the role of defense in
criminal trials—by states, IGOs, juridical actors, and NGOs.
These issues all lead to insufficient attention on the role of the accused and defense counsel
during the construction and maintenance of international courts, and in the cooperation afforded
by such actors to evidence gathering by legal teams. Defendants tend to be conceived of by all
these actors as passive agents, acted upon by the international system to determine their guilt,
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and they are often socially and politically condemned before their legal culpability is established
by trial. Each factor is explained in more detail below.
First, in terms of transitional justice, there is a conflict between the protection regimes of
international criminal justice due to the distinct focus of the two primary elements of criminal
law: the substantive law that delineates what is prohibited or required, and criminal procedure,
which determines how the law is applied in relation to prosecutions. Substantive law is underlain
by the responsibility of the state to protect citizens, and the concept of personal responsibility—
individuals can be held criminally responsible for breaching their legal obligations. Criminal
procedure, on the other hand, is governed by the need to protect the human rights of individuals
in relation to state action—in this case, primarily defendants, rather than protecting the victims,
which is the focus of substantive law.101
These conflicting protection goals similarly play out in the international context, through the
disparate emphases of international human rights and humanitarian law vs. international criminal
law and justice. The former are focused on protecting all people from abuses—and providing
justice to victims. This leads, in the context of prosecution, to the goal of ending impunity and
measuring success through the number of alleged perpetrators convicted—especially when they
are high-profile political actors. Liberal criminal justice, on the other hand, aims at protecting the
rights of defendants to ensure a fair, legitimate trial, through the principle of the presumption of
innocence and the rights and obligations stemming from the principle of the equality of arms. It
is by no means clear that political and legal conceptualizations of justice have compatible goals,
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despite the attempt by international criminal justice to utilize legal justice to achieve political
justice.102
The human rights focus of international criminal justice leads to an under-emphasis on the
importance of protecting defendant rights. There is significant resistance to enhancing
protections for defendants among states and within the UN, as this is implicitly perceived as
diminishing the ability to achieve justice through the conviction of “war criminals.” The
quotation marks are used here to indicate the labels used among states, at the UN, by human
rights NGOs, and in international media to socially condemn individuals that have not been
legally convicted in court.103 The public discourse by international media and many governments
tends towards the construction of a “narrative of guilt and innocence.”104 As Hannah Arendt and
others have argued, trials themselves may constitute a formalization through public theater of
this social and political narrative.105
Within such an international political environment, a genuinely fair trial encounters
significant obstacles absent or much weaker at the domestic level. These include an often much
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greater level of cooperation by international actors—states, the UN, and human rights NGOs—
with international prosecutors than with defense counsel, despite the necessary reliance of both
on aid beyond the power of the court to grant directly. Pre-trial narratives may undermine a
defendant’s ability to gain a fair trial via diminished international cooperation with defense
counsel in conducting investigations and accessing evidence.
The reliance by international criminal tribunals on external political actors exacerbates these
problems for defendants. International judicial authorities are reliant on external political, human
rights, and legal actors for support, including: states for financing, arresting suspects, and
providing evidence; the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to issue arrest
warrants; and human rights NGOs to provide evidence. The dissertation demonstrates that this
dependency has tended to be more problematic for the defense’s ability to adequately prepare for
trial than for the prosecution.
Another important consequence of the conflict between human rights and criminal justice
approaches is the increasing focus on, and participation by, victims in international court
proceedings. Victim participation, especially at the ICC, including the establishment of an Office
of Public Counsel for the Victims (OPCV), has arguably added to the burden upon the defense,
distorting the judicial dynamic between prosecution and defense by introducing a third party
with rights against the defense.106 While the human rights focus on ending impunity for mass
atrocities may not appear incompatible with generating fair trials, in practice the criminal justice
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that has resulted from the hybrid of substantial international law and domestic criminal
procedure exhibits a bias towards the rights of victims as an outgrowth of the political functions
of international courts.
The impairment of defendant rights through differential treatment of defense and prosecution
by external actors is exacerbated by the use of international courts by states—those that create
them and those that are state parties—to delegitimize or stigmatize enemy states and rebel
groups,107 and their leaders through prosecution and conviction.108 This has negatively impacted
defense protections by making states reluctant to cooperate with investigations by defense
counsel. The heinousness of the crimes exacerbates this problem, as states and IGOs do not wish
to be perceived as aiding war criminals.109 Stigmatizing media coverage of suspects and
defendants with a presumption of guilt is a further discouragement. A related issue is the use of
indictments by prosecutors to stigmatize suspects, especially if they are thought unlikely to be
caught or successfully prosecuted—that is, a pre-trial legal device is used to condemn suspects
rather than a guilty trial verdict.110
Second, the function of international courts in constructing a historical narrative is explored
as a political issue shaping defense protections.111 The role of courts in illuminating the “truth”
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of mass atrocity acts committed and thereby make denial more difficult has been highlighted by
internal legal and external political actors.112 The research demonstrates Arendt’s contention that
courts’ political function in constructing history risks undermining the legitimacy of trials by
diminishing the rights of defendants,113 including by limiting the ability of high-profile political
defendants to speak—such as Herman Göring at the IMT and Slobodan Milošević at the
ICTY.114 Courts fear trials becoming political theater, but this is almost inevitable with highprofile public and inherently politicized trials. As Martti Koskenniemi notes, they risk ultimately
becoming show trials.115
Third, the length and cost of trials has been an issue for international courts ever since the
IMT and IMTFE, with states and IGOs concerned to complete trials and contain costs,116 and
commentators claiming that long, expensive trials diminish the legitimacy of international courts
through inefficiency.117 This has led to pressure by states to accelerate trials and contain costs,
especially at the ICTY; an agenda which has negatively impacted defense parity through
procedural changes that weaken defense counsel’s opportunities for argumentation. Procedural
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changes at the ICTY are particularly significant as it is perceived by other international courts,
including the ICC, as a model to guide their functioning. There is a trade-off between types of
legitimacy here, with fairness diminished by the attempt to improve efficiency.
The influence of these human rights and political concerns on legal proceedings tends to lead
to an at least implicit bias against defendants by states, and by IGOs such as the UN and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the cases demonstrate, this results in problems
for defense parity, including a weak or nonexistent structural emphasis—when creating and
maintaining courts—on establishing an effective defense office to balance the power of the
office of the prosecutor; an imbalance in the international cooperation afforded to the defense
during pre-trial investigation; and inadequate attention on effective procedural guarantees for the
defense, during courts’ creation and their later development.
The impact of these influences on defense protections is intensified by a poor understanding
of the role of defense counsel in criminal justice by states and human rights NGOs, and even
international judicial actors (judges, prosecutors, and court staff) and defendants themselves. The
roles of defense counsel are as advocate for their clients, and arguably as an officer of the court
and minister of justice.118 It is commonly assumed, if not always articulated, that a successful
defense requires merely “targeting holes” in the prosecution case, requiring “less time and fewer
witnesses,” as stated in a 2005 ICTY appeals chamber judgment.119
A related issue is the impact upon the defendant of the two roles of criminal prosecutors: they
are tasked with winning their side of the case as well as expected to be administrators of
118
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justice.120 These tasks are arguably in conflict and create an unequal dynamic with defendants, as
prosecutors’ institutional advantages, which aid in winning their case, stem from their role as an
arm of criminal justice.121
The attitude expressed in the 2005 ICTY appeals judgment above underestimates the
difficulties for counsel in constructing a defense in the face of the institutional advantages of the
prosecution. This poor understanding also applies in the domestic criminal justice context,122 but
its effect is magnified at the international level due to the impact on defense protections of the
political goals and concerns described above.123 It is often insufficiently recognized that defense
counsel and their function are integral to achieving the trial goals of truth and legal justice. This
also explains why international court structures rarely provide defense with parity to the
prosecution, why pre-trial and trial procedures are inadequate to balance out prosecution
advantages, and why counsel tend to be provided with inadequate institutional support for
defending their clients.
This argument challenges the assumption that there are common norms and knowledge held
in epistemic communities.124 Such communities, or knowledge authority groups, are argued to
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accept the “same cause-and-effect relationships, truth tests to assess them, and share common
values.” They also share “acceptance of a common body of facts,” and a “common interpretive
framework.”125 In relation to international criminal justice, such communities are argued to
consist variously of practicing international criminal lawyers126 or international law scholars.127
However, the position of other commentators is that lawyers do not constitute such
communities in relation to criminal justice.128 This position, which is that taken in the
dissertation in relation to international criminal justice, is that:
[I]t is not easy to apply the model of epistemic communities to international legal experts. As
epistemic communities require shared principled beliefs and a common effort to affect
policy, they cannot be equated with disciplines or professions as a whole, such as the
community of international law professionals. Moreover, one can doubt whether more
specific groups of international lawyers can count as epistemic communities at all, given the
need for shared causal beliefs derived from methods and techniques accepted in the
discipline or profession they practice.129
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As argued in the dissertation, there is no juridical epistemic community sharing norms and
values in relation to international criminal trials. The inherently competitive and confrontational
nature of criminal justice—especially as international courts utilize an adversarial common law
trial structure—is partially responsible; as is the tension between the political protection goals of
international criminal justice (victims) and legal protection focus (defendants).

Research indicators
The section below details the indicators of the dependent variables, legality and defense parity,
and of the independent variable, institutional power, and related political dynamics, along with
the sources of data examined. Measuring legal indicators requires not just examining them as
formal attributes of law but also their implementation to assess the extent to which principles
actually operate in practice to constrain the power of international courts and provide protections
for defendants.130

Indicators of legality
The two primary features of legality are explored in the research: non-retroactivity of crimes and
of punishment.131 The former necessitates that no one is prosecuted for an act which was not a
130
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crime when committed. The contrary is indicated when laws “alter the future legal consequences
of past actions and events to the detriment of their subjects.”132 Determining breaches of the
legality of crimes requires assessing, as stated by the US Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham:
“whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.”133
Non-retroactivity is examined by comparing the substantive law of each crime before the
court—with its effective date being the date the statute came into force—with the substantive
law as understood to exist internationally at the time of the commission of acts before each court.
This in turn requires assessing the nature and extent of prohibitions contained in operative
treaties and customary international law as determined by courts and legal scholars. The sources
examined are courts’ statutes and associated legal documents,134 and existing law as determined
from the assessment of contemporary treaty and customary law, and legal scholarship. The
legality of interpretation135 of crimes by judges at each court is then examined through
assessment of international criminal tribunals’ case law, including the legal reasoning of courts,
dissenting judicial opinions, and scholarly analysis.
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Compliance with the legality of crimes by courts also has secondary requirements: the clarity
and specificity of legal prohibitions.136 Their evaluation involves a qualitative and subjective
analysis of the level of ambiguity and vagueness contained in the language used to describe
prohibitions, and thereby whether they permit excessive judicial discretion. Their exploration in
the case studies relies on the assessments of international legal scholars and an examination of
the case law of each court to determine the effect of the level of clarity and specificity of each
law on their application and interpretation by the chambers. An international court can be
considered to be clarifying existing law in conformity with the principle of legality as long as “it
is a measured clarification or interpretation and the result is consistent with the essence of the
offense and could be reasonably foreseeable…[I]t should not permit judges the freedom to create
law aimed at correcting lacunae of international criminal law.”137
Legality has usually been assessed by legal authorities, including the US Supreme Court, in
binary terms: a law and its application in a particular case are either retrospective or
prospective.138 This approach does not take into account the complexities of determining legality
from its various components and requirements, and so the dissertation’s assessment provides an
assessment along a spectrum with a total breach of legality and complete conformity at the
extremes. To illustrate the inherently subjective nature of the assessment of legality through legal
136
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interpretation, there was dispute over the legal basis of the decision by the appeals chamber of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone to reject a defense challenge to the court’s jurisdiction in
relation to their conviction for the recruitment of child soldiers. The challenge claimed that there
was no international law prohibiting this action at the time of its commission—that is, before
recruitment was included in the ICC Rome Statute’s definition of war crimes, which the Sierra
Leone court relied upon. The court determined that recruitment had already been outlawed in
customary law before Rome, but one judge dissented, in agreement with the position of the UN
secretary-general.139
Non-retroactivity is examined in relation to the three crimes that have been prosecuted by
contemporary international tribunals:140 war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.141
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This enables a comparison between the ICTY and ICC case studies, in Chapters 4 and 5,
respectively, with the origins of the international criminal justice system at the IMT at
Nuremberg, analyzed at the end of Chapter 3. War crimes142 are currently conceived of as grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions143 and 1977 Additional Protocols,144 and what are
known as “the laws and customs of war”—largely the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.145
War crimes depend for their determination upon the context of an international or civil conflict,
and consist of violations committed against different groups—those not or no longer taking part
in hostilities (civilians, POWs, and medical personal, etc.) or enemy combatants—and using
prohibited means or methods of warfare. Prohibited means of warfare include, for example,
poison gases, and prohibited methods include targeting civilians, excessive use of force, and
extreme damage to the environment.146
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Not codified by treaty, the definition of crimes against humanity is largely determined by the
statutes and case law of international tribunals, and customary law, and has varied over time.
Consistent in customary understandings of crimes against humanity has been the existence of
various underlying offenses—including murder, torture, and rape—that must be committed
against civilians. Elements currently also include that these offenses must be committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, and that the perpetrator is
aware of this fact.147
Genocide is codified in the Genocide Convention as having occurred when underlying acts—
including murder and preventing births—are committed against certain protected groups (on the
basis of ethnicity, nationality, or religion) with the intent to destroy that group.148 In this sense,
the substantive law of genocide is similar to that of crimes against humanity and war crimes: its
determination requires underlying offenses committed within a particular context. A major
difference, however, is that the context for genocide requires that the attack on a protected group
is intended to destroy that group. This is known as “special intent.”149 All international crimes
contain both a physical aspect (the act committed) and a mental element (the intent to cause the
harm committed). Determination of genocide therefore requires two kinds of intent in its mental
element: that to cause the underlying offenses and to ultimately attempt to destroy a protected
group through these acts—a particularly high bar in terms proving criminal culpability.150
147
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Assessing the second primary indicator of legality, the level of non-retroactivity of
punishment, requires examining the sentencing guidelines in the relevant international law—
including the operative court statute, secondary rules, and case law—and relevant domestic
law—if the statute requires this—and comparing these to the actual sentences handed down by
each court. Guidelines include sentencing ranges for years of imprisonment, and a delineation of
the manner and extent to which mitigating and aggravating factors may be taken into account.
An important secondary indicator of the legality of punishments is consistency in sentencing.
It is also an indicator of legal fairness through equality of treatment before the law:151 “[o]ne of
the fundamental principles of justice is consistency—like cases should be treated alike.”152 As
international legal scholar Mark Drumbl argues, “erratic sentencing practice [can] also affect the
coherence and legitimacy of the punishing institutions and even…bring the law into
contempt.”153 Consistency of sentences for convictions for similar crimes is therefore examined
within each case study by comparing sentences with the crimes for which individuals were
convicted. Also taken into account was the consistency with which judges exercised sentencing
discretion by incorporating such factors as mitigating and aggravating circumstances into their
decision-making to determine the extent to which the courts have demonstrated a “coherent
judicial approach” to sentencing.154 The sources utilized to examine legality of punishment were
court documents, and secondary legal sources that have analyzed internal consistency within a
court, and that between state and international sentencing.
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Indicators of defense parity
The dissertation focuses on the two most important areas of defense parity that reflect the nature
of the official dynamic between defense and prosecution, and that enable a comparison between
courts: institutional support and evidentiary procedural guarantees. The research excludes such
resource indicators of parity as court provided financing for defense counsel. The prosecution
requires far more resources than the defense at the international level in order to conduct
investigations, as they cannot rely on a police force for this, as would normally occur within a
domestic jurisdiction.155 Therefore financial resources are a less illuminating aspect of parity to
examine at the international level.
The analysis assesses the tendency of each indicator to influence the ability of defendants to
gain a fair trial, which ultimately depends on the relative ability of defense and prosecution
attorneys to utilize the material at their disposal within the courtroom to persuade the judges of
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This is therefore a subjective task. The research provides
examples to illustrate their significance in particular cases.156 It is in the practice of courts that
their fairness is ultimately expressed. As stated by Justice Robert Jackson in arguing for a court
at Nuremberg that would conduct fair trials: “Courts try cases, but cases also try courts.”157
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The normative standards of fairness utilized to assess the indicators of defense parity are
those stemming from the international case law. The primary sources analyzed are the main
bodies that have established case law in relation to the related issue of equality of arms:158 the
European Commission on Human Rights (1954-98), the European Court of Human Rights
(which allowed individual direct access only from 1998), and the UN Human Rights Committee
(which assesses implementation of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
The approach to examining institutional support is described below, then evidentiary
procedural issues. Two primary indicators of institutional support to defendants are analyzed in
the research: structural parity between prosecution and defense in the institutional framework of
a court, and court facilitation of pre-trial investigation by legal teams. Structural parity is a strong
indicator of the ability of the defense to gain an equal voice in court negotiations over rule
changes and allocation of budgetary resources, and therefore also affects the resource and
procedural dynamic with the prosecution. Structural parity refers to the formal position within
the court system of official representation for the prosecution—usually the office of the
prosecutor—and the defense—an office of defense counsel or representation for defense by
another body within the court structure.
Structural parity was assessed by examining the de jure status of the defense office relative to
that of the prosecutor’s office, as delineated in each court’s statute and other operative legal
documents. Then, how the structural dynamic has shaped the defense voice in negotiations vis-à-
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vis prosecution was explored through public institutional documents and interviews with
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other close court observers.
The second aspect of institutional support explored is court facilitation of pre-trial
investigations, including through providing immunities and privileges. Courts may also
encourage cooperation with states and compel witnesses to attend, through applying pressure on
states through public criticism, for example, and issuing subpoenas to witnesses. Known as the
right to compulsory process, court aid in securing evidence for defendants has become an
important feature of criminal justice fairness.159 Compulsory process issues are explored in the
research to determine the extent of institutional support for the prosecution and defense in
conducting pre-trial investigations.160 The examination also explores the cooperation of states
with prosecution and defense teams, the impact this has on trial fairness, and the mechanisms
courts utilize to address obstacles to state cooperation. Data utilized include court documents
(e.g. statutes, motions, and judgments), state and UN Security Council documents (e.g.
resolutions), media reports, memoires of political and legal actors such as state diplomats and
international court prosecutors, secondary historical sources, and interviews with court
observers.
Evidentiary procedural guarantees are examined during the pre-trial and trial phases of
proceedings against a criminal defendant. The pre-trial phase is explored from the time an
159
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accused is provided with counsel. The need for strict evidentiary procedures results from
distinctions between the ability of defense counsel and prosecution to investigate, and the need to
provide the defense with reasonable opportunities to rebut the prosecution’s case.
Two evidence-related procedural guarantees for defendants are examined in the research:
disclosure of prosecution evidence, and the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.
Disclosure is an evidence-access balancing procedure found in common law domestic legal
systems which requires the prosecution to provide the defense, before trial, with all the evidence
(including witness lists) that the prosecution will rely on during trial. It also requires the
prosecution to hand over not only incriminating but also exculpatory evidence in their
possession. Disclosure is especially important for parity in international trials because of their
mixture of common law procedure (an adversarial trial) with civil law rules of evidence. The
latter are far more relaxed than in a common law system, with hearsay and other more
questionable material allowed. Pre-trial disclosure to the defense therefore enables counsel to
respond to the much broader range of disputable evidence that will likely be used against their
clients.161 Prosecutorial disclosure also aids in balancing the disadvantage the defense suffers in
terms of investigative resources: financial, legal, and support from such external actors as states,
IGOs, and human rights NGOs.162 It is considered fundamental to the right to a fair trial by the
European Court of Human Rights.163
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The comprehensiveness and timeliness of disclosure are assessed in the research. Data on
disclosure are not available in a broad and systematic fashion for international courts. Instead the
analysis constructs a picture of disclosure through reliance on court documents, including
censure mentions against prosecutors; secondary sources discussing the issue; and interviews.
The ability to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is a protection procedure provided to not
only balance the prosecution’s ability to cross-examine defense witnesses, but to enable
defendants to face their accusers—a core principle of liberal criminal justice—and to challenge
the evidence being used to attempt to convict them. Assessing opportunities for crossexamination involved exploring the proportion of witnesses that defense counsel were able to
cross-examine in person, and trends over time. Sources of data examined include court statutes
and rules of procedure and evidence, judgments and other official court documents, secondary
academic materials, and interviews with court observers.

Indicators of institutional power
Institutional power was primarily explored by examining the role of states and IGOs in
establishing and modifying the structural and procedural rules of international criminal tribunals.
This involved analyzing the decision-making processes that generated the rules, and interpreting
the reasoning behind state and IGO decisions as an outcome of political bargaining. Factors
explored to assess the extent to which political influences shaped rule-making include references
to actors’ conceptualizations of justice and its requirements—such as privileging the prosecution,
and delegitimizing rivals and enemies—and references to the importance that rules reflect the
2011, www.legalaidreform.org/european-court-of-human-rights/item/203-ecthr-case-summary-natunen-vfinland-31/03/2009.
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requirements of such political goals as transitional justice and narrative construction. The role of
judicial actors (primarily the prosecution and judges) was also examined to assess: their role in
establishing, interpreting, and implementing rules; the manner in which the rules shaped their
interaction with the defense; and the extent to which the rules structure permitted political
influences on judicial actors to shape their interaction with the defense.
Sources examined include official documents delineating decision-making debates, drafts of
statutes and subsidiary rules documents, court legal and administrative documents, IGO
documents, the memoirs of participants, interviews, and secondary literature analyzing rulemaking bargaining by participants and scholars.
Political issues explored as possible influences on the extent of defense protections afforded
by international tribunals are: transitional justice through ending impunity and protecting victim
groups (and the related issue of the delegitimization or stigmatization of enemies); the
construction of a historical narrative; and the length and cost of trials. Their negative effect on
defense protections is examined through an exploration of the cooperation with courts provided
by states, IGOs, and human rights NGOs with pre-trials investigations. Sources include court
documents; media reports; the memoires of political and legal figures; secondary historical,
legal, and political material; and interviews.
Also examined was discourse by court and external actors on the trial process, including preverdict references to the guilt of defendants to determine whether there was an effective
presumption of innocence among external supporters of each court, and the acknowledgment of
the importance of defense protections to trial legitimacy through a focus by external actors on the
fairness of the court process. Sources analyzed include political and media debates on trials, and
secondary historical material. The exploration of non-legal concerns demonstrates the continuing
76

role of external actors in diminishing the legitimacy of global legal governance through
weakening the power of the defendant.

Case studies
The two cases of international tribunals explored in the research are the ICTY (from its creation
in 1993 to 2016), and the ICC (from its establishment in 2002 until 2016). For a critical
comparison of contemporary legal fairness legitimacy with that at the origins of international
criminal justice, Chapter 3 also includes an examination of the research indicators at the IMT at
Nuremberg (1945-6).
The case study method advantage of case comparability is balanced by the disadvantage of
the potential lack of representativeness of the cases for the larger set of units—in this case
international criminal tribunals.164 Where there are few cases examined, as here, there is also a
greater potential likelihood of selection bias, in this case by choosing courts with a particularly
high or low level of legality and defense parity. In the environment of global legal governance,
few criminal tribunals have ever existed, and this study attempts to compensate for the
constraints of selection bias by choosing cases where there is significant variation in the potential
causes and influences upon the dependent variables, including the source and context of the
courts’ creation, and the legal basis of their establishment and maintenance.
The ICTY, the first case, was the first international criminal tribunal established since the
IMT and IMTFE, and has been the model for the later ad hoc, permanent, and hybrid criminal
courts. As such, the ICTY has had enormous influence on the development of the post-Cold War
164
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international criminal justice system, and the level of legitimacy the system has been able to
achieve through legality and defense parity. The tribunal also has the most comprehensive
historical record for assessment of any international court. It is nearing the completion of its
mandate, having finished most of its own prosecutions and transferring other cases to local
courts, as part of its official Completion Strategy.165 As of October 2016, it has completed 102
trials, compared to 75 for the Rwanda tribunal, nine for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and
five for the ICC. Because of the length of time the tribunal has been in existence, and because
various attorneys have already left (and have tended to be therefore more willing to speak
openly), I was able to interview a significant number in relation to the ICTY.
The ICC, the second case, is broadly perceived as exemplifying the future of global legal
governance in relation to criminal justice.166 This is partly due to its permanent status—it is the
first and to date the only international criminal tribunal that was not established to try suspects in
relation to a single territorially- and/or temporally-bound conflict.167 It also enjoys a broad level
of state support, although significantly less so in Africa, and virtually universal jurisdiction
(literally universal in the sense that any situation can be legally referred to the court by the UN
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time-line; and Security Council Resolution 1534, March 26, 2004, which called on the ICTY and ICTR
prosecutors to decide on transferring cases to “competent national jurisdictions” (para. 4).
166
David J. Scheffer, “The International Criminal Court,” in Routledge Handbook of International
Criminal Law, ed. William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (London: Routledge, 2013), 67-84; Steven Ratner,
Jason S. Abrams, and James L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International
Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 230-45; and
Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 2nd ed. (New York: The
New Press, 2002), 346-92.
167
For several years the African Union has moved towards establishing a criminal chamber within the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which is seen by some as a challenge to the authority of the
ICC in Africa. See Chacha Bhoke Murungu, “Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 9, no. 5 (2011): 1067-88.
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Security Council). The ICC has only tried a handful of cases to date, meaning that its
examination in the research perforce is able to rely less on case documents and other evidence of
trial practice and the interaction of prosecution and defense attorneys with state and other outside
agencies. This is especially true in comparison to the ICTY case. Nevertheless, the court was
chosen because of its prominence in debates on the legitimacy and future of global legal
governance. Defendant protections at the ICC have also been shaped considerably by the
precedent of the creation and operation of the ICTY, and so its inclusion enables an exploration
of the dynamic between courts on this issue. Fewer individuals were interviewed in relation to
the ICC than the ICTY, partly due to the greater number of current and former legal staff
members at the ICTY, creating a larger pool of potential interviewees, but also due to greater
reluctance of ICC staff to be interviewed.
An assessment of the research indicators in relation to the IMT is also included in Chapter 3
in order to provide historical context for the more extensive assessment of the ICTY and ICC in
Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. This enables a critical appraisal of the narrative of the progress of
international criminal justice in terms of defense standards, and a sense of the continuity of the
political concerns that continue to influence these standards, as well as to assess the impact of
different contexts—political, legal, and historical—on these standards within international
courts. The IMT is the first modern international criminal tribunal, and is attributed with creating
international criminal justice, including through the establishment of major mass atrocity crimes
(crimes against humanity and, effectively, genocide), and setting a precedent for the international
prosecution of high-level suspected mass atrocity perpetrators.
In the standard narrative of the development of international criminal justice, the IMT is
claimed to have provided a flawed start with regards to trial fairness. Since the early 1990s, when
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international courts were again created, this problem has been assumed to have largely
disappeared, with contemporary courts characterized as legitimate in terms of trial fairness.
However, the research demonstrates that, while enjoying far greater standards of defense
protection than Nuremberg, current courts still exhibit some challenges with regard to legality,
and especially significant problems with defense parity, and therefore are far weaker in terms of
legitimacy through protection of defendants than is acknowledged within IR.
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2 The state of research on the legitimacy of global legal governance
This chapter explores the theoretical background to an analysis of the legitimacy of global legal
governance institutions. The first section describes the normative need for such institutions to be
legally legitimate; provides a critique of the international relations and international legal
scholarship on the subject; and explains the place of the dissertation’s argument within it. In
terms utilized by José Alvarez to describe approaches to the legitimacy of global governance, the
argument is: institutional (focused on the effects of the structures, and associated processes, of
international criminal courts), vertical (concerned with institutions’ relationship to individuals),
and liberal (based on assessing the impact of institutions on procedural and substantive rights).1
The chapter’s second section explains the limitations of the IR literature in understanding
international law resulting from the literature’s jurisprudential underpinnings—primarily legal
positivism and natural law. The section moves on to demonstrate the value to understanding
international law’s legitimacy of a legal theory which: focuses on what makes law (and thereby
legal norms) distinct from other forms of social ordering; and is contextualized to liberal legal
systems. This approach is utilized in the research, as discussed in Chapter 1. The third section of
Chapter 2 explores the value to the dissertation of literature on institutional power, and the goals
and concerns of political actors in relation to international criminal justice that may impact the
indicators of legitimacy explored in the research.

The legitimacy of global governance

1

José E. Alvarez, “Introducing the Themes: Introduction to Symposium on Democratic Theory and
International Law,” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 38 (2007): 159-74.
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Especially since 1945, intergovernmental organizations, international laws, and their associated
regimes2 have been developed by states in order to overcome practical cross-border problems of
interstate cooperation, such as generating increased trade, smoothing financial transactions, and
dealing with air and water pollution.3 States have also coordinated to create institutions and laws
to generate social justice outcomes, such as improved civil and political human rights.4 This
agglomeration of institutions, legal regimes, and processes has come to be called “global
governance,” with governance understood in James Rosenau’s terms as “the maintenance of
collective order, the achievement of collective goals, and the collective processes of rule through
which order and goals are sought.”5
Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson conceptualize “international institutions” as
“merely one specific, historically contingent element” of global governance6—international law
constitutes the other major structural component. The institutions, agents, and processes of
global governance are seen in formal, treaty-based, international institutions, laws, and
regimes—in the case of trade, for example, including the World Trade Organization and the
2

Stephen Krasner defines international regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective
choice.” See Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 186.
3
Thomas G. Weiss, Global Governance: What? Why? Whither? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 8-26.
Some have argued that global governance arrangements began to emerge as early as the fifteenth century:
see e.g. Craig N. Murphy, “Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood,” International
Affairs 76, no. 4 (2000): 789-90.
4
Margot Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
5
James N. Rosenau, “Change, Complexity, and Governance in a Globalizing Space,” in Debating
Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, ed. Jon Pierre (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), 175.
6
Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “Global Governance to the Rescue: Saving International
Relations?” Global Governance 20 (2014): 30.
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).7 Global
governance also consists of informal arrangements such as the Basel Committee,8 which
provides a forum for international banking supervision by the heads of the central banks of
various states.9
Despite the dominance of states and IGOs, the individual has increasingly been addressed by
global governance arrangements since 1945.10 This includes via international humanitarian and
human rights legal protections,11 the ability to bring litigation against an individual’s government

7

TRIPS constitutes Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994. See the World Trade Organization, Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm.
8
See Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs.
9
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems 68, no. 3 (2005): 15-62.
10
Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann, and Matthias Goldmann, “Developing the Publicness of Public
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities,” in The Exercise of
Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law, ed. Armin von
Bogdandy, Rudiger Wolfrum, Jochen von Bernstorff, Philipp Dann, and Matthias Goldmann (New York:
Springer, 2010), 3-32; Manuel Castells, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication
Networks, and Global Governance,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 616 (2008): 78-93; Lloyd Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People
First,” Global Governance 7 (2001): 19-23; and Thomas G. Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance and
Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 795814.
11
E.g. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948;
Geneva Conventions I-IV, August 12, 1949; Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions,
June 8, 1977; and Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989.
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for breach of rights,12 and prosecution for mass atrocity crimes through international criminal
justice.13
The term “global governance” is an “analytical tool” for understanding political change,14
and this dissertation analyzes an underexplored source of the legitimacy of global legal
governance—liberal legal principles—in order to further our understanding of the role of the
individual in international relations since 1945. International criminal tribunals, as the primary
institutions of international criminal justice, and a significant component of global legal
governance, impinge upon most of the features of governance mentioned in Rosenau’s definition
above: by pursuing the goals of order and justice by attempting to achieve punishment and
deterrence through the processes of domestic criminal justice projected at the global level. The
dramatic coercive implications for the individual of prosecution within global legal
governance—incarceration, possibly for decades—require a basis of legitimacy that is distinct
among global governance institutions.

Legitimacy within IR
Legitimacy as a concept in political science generally refers to the acceptance of the rules of
institutions such that they are obeyed, or that they have the right to exercise authority. IR
research on the legitimacy of institutions and law can be broadly divided into that which focuses
12

E.g. individuals and other contracting states can pursue legal action against a government member of
the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights which also accepts the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights. See European Court of Human Rights, “How the Court works,”
www.echr.coe.int.
13
Through prosecution for violations of international criminal law at international and “hybrid”
(international-domestic) tribunals. See Richard J. Goldstone and Adam M. Smith, International Judicial
Institutions: The Architecture of International Justice at Home and Abroad (London: Routledge, 2009).
14
Weiss and Wilkinson, “Global Governance to the Rescue:” 29.
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on normative standards15—whether an institution has the right to govern, or a law or legal system
ought to be followed—and a descriptive, or sociological, approach16—whether that authority is
accepted by its subjects or others. Normative and descriptive legitimacy are conceptually distinct
but are often conceived of as coinciding, such as in the following definition of legitimacy from
criminal psychology: “[people] believe that the decisions made and rules enacted by others are in
some way right or proper and ought to be followed.”17 At other times the distinction in IR
scholarship is clearer: “When people disagree over whether the WTO is legitimate, their
disagreements are typically normative. They are not disagreeing about whether they or others
believe that this institution has the right to rule; they are disagreeing about whether it has the
right to rule.”18 In large part, “the concept of legitimacy, mercurial as it is, has remained underscrutinised, leading to confusion and misuse.”19
A methodological weakness within much IR research on descriptive legitimacy is that it
tends to be defined in terms of rule compliance: in which case legitimacy is conflated with

15

E.g. Robert A. Dahl, “Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View,” in
Democracy’s Edge, ed. Ian Shapiro and Casino Hacker-Cordón (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 19-36; and Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005).
16
E.g. Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization 53, no.
2 (1999): 379-408; and Christian Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” International Politics
44, nos. 2-3 (2007): 157-74.
17
Tom R. Tyler, “Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,” Annual Review of
Psychology 57 (2006): 376.
18
Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” Ethics
& International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2006): 405. Italics in original.
19
C.A. Thomas, “The Concept of Legitimacy and International Law,” LSE Law, Society and Economy
Working Papers 12/2013, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013, 1
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2013-12_Thomas.pdf. Italics in original.
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compliance, rather than generating it.20 Normative accounts used to rely purely on state consent
as providing a legitimacy based on international legality, but it is now generally agreed that this
provides an inadequate explanation.21 Normative accounts tend now to be broader, and either
input-based—focusing on the principles expressed through processes,22 especially democratic
value, such as accountability and transparency23—or output-based—relying on whether
outcomes are, say, efficient, effective, or fair in distributive terms,24 or in problem-solving.25
In social science, the most prominent analyst of legitimacy remains Max Weber, who
described the basis of the authority of the modern state as rational-legal—stemming from the
effectiveness and efficiency of impersonal rule-making bodies.26 While Weber thereby linked
legitimacy with institutional processes, IR research on legal, political, and bureaucratic processes
has tended to conceive of their legitimacy as stemming solely from that of the institutions that
generate them. Such approaches tend to conflate the legitimacy of institutions with that of the
procedures themselves, ignoring potential sources of legitimacy generated by the specific
20

Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law, International Relations and Compliance,”
in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons
(London: Sage, 2002), 538-58.
21
Daniel Bodansky, “Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations,” in Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff
and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 333.
22
E.g. Jens Steffek, “The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach,” European
Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2 (2003): 249-75.
23
E.g. Jan Wouters and Nicolas Hachez, “Transitional Societies and the Rule of Law: A Benchmarks
Approach,” Working Paper No. 47, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Catholic University
Leuven, March 2010.
24
E.g. Daniel C. Esty, “Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law,”
Yale Law Journal 115, no. 7 (2006): 1490-1562.
25
E.g. Jason Ralph, “Anarchy is What Criminal Lawyers and Other Actors Make of It: International
Criminal Justice as an Institution of International and World Society,” in Governance, Order, and the
International Criminal Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court, ed. Steven C. Roach (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 133-53.
26
Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline in Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus
Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
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characteristics of these processes. Ian Clark, for example, in a book-length study of international
legitimacy, demonstrates this conflation of institutional and procedural legitimacy when he
defines procedural legitimacy as where “rules may be deemed appropriate…because they
emanate from a ‘rightful source of authority.’”27

The “legal legitimacy” of global legal governance
This section identifies the dissertation’s approach to analyzing the legitimacy of global legal
governance as one characterized by a focus on the relationship between institutions and
individuals, as mediated by liberal individual rights. States increasingly transfer decision-making
power to global governance institutions. This potentially weakens the quality of liberal
democratic norms at the state level by removing the ability of citizens to shape policies as well as
weakening such aspects of liberal democratic oversight as transparency and accountability.28
This transfer also poses questions about the liberal quality of decision-making at the interstate
level.29
The justifications for the transfer of authority to global governance institutions and decisionmaking to international legal forums has tended to revolve around issues of practical problemsolving, largely ignoring issues of legitimacy. Yet—or perhaps because of this—Andrew
Moravcsik claims that the extent of a deficit of liberal democratic norms in global governance “is
emerging as one of the central questions—perhaps the central question—in contemporary world
27

Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 18.
David Held, “Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective,”
in Global Governance and Public Accountability, ed. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi
(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 240-67.
29
Michael Zürn, “Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 2
(2004): 260-87.
28
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politics.”30 He argues, however, that there is no such deficit in global governance, and claims
that those who argue otherwise are relying on an ideal of how liberal norms operate at the
domestic level rather than how they work in practice.31
Giandomenico Majone similarly argues that delegation of governance functions to IGOs that
operate on the basis of expertise, such as the European Central Bank, do not suffer from a
democratic deficit as such institutions even at the domestic level are expected to operate
autonomously from liberal democratic control, and are more effective precisely because they are
insulated from political influence over decision-making.32 Their legitimacy stems from technical
expertise, not criteria of liberal norms. In a similar vein, Jens Steffek argues that, as global
governance arrangements currently do not have the same level of policy-making and policyimplementing authority as states, they do not need to be judged on a strict standard of democratic
legitimacy.33
This dissertation argues, in contrast, that as global legal governance institutions with criminal
law jurisdiction exercise enormous power over individuals—with the potential to remove their
liberty for decades—to acquire legitimacy such coercive capability requires justification through
the operation of legal norms typically characteristic of liberal democratic states. Democratic
deficit theorists identify two main types of weakness within global governance arrangements:

30

Andrew Moravcsik, “Is There a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis,”
Government and Opposition 39, no. 2 (2004): 336. This is evident, for example, in critiques of institutions
for unequal power between states in the UN Security Council, the similar issue of lack of voting parity
between member states of the IMF, and the weak accountability of the European Central Bank.
31
Ibid: 336-63.
32
Giandomenico Majone, “Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity,” European Law Journal
8, no. 3 (2002): 319-39.
33
Steffek, “The Legitimation of International Governance.”
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sociological34 and institutional. The dissertation’s argument explores the latter, which concerns
the democratic basis, or origin, of an institution—whether it was created through a democratic
process (e.g. popular elections)—or whether it operates through democratic processes,35
especially accountability, transparency, and engagement.36 José Alvarez identifies three main
types of institutional arguments: ideological,37 horizontal,38 and vertical.39 The dissertation’s
argument falls into the third category, which is explored below.

34

Sociological approaches stem from several normative perspectives. First, “communitarian” approaches
conceive of democracy as an expression of the general will. See Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness
and Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, trans. 1990 [1983]); and James Bohman,
Democracy across Borders: From Dêmos to Dêmoi (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007). Second,
“liberal” approaches argue that legitimacy stems from a respect for fundamental human rights. See Johan
Karlsson Schaffer, Andreas Føllesdal, and Geir Ulfstein, “International Human Rights and the Challenge
of Legitimacy,” in The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes: Legal, Political and
Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Andreas Føllesdal, Johan Karlsson Schaffer, and Geir Ulfstein (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1-31. Third, “republican” approaches conceive of political
legitimacy stemming from institutional arrangements that diminish domination. See the various
contributions to Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí, eds., Legal Republicanism: National and
International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
35
E.g. Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011).
36
E.g. Glasius, “Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?”
37
The ideological critique argues that the substantive goals pursued largely reflect the normative
preferences of dominant states. See Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law,
Democracy, and The Critique of Ideology (Oxford University Press: New York, 2003). Such goals
include free trade, the “Washington Consensus” approach of low government intervention in the domestic
economy, and the promotion of equal civil and political rights above economic.
38
Horizontal issues relate to the inequality between states in international decision-making fora. In
addition to the privileged status of the P5 in the UN Security Council, Alvarez mentions the outsized
decision-making role of wealthy shareholder states in powerful financial institutions such as the IMF and
World Bank. However, Steve Charonovitz warns that it is inappropriate to project the idea of “one person,
one vote” to the interstate level: states are collectivities which represent vastly different numbers of
individuals and so providing an equal role in decision-making to China, with over one billion people, and
one of the many states with under one million inhabitants is not democratic. See Steve Charnovitz, “The
Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global Governance,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
10, no. 1 (2003): 45-77. According to Joseph Weiler, the consent of states to decisions which affect
them—such as agreeing to treaties—which stems from the sovereign equality of states, the foundation
stone of international politics, is at odds with the functioning of the democratic concept of “one person,
one vote” in most democratic states, where decisions are made by some form of majority vote yet are
binding on all citizens. See J.H.H. Weiler, “The Geology of International Law—Governance, Democracy
and Legitimacy,” ZaöRV (Heidelberg Journal of International Law) 64 (2004): 547-62.
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Vertical issues are concerned with the relationship between individuals and the governance
arrangements that shape their lives. There are three main vertical democratic deficit arguments:
in relation to representativeness,40 participation,41 and liberal. The latter, which Alvarez calls
“substantive rights,”42 characterizes the nature of the dissertation’s argument. The liberal
approach argues that the value of democracy is in its ability to protect fundamental substantive
and procedural rights. These include due process rights for individuals accused of wrong-doing:
for example, a prohibition on retroactive prosecution or punishment without legal protection for
defendants. Note that while Alvarez calls this third vertical deficit a “substantive, not
procedural”43 issue, some of the examples of rights he provides, including legality or nonretroactivity (a core issue explored in the dissertation), arguably involve procedural rights as
much as substantive ones.
The place of criminal justice in liberal democracy has been little studied in recent democratic
theory, which Melissa Williams states “is surprising insofar as much of the theory of democracy
39

José E. Alvarez, “Introducing the Themes: Introduction to Symposium on Democratic Theory and
International Law,” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 38 (2007): 159-74. Alvarez also notes
that some problems with global governance may be attributable to all three forms of critique, such as
some actions of the Security Council, which Craig Forcese argues constitute “hegemonic federalism.” See
Craig Forcese, “Hegemonic Federalism: The Democratic Implications of the UN Security Council’s
‘Legislative Phase,’” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 38, no. 2 (2007): 175-97.
40
Non-democratically elected institutions make significant decisions, including passing laws. Daniel Esty
identifies these as issues of legitimate policy-making or “right process” in the administrative law context,
known at the international level as “good governance,” including transparency and accountability. See
Daniel C. Esty, “Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law,” Yale
Law Journal 115, no. 7 (2006): 1490-1562.
41
Citizens are not involved in deliberative decision-making processes, and so they lack transparency and
public participation. John McGinnis, “Foreign to Our Constitution,” Northwestern University Law Review
100, no. 1 (2006): 303-29; and Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, “The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law.” Note that lack of participation is identified by Esty as a lack of electoral
representativeness.
42
Natasha Affolder, “Democratising or Demonising the World Heritage Convention,” Victoria University
of Wellington Law Review 38, no. 2 (2007): 341-61; and Forcese, “Hegemonic Federalism.”
43
Alvarez, “Introducing the Themes:” 161.
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concerns how shared norms become binding law, and where are shared norms more forcefully
expressed or enforced than in the domain of criminal law?”44 She suggests the answers may lie in
disagreement among democratic societies over the purposes of criminal justice: whether it is
primarily punitive, restorative (for the victims), about creating order and stability, and/or
rehabilitating offenders.45
There is a significant and longstanding literature on the sources of legitimacy for criminal
justice at the state level that can be applied to understanding international criminal justice,
including the community justice approach associated with Emile Durkheim,46 and Max Weber’s
formal-rational justice.47 Legal scholar Aaron Fichtelberg argues for taking an institutional,
vertical, and liberal approach to understanding the legitimacy of the ICC, along the lines taken in
the dissertation.48 The legitimacy value of liberal norms lies primarily in their ability to protect
substantive and procedural rights, rather than in the nature of international courts’ establishment
and consent,49 or the process for establishing a court’s jurisdiction over people.50 Fichtelberg
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Melissa S. Williams, “Criminal Justice, Democratic Fairness, and Cultural Pluralism: The Case of
Aboriginal Peoples in Canada,” Buffalo Criminal Law Review 5, no. 2 (2002): 451.
45
Ibid: 451-95.
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Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: Macmillan,
1933 [1893]). It argues that traditional penal justice represents “collective consciousness” and so requires
a “demos” or culturally self-identifying community. Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick expand on
Durkheim’s approach by arguing that law develops in three stages in society, characterized by elite
coercion as well as the general will. See Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law & Society in Transition:
Toward Responsive Law (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001 [1978]).
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Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Roth and Wittich.
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Fichtelberg, “Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court.”
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E.g. Glasius, “Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?” 44.
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does not pursue this approach empirically,51 however, and does not identify specific rights that
should be analyzed.

The value of jurisprudence to understanding the legitimacy of law
This section demonstrates the value of jurisprudence in examining the rights of defendants as an
aspect of the legal legitimacy of international tribunals. First it highlights the drawbacks of the
dominant approaches—natural law and especially legal positivism—for such a task. It then
argues for the utility of an alternative jurisprudence, the legal-principles-based jurisprudence of
Lon Fuller.
Ronald Dworkin states that “[l]aw is a political concept…and…political concepts are
concepts of value”—that is, law can only be constructed by reference to values.52 The
jurisprudence that attempts to explain the value of legality, he argues, lies within three main
schools, those based around the political values of “accuracy,” “efficiency,” and “fairness.”53
First, natural law approaches perceive accuracy in law to the extent that its content conforms
to previously established (religious or secular) standards of morality.54 Second, and in contrast,
those in the legal positivist school argue, inter alia, that law promotes efficiency in the
accomplishment of governments’ wishes, by enabling legal subjects to foresee government
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As Fichtelberg notes, at the time he was writing, no prosecutions had yet been completed at the ICC.
Fichtelberg, “Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court:” 781.
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Ronald Dworkin, “Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy,” Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 24, no. 1 (2004): 19, 23.
53
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54
Prominent examples of such natural law approaches include John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural
Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis
(On the Law of War and Peace), trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925 [1625]).
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demands and to adapt their behavior to it. According to positivist approaches, law is thereby
conceptually distinct from morality—the law is solely what a sovereign decrees,55 or is
determined by a constitutional rule established by ruling authorities.56
Third, fairness as a value of legality refers to the role of law in securing political equality and
a lack of arbitrariness in the exercise of coercive authority through adequate notice of the law’s
requirements, consistency in applying legal standards, and equal treatment before the law.
Dworkin argues that this approach describes his own theory of “law as integrity:” moral
reasoning is intrinsic to the law—unlike in positivism—and is determined through principles of
fairness in application of the law—unlike natural law, where the morality of law is determined
by substance. Law includes not only substantive rules but “the principles that provide the best
moral justification for those enacted rules,” which Dworkin calls “structuring fairness
principles.”57
Dworkin’s interpretivist approach shares a similarity of outlook with that of legal philosopher
Lon Fuller. Both argue that moral reasoning is inherent to the law, is determined through
principles of fair procedure—in the case of Fuller—and procedure and substantive morality—
Dworkin—and that these principles are justified by respect for, and the need to provide equal
treatment for, all individuals. Fundamentally, they both conceive of the legal subject as
occupying a privileged place in a legal system.58
55

See especially Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, ed. Ross Harrison (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, [1776] 1988); and John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955 [1832]).
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Most prominently, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).
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According to Kristen Rundle, Fuller is distinguished from Dworkin in his emphasis on how the form
that law takes, that of general rules, generates the reciprocal relationships that the morality of a legal
system rests on. The generality of rules presupposes a conception of the legal subject as a responsible
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However, Fuller’s approach differs from all three categories described by Dworkin. The
value of legality, according to Fuller, lies partly in efficiency for legal authorities (as positivists
claim) and that of moral value for legal subjects (as natural law claims). Unlike natural law
approaches, however, Fuller argues that the morality of law stems not from legal outcomes, but
from the dignity that legal subjects are afforded by their treatment as responsible agents by legal
authorities (e.g. legislators, judges, and prosecutors). Fuller does not accept positivism’s
conceptual separation of law and morality, and finds fault with its underappreciation of the role
played by subjects within a legal system—they are active participants, not mere passive receivers
of legal commands.
Despite its flaws in terms of understanding the bases of law’s legitimacy, the jurisprudence in
Dworkin’s first category, legal positivism, underlies much IR analysis of international law,
especially neoliberal institutionalist approaches.59 The following sections explore the nature and
limitations of positivism and natural law for exploring the legitimacy of international law in
order to move the discussion to Fuller’s jurisprudence, which the dissertation argues is far more
useful for exploring legitimacy in relation to global legal governance.
agent by the authorities that create and enforce the law, and not merely a passive receiver of legal
commands. See Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon Fuller (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2012), 180, 189. The value of law as stemming, in Fuller’s conception, from the
conception of legal subjects as inherently requiring treatment as responsible agents “is prior to Dworkin’s
value of political integrity, or equality before the law, because Fuller’s speaks to the shape, content and
presuppositions of law’s distinctive form in a way that Dworkin’s does not.” Also, “Fuller’s
understanding of the value of legality can also be distinguished from Dworkin’s in how it directly
addresses a question that Dworkin’s jurisprudence neglects; namely, the question of what makes law
distinctive, that sets it apart, from other modes of social ordering.” See Rundle, Forms Liberate, 181.
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Natural law
Natural law60 has a long intellectual history, originating in ancient Greece,61 but had been largely
discredited in Anglo-American legal circles by the nineteenth century, though it still informs the
approach to international law of some constructivist and “English school” research in IR.62 Law
is understood to be defined by its moral content. Obligation to obey human-made laws, and their
legitimacy, stem from the extent to which the content of that law (generating substantive
legitimacy) and the justice of a particular outcome (distributive fairness legitimacy) conform to
the dictates of “natural” law. The latter derive from the idea that there is a higher law to humanmade laws, which contains moral standards discoverable through rational thought and that
originate in the inherent nature of humans or in a deity.
Natural law approaches argue, in their most extreme form, not only that law and values
cannot be separated, but that rules are legal only when their content exhibits society’s, or
universal, moral values. Theorist John Finnis argues more moderately that natural law acts as a
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guide to the justness of human-made laws.63 Contemporary approaches tend to understand
certain aspects of international law, especially international humanitarian and human rights law,
as embodying the values of the international society of states.64 Natural law also arguably
provides the most effective legal justification for the posited existence of jus cogens international
legal standards.65
Natural law’s focus on the legitimacy-generating quality of the substantive content of
international law is useful in relation to understanding human rights and humanitarian law, but is
largely limited to areas with significant broad agreement on the value of the underlying rights.
There is very little global agreement, for example, on many individual civil and political rights,
as they conflict with local values and interests.

Legal positivism
While little concern with legitimacy was demonstrated in IR research during the Cold War, since
then “there has been an explosion of interest, both among international lawyers and international
relations scholars, in the legitimacy of international institutions.”66 However, less studied is what
is distinctive about the law itself, which is arguably a result of a conflation of the legitimacy of
law with that of institutions, and an underappreciation of the contribution of legal philosophers to
understanding the nature of law and a legal system as a distinctive form of rule structure.
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Partly due to the Cold War dominance of structural realism in IR, which views international
law as epiphenomenal, there has traditionally been an underappreciation in IR scholarship of the
utility of jurisprudence to understanding international law.67 This is partly due to the long-term
pre-eminence in international jurisprudence of the school of legal positivism, which defines law
in terms of the form that a rule takes (e.g. a general order issued by a recognized legal authority),
and contends that there is a complete conceptual separation between law and morality. This is
not to state that positivists perceive no connection between law and morality—they acknowledge
many. They argue that there is no necessary link—law and morality are distinct subjects, and law
does not inherently generate legitimacy.
In its original version, positivism claimed that rules are only law to the extent that they are
backed by the coercive enforcement of a sovereign.68 The centrality of sovereign enforcement
made legal positivism a poor approach to understanding international law, which is far more
disparate than domestic law in its sources of creation and enforcement.69 However, a more
sophisticated, mid-twentieth-century restatement of positivism by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart
has become prevalent among Anglo-American legal scholars.70 Hart views governments not as
unbounded sovereigns, but as constrained by a “rule of recognition,” such as a constitution, that
67
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delineates the authority that legal institutions may exercise.71 Law is a system of rules, consisting
of primary rules, which impose duties on their subjects, and secondary rules, which provide the
procedures for the former’s creation, interpretation, and implementation.72
A significant problem with applying legal positivism to understanding international law is
that the former is an “analytical” approach, not dependent upon a particular social or historical
context.73 Hart’s positivism embodies a “pretention to universality…a model purportedly
applicable to legal phenomena whenever and wherever they arise.”74 He effectively makes a
false analogy to natural science, claiming to establish a theory that applies broadly across
political, social, and historical contexts in scientific-law-like ways, exhibiting the “neglect of
history and…relentless presentism” of which Andrew Hurrell has accused rationalist IR.75
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In addition, constructing such a purely conceptual, or analytical, jurisprudence of law is a
futile task as it ignores the inherently normative dimension of law.76 The conceptual separation
of law and morality demonstrates a confusion about the nature of law, as understanding law and
its implementation by courts requires interpretation with reference to the purposes of legislators.
Therefore understanding the “is” of law requires an incorporation of the “ought”: “Facts cannot
be divorced from values.”77
Nevertheless, Hart’s positivism is accepted by most Western international lawyers, who
extrapolate a legal sources doctrine that relies upon formal validity—a rule is law if it is created
by states through agreed formal processes.78 The best-known attempt to meld Hart’s positivism
with IR institutionalism is the “legalization” approach of Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane,
Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal.79 Legalization is posited as the
institutional development of a norm along three dimensions: obligation (the extent to which a
rule creates binding commitments); precision (the level of clarity and specificity); and delegation
(the extent to which authority has been granted to credible third parties to interpret, implement,
or enforce). An increase along any dimension indicates a “hardening,” or bindingness, of law.
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Legalization has been significant in “communicat[ing] the message that international legal
phenomena were worthy of sustained scholarly attention by political scientists.”80
Legalization is limited, however, by its socially-weak positivist understanding of law as
determined purely by form: it ignores the centrality of the social dynamic between legal
authorities and subjects in constituting law. Legalization also undervalues customary law and the
practice of IGOs, focuses on law as outcome to the neglect of process, and provides an
inaccurate characterization of the elements of international law. While the legalization dimension
of precision is a useful indicator of law, obligation—indicated in the research by treaty
language—conflates state consent with a felt sense of obligation (legitimacy), and delegation
conflates institutional with legal authority.81
The legal positivist emphasis on state consent marries well with the core assumptions of
institutionalist and rational choice approaches to IR, which view international law as resulting
from interest-based bargaining by states.82 By claiming that compliance results from instrumental
calculations—a logic of consequences83—and not a felt sense of obligation, rationalist IR
approaches, however, do not distinguish what is distinctive about legalized rules: they perceive
little or no effective difference in the international system between social and legal norms. They
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also tend to conflate law with institutions, generally assuming that law is irrelevant without
enforcement.84
The following subsection explains how an alternative approach to understanding law—that
of Lon Fuller—can provide greater insight than the dominant jurisprudence into the legitimacy
of global legal governance. The rest of the current section explains Fuller’s critique of legal
positivism. Fuller was involved in the 1950s and 1960s in a pubic debate with Hart over how
best to understand law.85 The former argued that the enterprise of analytical jurisprudence is
futile, as law is always constructed within a particular social and political environment that
shapes its purposes and functioning.86
Contemporary positivism, Fuller claimed, also disregards the issue of the abuse of law,
ignores the reciprocities (between legal authorities and subjects) necessary to maintain a
functioning legal system, and fails to achieve its aim—of moving positivism away from the
conceptualization of law as rules imposed through coercive enforcement. Without significant
limitations on the power of legal authorities, law is still merely a “one-way projection of
authority”87—the position of positivism since its origins. There is no “suggestion that the
citizen’s voluntary cooperation in obeying law…must be ‘matched by the corresponding
cooperative effort on the part of government.’”88 Within positivist conceptions of law, only the
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attitudes of legal authorities towards the law are significant to the functioning of a legal
system—the attitudes of legal subjects are irrelevant.89
This overemphasis on legal authorities is due to a focus on law to the neglect of its purpose—
arguing that laws and the goals of legislators in creating them can be distinguished without
negatively affecting our understanding of the nature of law. In contrast, Fuller defined law as
“the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules,”90 which captures his
emphasis on both the purpose and practice of law. This understanding of the inherent normative
quality of law adds a missing dimension to existing conceptions of the legitimacy of legal
institutions as a form of social ordering:91 the interaction between legal participants—legal
authorities and subjects—is a component of the law itself.

Lon Fuller: A political jurisprudence of democracy
Fuller is the initiator and most well-known advocate of the American school of “process”
jurisprudence.92 This attempts to understand legal decision-making not as a result of deductive
logic or the attitudes of legal officials, as previous approaches in American jurisprudence had
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done, but as a result of properties inherent to law itself. Fuller is considered “one of the most
influential thinkers on jurisprudence outside America,”93 but his jurisprudence has received
relatively little attention in his own country—where he is known in law schools for his work on
contracts law, and more recently as an “intellectual father” of the alternative dispute resolution
field.94
Fuller rejects the positivist position that law is conceptually distinct from morality, arguing
that adherence to certain principles of legality embodies moral value in restricting the arbitrary
and abusive exercise of power; and in thereby making morally good outcomes—such as the
protection of human rights—more likely.95 These principles of legality are those usually
associated with a “thin” or formal conception of the rule of law.96 Indeed, Fuller is frequently
cited within such research as the identifier of the quintessential requirements of the rule of law,
such as clear, unambiguous laws which cannot be applied retroactively.97
However, to function effectively, the rule of law requires, according to Fuller, a “cooperative
effort,”98 characterized by the “interlocking role expectations”99 of legal-subject compliance with
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legal prohibitions, matched by authorities’ compliance with constraining legal principles.100
Therefore his approach is far more than a mere checklist of rule of law criteria, as it has often
been perceived, as implicit within these principles is a certain conception of the legal subject—as
a responsible agent, treated with dignity by legal authorities.101
To the extent that legal principles exhibit procedural fairness, they generate a “legal
morality,” which Fuller described as “that special morality that attaches to the office of law-giver
and law-applier, that keeps the occupants of that office, not from murdering people, but from
undermining the integrity of the law itself.”102 This argument was underappreciated at the time of
writing partly due to the author’s own limited exploration of the broader underlying legal theory
in most of his work. In a book of essays published shortly after his death, The Principles of
Social Order, Fuller laid out his theory in more detail,103 and a few legal scholars have attempted
to clarify his arguments.104
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While institutions are necessary for the creation, implementation, and enforcement of law,
legal positivists, and rationalist IR scholars, fail to address what is distinct about legal
institutions—as a result of the particular nature and qualities of law. Legal obligation, in Fuller’s
account, is owed not to legal institutions per se, but to the legal system, stemming from the
extent to which the institutions conform to procedural fairness standards. Legal institutions are
conceived of as the social agencies of legal procedure.105
In this approach, being a subject in a liberal legal system means being “a subject of law,” not
being “subject to the direction of another.”106 Legal subjects are conceptualized by the system as
possessing “agency”: the ability to adapt to general rules, which create a “relatively stable
reciprocity of expectations” between subjects, as long as authorities adhere to legal principles
which generate and sustain that stability.107 This presents a similar conceptualization of the legal
subject to that of natural law philosopher John Finnis when he states, quoting the 1779
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, “Individuals can only be selves—i.e. have the ‘dignity’ of
being ‘responsible agents’—if they are not made to live their lives for the convenience of others
but are allowed and assisted to create a subsisting identity across a ‘lifetime.’”108
Fuller’s approach therefore provides a more valuable conceptual vehicle for exploring the
legitimacy of global legal governance than traditional approaches to law. It argues that law is
distinct from a simple exercise of hierarchical power, for three main reasons: law’s structure as
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general rules in a liberal legal system; the relationship between lawmakers and legal subjects that
law’s structure requires; and the centrality of legal practice and constraints on lawmaking power
to the legitimacy of a legal system. The third issue is the basis of the argument in Chapter 1, and
is explained there. The first two issues are explored below as they relate to understanding a legal
system’s legitimacy.
First, the political nature of Fuller’s jurisprudence has been largely ignored by legal
scholars.109 Yet it is central to his conception of law, which argues that legal practice can be an
important source of legitimacy in a liberal legal system. This contextualization, and taking into
account the purpose of law in such a system, are essential to understanding the legitimacy of law.
That purpose is to provide the freedom that enables subjects to interact effectively. This
approach relies on a positive conception of liberty as “freedom to” achieve a purpose, as opposed
to the more limited “freedom from” interference in one’s choices that John Stuart Mill
advocated.110 The latter provides a poor understanding of the freedom that matters to most
people because it is an individualistic and asocial idea of freedom as personal autonomy,
whereas a broader, more realistic understanding of freedom as a component of the liberal quality
of global legal governance is that which embodies social interaction—which requires public
institutions to sustain.
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The purpose of public institutions, including those that constitute the legal system, is to
generate the conditions for a social form of freedom.111 The purpose of law is to “provid[e] the
citizenry with a sound and stable framework for their interactions with one another, the role of
government being that of standing as a guardian of the integrity of this system.”112 The purpose
of law is not—as argued by positivists—to direct “other persons how to accomplish tasks set by
a superior.”113
In Fuller’s understanding, the structure or form that law takes in order to fulfill this purpose
is that of “governance through general rules.”114 The property of generality indicates that law
permits or prohibits a type of conduct, rather than applying solely to a particular case. The
generality of law means that it provides legal subjects with a “baseline for self-directed action”—
law is not a set of detailed instructions by authorities directing subjects in order to achieve
specific goals.115
This moves the analysis to the second feature of Fuller’s approach: the reciprocity between
authorities and subjects which characterizes liberal legal practice. Reciprocity, along with
generality, mediates the power of legal authorities by requiring a relationship with subjects that
acknowledges their agency and dignity as free individuals. While the understanding of law’s
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structure as general rules is widely accepted in jurisprudence,116 one of Fuller’s key original
claims is that generality distinguishes law from other forms of social interaction and control—
such as the orders of a superior to a subordinate in a hierarchical authority relationship.
Law in a system of liberal democratic governance is portrayed by legal positivists as
emphasizing the role of “superiors” to the neglect of “subordinates”—terms which apply to
giving orders, but not to legal process. To be effective, general rules instead require a reciprocal
relationship between legal authorities and subjects due to the onus law places on subjects to
understand its requirements: “law is a kind of governance that works by treating subjects as
capable of altering their conduct because they grasp that there is a rule with which they are
expected to comply.”117 Generality in a liberal legal system therefore requires an acceptance by
authorities that legal subjects have the responsible agency to conform to the requirements of law
without specific controlling guidance.
Kristen Rundle describes Fuller’s conception of the legal subject as an agent as “a person
‘capable of purposive action,’ in possession of her capacities, and who is to be regarded as an
end in herself. An agent, therefore, is more than someone simply capable of responding to
direction by legal authorities, even if that direction is entirely favourable to her. She is instead a
bearer of dignity.”118 Law does not act upon the legal subject as an imposition, but inherently
requires the subject be conceived of as a dignified agent and requires forbearance on the part of
legal authorities in the form of certain legal principles that enable general rules to be effective
while also acknowledging the agency and dignity of legal subjects. To embody liberal legal
116

Rundle, Forms Liberate, 9.
Benjamin C. Zipursky, “The Inner Morality of Private Law,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence
58, no. 1 (2013): 35.
118
Rundle, Forms Liberate, 10, quoting Fuller, “Freedom:” 1305, 1307.
117

108

standards, the exercise of legal authority requires an attitude towards legal subjects characterized
by “a sense of trusteeship,”119 which is “the duty of the lawmaker to show respect for the agency
of legal subjects.”120
The relationship between legal participants—authorities and subjects—is fundamental to
understanding law, and an effective legal theory needs to maintain an equal focus on the role and
responsibilities of both groups. Law is a social process, generated and sustained by
communication and interactional expectancies between law-makers and law’s subjects.121 In a
context of liberal governance lawmakers are constrained in their exercise of power and legal
subjects are not mere obedient sheep: while subjects are expected to comply with the law,
authorities are reciprocally expected by subjects to adhere to legal principles that are intrinsic to
law as a distinct form of social ordering, and that provide a constraint on lawmaking and
application. A legal system is legitimate to the extent that legal authorities adhere to these
principles—from which the research dependent variables of legality and defense parity,
discussed in Chapter 1, are derived.
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The legal legitimacy of global legal governance
A few international legal scholars have specifically acknowledged the role of procedural criteria
of legitimacy that rely on the nature of law itself—most prominently Thomas Franck.122 A
handful of legal scholars have also begun to utilize Fuller’s approach to understand international
law.123 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope rely on Fuller’s conceptualization of and criteria of law
in assessing the legitimacy of international laws relating to climate change, torture, and the use
of force.124 Nevertheless, the authors apply all of his criteria, without regard to their
appropriateness for analyzing international law, and in a non-systematic fashion, leading to an
imprecise and inadequate assessment of legal process legitimacy in the areas they examine.
There has been little acknowledgment of the relevance of Fuller’s conception of law by IR
and international law scholars to an understanding of international criminal justice, where it has
arguably greater salience.125 Two legal philosophers have done so, Larry May and David Luban.
May has made the normative argument that a more complete adherence to Fuller’s principles
would provide an ethically minimalist middle ground between legal positivism and natural
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law.126 Luban has made a brief and nonsystematic attempt at an empirical argument along these
lines.127 In contrast, in IR research on the legitimacy of international criminal law and justice, the
focus has been on the output of courts, including via analyses of the number of trials and
prosecutions, the cost, and expediency of trials, and the broad institutional legitimacy of courts—
that is, non-legal institutional issues such as autonomy.128 There has been little exploration of the
legitimacy of legal practice within IR research on global legal governance.

The role of power in understanding legal fairness legitimacy
This section analyzes the literature on the role of politics and political actors in shaping
international criminal justice. It also describes how the concept of institutional power provides a
useful analytical tool for assessing the effect of rule-making on the legal fairness of international
tribunals.
Juridical actors in liberal polities—especially judges and prosecutors—often claim a position
known as “legalism:” that their legal decision-making is purely the result of legal considerations,
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and not affected by political influences.129 Gary Bass argues that this attitude is also held by
juridical actors at international trials.130 Rachel Kerr argues that while law and politics influence
each other at the ICTY, politics does not affect the courtroom131—and thereby does not
undermine the legal fairness of trials. Kerr, and many legal actors themselves, demonstrate an
inadequate appreciation that political decisions taken outside the courtroom shape the dynamic
between the defense and prosecution inside, especially at the international level.
Realists and neoliberal institutionalists argue that powerful states tend to exert significant
political influence over international criminal tribunals. Realists claim that such organizations are
dominated by states in order to facilitate the achievement of their—largely military and securityrelated—interests, and that courts enjoy little autonomy.132 Neoliberal institutionalists tend to
argue that international courts, while not completely controlled by powerful states, are subject to
the material influence of members and are likely to be sidelined by states when they are
perceived as not useful in achieving collective goals, such as the delegitimization of rivals.133
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According to David Bosco, in discussing the ICC, “this understanding yields two likely patterns
of major-power behavior towards…court[s]: marginalization and control.”134
There is little exploration by IR scholars of the issue of political influence on the fairness of
trials through the lens of the protection of defendants’ legal rights. Nevertheless, research has
explored more broadly how political goals, such as transitional justice and historical narrative
construction, have shaped the operation of international tribunals, and this research is relevant to
the current study.
First, as a transitional justice mechanism, courts have been argued to aid reconciliation and
post-conflict peacebuilding.135 Others have been critical of this role, partly because international
courts mediate between concern with the rights of victims and those of criminal defendants.136
There is a potential conflict in the protection regime built into the nature of criminal law: the
function of substantive international criminal law is the protection of the right of all individuals,
depending upon the context, against certain forms of egregious bodily harm, while that of
procedural criminal justice is the protection of the rights of defendants.137 This issue is evident at
the domestic level, but scholars point to exacerbating factors at the international level, such as
the utilization of trials to stigmatize states’ military and political enemies and rivals, and the
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related concern of states not wishing to be seen to be aiding criminal defendants publically
stigmatized as war criminals.138
Second, states and legal actors at international courts, including judges and prosecutors, have
argued that such courts perform a valuable historical narrative construction function by making
denial of atrocities more difficult to sustain, and thereby enabling reconciliation on the basis of
acknowledgment of past wrongs.139 Others have argued that this function interferes with legal
fairness.140 For example, Hannah Arendt contends that courts’ political function in constructing
history means they become political theater and risk undermining the legitimacy of trials by
diminishing the rights of defendants,141 including by limiting the ability of high-profile political
defendants to speak.142 International trials ultimately risk becoming show trials.143
Another issue potentially affecting legal fairness for defendants is the lack of consensus over
what constitutes human rights and how it can be pursued through international criminal justice.
This has generated multiple narrative frameworks and discourses, including those of universal
138
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ideology,144 law,145 entitlements,146 duties,147 and post-colonial power politics.148 The dominant
framing has increasingly become a fusion of individual criminal law with universal ideology.149
Nevertheless, international media discussion of atrocities and prosecutions does not demonstrate
a universal public acceptance of a legalist perspective to criminal trials: instead of a universal,
neutral concern with truth and justice, and the presumption of innocence, there is also often a
public assumption of guilt.150 This potentially leads to weaker investigative support offered by
states, IGOs, and NGOs to defendants than prosecution at international courts, weakening parity
for the former during proceedings.
A valuable contribution to conceptualizing the role of power within global governance
institutions, with implications for the effect of politics on legal rules within international criminal
justice, has been made by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval.151 They argue that power is a
social concept that exists along two dimensions. The first is kinds of social relations, which exist
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in polar terms of interaction (a power relationship between distinct, “pre-constituted” actors) or
constitution (power between actors whose identities are mutually constituting152). The second
dimension is the specificity of social relations, along a spectrum from spatially and temporally
direct and immediate to socially indirect or diffuse (the latter is a relationship meditated at a
distance through intervening actors or over time through the construction of rules, say). From
these dimensions the authors generate a fourfold taxonomy of power: compulsory (direct
interaction), institutional (diffuse interaction), structural (direct and mutual constitution), and
productive (diffuse constitution).
The second concept, that of institutional power, provides a valuable conceptual tool for
analyzing the role of states and IGOs in creating the rules by which international criminal
tribunals are structured and operate, and how this shapes the interaction of the defense and
prosecution. As argued by Barnett and Duval, institutional power refers to the role of actors,
working through formal and informal institutions, in establishing policies which shape and
constrain the behavior of other actors.153 The institutional power literature has examined agendasetting,154 the creation of structural and procedural rules,155 and the effect of institutional
structures on the ability to shape institutional values and interests.156 The dissertation contributes
to the literature on institutional power by examining its role within the processes of the creation
152

Alexander Wendt, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” Review of International
Studies 24, no. 1 (1998): 101-17.
153
Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 15-17.
154
Mark A. Pollock, Engines of Integration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Stephen D.
Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985).
155
Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000)
156
Greg Shaffer, “Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach,” in Power
in Global Governance, ed. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 130-60.

116

and operation of international criminal tribunals, and by assessing its effect on the legal
courtroom dynamic between two of the most important actors within that environment—the
prosecution and defense.157

Conclusion
Analyses of the legitimacy of global legal governance have tended to ignore what is distinct
about legal institutions. This partly results from a lack of understanding of the distinctive
features of law as a system of social norms. It is also a consequence of applying jurisprudence
that is poorly suited to understanding the legitimacy of international law. The jurisprudence of
Lon Fuller provides a little-explored approach that is better suited to analyzing legitimacy than
current natural law and positivist approaches.
Research on the role of power in shaping the behavior and relationships of actors within
international tribunals has tended to overlook the dynamic between the prosecution and defense,
which is essential to understanding such institutions’ fairness and legitimacy. Similarly neglected
has been the effect of rule-making actors on this dynamic. The concept of institutional power
provides a useful approach to exploring the relationship between the rule-making authority of
states and the prosecution-defense dynamic.
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3 Liberal legal norms in the evolution of international criminal
justice
This chapter explores the legal and historical development of the research indicators and their
role in international criminal justice in order to provide context and illuminate the normative,
political, and historical context to an analysis of the contemporary case studies in Chapters 4 and
5. This chapter begins by describing the historical development of the dependent variables,
legality and defense parity, as further explanation of their significance to the legitimacy of
international criminal courts. Next, the historical development of international criminal justice is
analyzed, emphasizing how the political context of international courts has shaped fairness
towards defendants. Finally, the research indicators are explored in relation to the IMT at
Nuremberg1 in 1945-6 in order to provide a basis of comparison for the case study analysis in
later chapters, and to enable a critical assessment of the narrative of the progression of fairness in
the development of international criminal justice.
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The development of the principle of legality
This section explains the evolution of the principle of legality in domestic and international law,
focusing on its core aspects, the prohibition on retroactive enforcement of criminal law and
punishment. First, legality is analyzed in relation to the evolution of Western common and civil
law systems, as they constitute the basis of the structure of trials and procedural protections for
defendants in international criminal justice. Second, legality’s development as a core principle of
criminal justice in international law is explored. This discussion focuses on underscoring the role
of legality as a fundamental norm of liberal legal practice—in both domestic and international
criminal justice.

Domestic development
Non-retroactive enforcement of law and punishment has been discussed since at least ancient
Greece: for example by the historian Diodorus and the orator Demosthenes.2 However, it may
have been lauded more as a means of preserving traditional culture from future change than due
to any concern with legal fairness.3 Non-retroactivity was arguably first clearly distinguished as a
core principle of fair legal practice in the Roman Republic and Empire, while the law of
Medieval European states owes an enormous debt to Roman and Byzantine law.4 A prominent
early European example is references to legality in the English Magna Carta of 1215, which

2

Douglas M. MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 240-56.
Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 910.
4
Jerome Hall, “Nulla Poena Sine Lege,” The Yale Law Journal 47, no. 2 (1937): 167-8.
3

119

suggest that non-retroactivity was a legal principle limiting the law-making powers of the
sovereign.5
Middle Eastern religious texts provide important, if often vague or ambiguous, references to
the undesirability of ex post facto legislation. In the New Testament, Saint Paul, in his Epistle to
the Romans, states that “where there is no law, neither is there any transgression.”6 In the Koran,
Allah states that “we never punish before I have sent a messenger,”7 but there is no clearer
reference.8 In the Hadith—the reported sayings and acts of the prophet Muhammad—there are
references to non-retroactivity of crimes in relation to usury laws.9
The European Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led to the
establishment of non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment as core features of criminal law in
Western states.10 Their development is deeply connected to the development of democracy
within European states, as they were conceived of as a protection against executive power: only a
legislative body—constituted by the people—can define what is illegal and what punishments
should apply.
Two of the first distinct references to the undesirability of the retroactive enforcement of law
in a constitutional document occur in the 1776 Delaware Declaration of Rights and Fundamental
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Rules, and the 1780 Massachusetts Bill of Rights.11 Some of the first occurrences at the state
level are in the 1787 Austrian penal code, and in two documents signed in 1789 that have been
fundamental to disseminating fair legal practice and defendant protections internationally: the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the US Bill of Rights.12
The most dramatic increase in the global incorporation of non-retroactivity into domestic law
has occurred since the beginning of the Cold War. Of 69 states for which there was information
in research conducted by the United Nations into state legal systems in 1946-7, 36 percent had a
strong provision protecting against ex post facto criminal laws, and 32 percent each had a weak
or no non-retroactivity provision in their constitution or statute.13 I determined a strong provision
with reference to the necessity for the existence of prior law for prosecution, or specific
references to retroactivity. A weak version of non-retroactivity was determined as where there
was mention simply that people can only be prosecuted for a breach of law.
Extrapolating the level of non-retroactivity from data on state constitutions collected in 2007
makes clear that, 60 years later, in an international system characterized by almost four times as
11
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many independent states, 91 percent of states have a strong non-retroactivity provision, while
only 6.5 percent have a weak provision, and 2.5 percent no provision.14 During the period 1947
to 2007, therefore, the proportion of states with a strong provision increased by 57 percentage
points, and those with no provision declined by nearly 30 percentage points. It is evident that
concern that there be strong constitutional or statutory constraint on retroactive criminal law
enforcement has become almost universal among states and territories.
It should be noted that there is a major distinction among states in the application of nonretroactivity: between those with a common law (Anglo-American) legal system and those which
follow a civil law (continental European) model. The former tend to apply it less rigorously,
partly due to the existence of common law crimes (crimes not found in written statutes) and the
greater role of judges in making law.15 This makes the determination of retroactive enforcement
at the international level more difficult: are judges interpreting existing law (that is,
“discovering” law, in common law parlance) or creating it ex post facto? This issue has
generated contention in determining the level of non-retroactivity in the practice of international
criminal tribunals.
In present day Islamic, Shari’a, legal systems, non-retroactivity only applies to certain types
of law.16 All states that utilize this form of legal system have ratified at least one treaty that
incorporates the principle17—these treaties are discussed in the following section. According to
14
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Cherif Bassiouni, in current Islamic law, quesas crimes—largely murder and assault—tend to
adhere to non-retroactivity in most states that enforce this category of crimes. Since
independence, most Islamic states have incorporated non-retroactivity provisions into their legal
system—through statute or constitution.18

Recognition in international law
During the Cold War, the prohibition on non-retroactivity in criminal law became incorporated
into most major international human rights and humanitarian legal instruments, and thereby
progressively recognized as a fundamental legal right at the domestic and international levels.
The drafters of post-Cold War international criminal tribunals, starting with that for Yugoslavia,
accepted this right as constituting a restriction on their ability to construct new law.
First, in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) included the nonretroactivity of crimes and punishment as unrestricted domestic and international rights: “No one
shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time
the penal offence was committed.”19
The following year, Geneva Conventions III and IV became the first multilateral
humanitarian legal documents to contain criminal law procedural rights—for prisoners of war
18
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and civilians, respectively—including the right to non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment.20
They are also the first legally binding instruments, as the UDHR was initially merely expressive
of the intent of its signatories—although there is a “growing consensus” that all or most of the
rights contained in the declaration have since attained customary law status, and so are now
binding on all states.21 Non-retroactivity is also a legal right in the 1966 International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—in fact it is one of several provisions that are nonderogable, even in time of national emergency.22
Non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment are also among the rights guaranteed to those
under military occupation in international and civil wars, respectively, in the 1977 Additional
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions;23 and non-retroactivity for crimes in the 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child.24 While Additional Protocol II does not contain a
provision for non-derogation of non-retroactivity, the document specifically applies to civil
war—where many rights are routinely suspended under state-of-emergency laws—so its
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acceptance by more than 160 states is particularly significant as an indicator of the level of state
support for non-retroactivity as a fundamental right.25
Non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment are also guaranteed in most major regional
human rights treaties created during and after the Cold War. This includes the 1950 European
Convention on Human Rights,26 the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights,27 the 1981
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,28 and the 2004 revised Arab Charter on Human
Rights.29
The incorporation of non-retroactivity as a legal right in the constitutions and statutes of the
vast majority of states, described above, is a significant indicator of the acceptance in state
practice that is required for the determination that a principle has attained international
customary law status.30 Its incorporation into nearly all major global and regional human rights
and humanitarian treaties since 1945 is further evidence of the consistency of state acceptance.
Practice since 1993 by international criminal tribunals has also generally been consistent,
although there are weaknesses, as explored in Chapters 4 and 5. Overall, non-retroactivity of
crimes and punishment are broadly argued to have attained customary law, and possibly jus
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cogens, status.31 Jus cogens consists of international legal norms that are peremptory over all
other legal rules (examples include genocide and apartheid). The jus cogens status of nonretroactivity would introduce procedural norms to the small list of heretofore substantive
peremptory legal norms.32

The development of concern with defense parity
This section analyzes the development of defense parity in civil and common law systems. First
the evolution of fair trial standards more broadly in domestic law is described, before an
explanation of the place of defense parity within those standards. Finally, the importance of
defense parity as a principle of criminal justice is explored by analyzing its acceptance within
international law. The discussion aims to clarify the role of defense parity as a norm of
international criminal law practice.

Domestic development of fair trial standards
The institutional and procedural basis of international criminal justice is provided by the two
most common forms of legal system globally today: common law and civil law. They both
originated in Medieval Europe, where criminal trials were instituted in the early post-Roman era
(after c.500AD). In some territories, such as the German states, trials were initially private—not
directly involving government agents or institutions—and the guilt or innocence of the accused

31
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was primarily determined by “trial by ordeal”—such as combat or submersion in water.33 This
effectively presumed the guilt of the accused—if successful in the ordeal they were still punished
by banishment for example. Over centuries this system changed towards public trials with
increasing protections for the accused, although some of the defense parity aspects of due
process—such as institutional support for defense counsel investigations—are of much more
recent origin, as explained below.
Most continental states of Western Europe, largely with a developing civil law tradition,
introduced trial procedures between approximately 900 and 1400, with often a single government
official performing the primary modern criminal justice roles of investigator, prosecutor, jury,
and judge. The inquisitorial trial model, introduced in German territories from Italy in the
sixteenth century, left little room for an active role by the defendant—the accused was reduced to
one feature in a process of attempting to ascertain the truth and not granted special privileges.
Defense parity protections consequently were slow to develop.34
As certain Continental states, such as France, became absolute monarchies from the
seventeenth century the sovereign became the highest judicial authority.35 This began to change
in Europe especially during the eighteenth century as the Enlightenment reshaped attitudes
towards the role of the individual vis-à-vis the state. As citizens legitimizing the existence of the
state, individuals began to gain protections from government, including from the arbitrary and
33
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abusive use of coercive authorities involved in the criminal justice system.36 In France,
Republican ideas brought to prominence by the revolution of 1789 generated such prosecutorial
changes as public trial, by jury, and via an accusatorial approach, with rights and privileges for
the accused that had been denied under the prior, inquisitorial, proceedings. The 1789 French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen included trial principles such as the
presumption of innocence for the accused, and due process provisions such as habeas corpus (no
imprisonment without legal charge).37 Such legal-principle-related and procedural developments
are illustrative of the enhancement of defense parity by elevating the position of the defendant in
institutional proceedings.
England was more removed from the center of Roman power than the empire’s continental
western European territories, and Roman institutions were soon eroded by the invasion of
Germanic peoples after the fifth century.38 Trial for the accused was only introduced after the
French Norman invasion in 1066, when official prosecution became institutionalized as a means
of avoiding private vengeance and maintaining public order.39 Even then, there was no
requirement of an unbiased jury and the accused had no rights under this system.40
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As in civil law states, trial by jury gradually replaced trial by ordeal. However, for centuries
the accused had no defense parity protections such as the ability to call witnesses and
prosecutorial disclosure, and they were not allowed legal counsel.41 Only from the seventeenth
century did prosecutions begin to approximate a fair trial and move towards parity between the
defense and the prosecution in terms of judicial structures, procedures, and resources. The
development of criminal due process has paralleled, and constitutes an element of, the
development of democracy—in England and in Europe more broadly.
Changes gradually occurred in England over the next two centuries, with the nineteenth
century in particular seeing a transformation in the rights of the accused. Changes included
increased autonomy for judges, the right to not incriminate oneself, the right to defense counsel,
defense presence during witness testimony, and two central defense parity issues analyzed in the
research: pretrial disclosure of evidence, and the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.
The creation of a police force in 1829 also removed investigative functions from prosecutors,
and led to greater impartiality in the judiciary.42 The jury is still out, so to speak, on why the
common law system in England generally developed protections for the accused earlier than
Continental civil law systems, and made much less use of torture, but neither system attained
what are today considered full fair trial protections until the twentieth century.
In some of the American colonies prior to independence, various fair trial rights developed
early on, partly in reaction to injustices in the European legal systems which the colonists had
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fled.43 The tendency towards increasing protections for defendants continued after
independence—deprivation of trial by jury, for example, was among the list of complaints
against the English Crown in the 1776 Declaration of Independence. The first constitutional
document at the state level to contain a substantive listing of due process trial rights is the US
Bill of Rights of 1789.44 After 1845 the modern division of functions within a trial developed:
with the jury determining the facts of a case and the judge deciding on the applicable law.45
Constitutional and statutory trial rights were, however, often breached in practice in the
United States, especially for slaves and racial minorities, and varied significantly by state.
Increasingly from the mid-nineteenth century, however, federal court decisions insisting on
higher standards at the state level led to a significant improvement in fairness standards,
including the defense parity provisions of disclosure, witness cross-examination, and in the
1960s institutional support for defense counsel for those who cannot afford one.46

The relationship between trial fairness standards and defense parity
International criminal law scholar Christoph Safferling describes the principle of a fair criminal
trial as encompassing “a whole range of different rights and obligations” in relation to defendants
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that have developed in various legal systems over centuries.47 He conceives of these as
constituting a single right, but one whose components fall within three categories: “institutional
guarantees,” “moral principles,” and first and second generation human rights (civil and political,
and economic and social rights, respectively).48 Only the first has received much attention in IR
research on international courts, while all three are analyzed in the dissertation.
First, institutional guarantees are addressed primarily to legislators, and include such factors
as the independence and impartiality of courts.49 Second, moral principles guide implementation
by authorities within the criminal justice system: for example, the presumption of innocence and
“equality of arms” between the prosecution and defense. These are legal principles in the sense
used by Ronald Dworkin, as guides to legal implementation and interpretation.50 Third, first and
second generation human rights for defendants stem from these moral principles. First generation
rights for criminal defendants are those to be free of government action that diminishes the
dignity of the individual, including the right to freedom from torture to extort a confession.
Second generation rights to be provided with resources by government include that to courtprovided defense counsel.
In the research, an institutional aspect of defense parity often overlooked is explored:
institutional parity in a court’s structure. The project also relies on the second issue, moral-legal
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principles, as establishing the underlying normative guidelines delineating the boundaries of a
fair trial, and the third issue (defendant rights), as laying out the specific legal obligations
towards defendants stemming from these principles.
Defendants rights are what may be called “status human rights,” attaching to an individual
according to their status in the legal proceeding, as contrasted with “pure” human rights, such as
freedom from torture, which attach to all individuals, regardless of status.51 The primary legal
status rights and legal principles that defendants require for protection of their dignity and to
discover their guilt or innocence include: the principle of the burden of proof lying with the
prosecution; the corollary principle of the presumption of innocence, and from that,
expeditiousness of trial; the right to counsel; that counsel is adequately prepared—requiring
sufficient financial and institutional resources and time to prepare a reasonable defense; and such
procedural due process protections as the right of disclosure of prosecution evidence, and the
right to present defense witnesses and cross-examine prosecution witnesses.
Most of these individual rights are encapsulated within the principle of the “equality of arms”
between the prosecution and defense. In the research—as explained in Chapter 1—the term
“defense parity” is utilized instead of equality of arms, as the focus is specifically on institutional
and procedural issues—as opposed to the more resource-oriented understanding of equality of
arms. This is to enable greater comparability between courts, and provides a more relevant and
applicable means of exploring the power dynamic between the prosecution and defense counsel
in the international judicial environment.
51
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Recognition of fair trial rights and defense parity in international law
A significant weakness in the development of a coherent system of international criminal justice
is the ad hoc nature of trial protections for defendants, with each court developing its own
standards. While substantive law has developed a broad degree of consistency, criminal
procedure has lagged far behind.52 International humanitarian and human rights law contain
broad but often unspecified trial protections. Geneva Convention III of 1929 is the first
multilateral treaty to contain aspects of the right to a fair trial;53 and the UDHR marks the first
time that trial rights were included in an international human rights legal document.54
Geneva Convention IV of 1949, relating to the treatment of civilians, contains various fair
trial rights for defendants.55 Especially significant are: the right to a speedy trial and to be
informed of charges in a language the accused understands; the right to present evidence, call
witnesses, and the right to defense counsel (provided by the court if the accused cannot afford
their own), and the provision of an interpreter if required; and the right of appeal. These
protections are also included in the ICCPR,56 the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions,57 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child;58 as well as numerous regional
agreements, including the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man;59 the European

52

Elise Groulx, “Champion of Justice Speech,” National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 30
July 2004, 165-6.
53
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, articles 61-6.
54
UDHR, articles 7-11.
55
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12,
1949, articles 71-6.
56
ICCPR, article 14.
57
Additional Protocol I, articles 45, 75, 85; and Additional Protocol II, article 6.
58
Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, article 40.
59
American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, article 26.

133

Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);60 the American Convention on Human Rights;61 and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.62
States have acknowledged the existence of prosecutorial advantages in relation to the defense
in the conduct of criminal trials through the incorporation of elements of defense parity as core
criminal justice rights in various international human rights and humanitarian laws. These
include the Geneva Conventions,63 and their Additional Protocols;64 the ICCPR,65 the
Convention on the Rights of the Child;66 and the European,67 African,68 and American69 human
rights conventions.
However, while most of these documents reference the legal principles of the presumption of
innocence and one or two specific equality-of-arms issues—such as the right to counsel, paid for
by the court if necessary—the precise rights defense parity entails for criminal defendants are left
largely unspecified in international law. This partly accounts for the inconsistency in the
inclusion of parity rights in the statutes of international tribunals, as discussed in Chapters 4 and
5.
In customary law, significantly deriving from international case law, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has produced by far the most rulings clarifying the human rights of
criminal defendants, domestically and internationally. Masha Fedorova, in the first book-length
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study of equality of arms in international criminal justice, quotes the court as stating that equality
is “an essential guarantee of the right to defend oneself,”70 which “implies a balance of fairness
between parties.”71 She includes two fundamental rights that have been incorporated into the
principle of parity applied in the research: disclosure of prosecution evidence, and crossexamination of prosecution witnesses.72
The case law is inconsistent concerning whether a defendant’s right to parity has been
violated when any of the relevant guarantees have been breached, or whether demonstrating a
violation requires evidence that the breach has been harmful to their defense.73 Demonstrating
prejudice to the outcome for a defendant is problematic because it involves the determination of
a bias introduced to the decision-making of the trial judges, who are themselves making the
determination of whether a violation has occurred. Perhaps due to the difficulty of proving that a
violation has prejudiced a defendant, most prosecutors I interviewed claimed that the procedural
violations which we discussed had not been a problem for defendants in the trials they had
prosecuted because the breaches did not demonstrably affect the outcome of any trial. The
dissertation takes the more cautious approach of the ECtHR in Lanz v. Austria—cautious from
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the perspective of protecting the rights of defendants—of highlighting breaches of guarantees
whether or not they have been determined by the court to have prejudiced the defense.
Additional sources, which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) considers
constitute aspects of the customary law of fair trials and defendant protections,74 include the
1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,75 and the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind by the United Nations’ International Law Commission
(ILC).76 However, they contain vague references to fairness and add little to treaty or customary
law.

Defense protections and politics in international criminal justice
This section explores the development of international criminal justice from the early twentieth
century to the early post-Cold War period, focusing on the evolution of liberal legal fairness
standards. This is to provide background to the case study chapters on the ICTY and ICC, and to
provide context for the later analysis in this chapter of legality and defense parity at the IMT.

Before World War II
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There is a medieval European history of courts trying individuals for international crimes, but
this history has had no discernable impact on twentieth century developments.77 That a political
consensus was developing towards accountability by the early twentieth century is indicated by
two attempts to try individuals for crimes committed during World War I involving German and
Turkish nationals. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles after the war accused the wartime German head
of state, Kaiser Wilhelm II, of international crimes; and it stated the Allied powers’ intention to
establish a “special tribunal” to try him, to be composed of judges from each of the victor states.
It also declared the Allies’ right to establish military tribunals to try German military personnel
for war crimes.78 The Netherlands, however, where the Kaiser had fled following the war,
refused to extradite him, arguing that the crimes for which he was wanted did not exist
internationally, and so would be a breach of legality through the retroactive enforcement of
law.79
There were also Allied demands to prosecute Turkish commanders in charge of the
deportation of the Armenian Christian minority from Turkey between 1915 and 1917. Some 2
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million Armenians are estimated to have died from systematic brutality during the expulsion,80
including many documented acts of mass murder, sexual violence, and starvation, in what the US
ambassador to the Ottoman empire at the time, Henry Morgenthau, described as “race
extermination”81 and has since been widely labeled as genocide.82 It also spurred the first
recorded diplomatic use of the phrase “crimes against humanity.”83 While the first peace deal
between the Allies and the post-Ottoman Turkish government, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres,
declared the right of the Allies to set up courts to try Turks for the Armenian atrocities, it was not
ratified by any of its signatories and the ultimate settlement, contained in the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne, omitted this provision.84
While the suggestion of prosecuting a head of state for international crimes was radical, none
of these trials took place. Nevertheless, the situation set an “incomplete precedent” for
governmental responsibility and for prosecution for “crimes against peace” which were
implemented less than 30 years later at Nuremberg and Tokyo.85 As stated by the ILC in 1950:
“After the termination of the First World War, the conviction crystallized in the minds of
80
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thinking people that the horrors of war must be spared to men, that war is a crime against
humankind and that such a crime must be prevented and punished.”86 The ILC also noted that
“[p]ublic opinion in favour of the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction
continued to manifest itself through the thought and action of official bodies, scientific
institutions and leading jurists.”87
At a 1925 Washington DC conference, the Inter-Parliamentary Union explored the idea of a
legal code to help prosecute for the crime of instigating a war of aggression—with the inclusion
of the principle of legality. The 1926 Brussels conference of the International Association of
Penal Law endorsed the idea that the Permanent Court of International Justice88—the first
international court to adjudicate legal disputes between states—acquire individual criminal
jurisdiction and that treaties be drawn up—thus avoiding retroactivity.89
Between World War I and II, two notable attempts were also made to create the world’s first
permanent international court to try individuals. First, in 1920 the judicial advisory committee
created prior to the Permanent Court of International Justice recommended that the latter also try
individuals for international crimes. The League of Nations, to which the new court would be
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attached, rejected the proposal due to the almost total lack of political will among states to
endorse such a expansion of international jurisdiction.90
Second, on October 9, 1934, King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French foreign
minister, Louis Barthou, were assassinated in an attack by a Bulgarian nationalist in Marseilles.
Later that year the French government made proposals to the League of Nations to prosecute
terrorism, which led to the drafting of two treaties: one to criminalize terrorism under the
domestic law of signatories, and one to create a permanent court to prosecute it. The court would
have in effect have been a “hybrid” tribunal, applying domestic law in an international court.91
Again there was insufficient political will to move either treaty forward.92

The IMT at Nuremberg and the IMTFE at Tokyo
Attitudes towards international prosecution began to change in 1942 as the wartime Allies began
to consider the idea of holding the Axis Powers responsible for atrocities during World War II,
and the following year, in the Moscow Declaration, they stated their intention to prosecute Axis
soldiers for war crimes.93 The UN War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), established by 17 Allied
states in October 1943, provided legal recommendations, which arguably developed the

90

The international crimes considered were “a breach of international public order or against the universal
law of nations.” See Walter George Phillimore, “An International Criminal Court and the resolutions of
the Committee of Jurists,” British Yearbook of International Law 3, no. 1 (1922-3): 79-86, quote at 80.
91
Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum Submitted by
the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, International Law Commission, 1949 (UN doc.
A/CN.4/7/Rev.1), 16-18.
92
L.C. Green, “International Crimes and the Legal Process,” The International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 29, no. 4 (1980): 567-584.
93
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Perennial Conflict Between International Criminal Justice and Realpolitik,”
Georgia State University Law Review 22, no. 3 (2006): 553.

140

customary international law of crimes against humanity applied by international and domestic
war crimes trials after 1945.94
Nevertheless, at a September 1944 meeting in Québec, British prime minister Winston
Churchill and US president Franklin D. Roosevelt still agreed that the political solution of
summary killings was appropriate for the enemy leaders—only ordinary soldiers should be
prosecuted.95 Soviet premier Joseph Stalin stated that he would prefer prosecution—almost
certainly a show trial, similar to those he had instigated against his own military officers before
the war, and German prisoners of war (POWs).96
At this time, no concern was evident among the Allied leaders that international criminal
jurisdiction need be exercised over defeated wartime leaders in order to punish them. They
would in effect be punished retroactively and without recourse to any evidentiary standards—a
key aspect of defense parity—to determine if they had committed such crimes.97 The Allied
concerns at this point were purely political—legal principles seem to have been irrelevant to
Churchill and Roosevelt’s thinking until 1945.98 Churchill did not even seem to grasp the

94

For example, Allied representatives at the UNWCC were using the term “crimes against humanity” by
at least the spring of 1944. The UNWCC from its origins seems to have been concerned to extend war
crimes prosecutions beyond its traditional boundaries, for actions committed outside of war. See Dan
Plesch and Shanti Sattler, “Changing the Paradigm of International Criminal Law: Considering the Work
of the United Nations War Crimes Commission of 1943-1948,” International Community Law Review 15,
no. 2 (2013): 203-23; and Egon Schwelb, “The Work of the United Nations War Crimes Commission,” in
The British Year Book of International Law 23 (1946): 373,
archive.org/stream/britishyearbooko031843mbp/britishyearbooko031843mbp_djvu.txt.
95
Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 80, 87-9.
96
Ibid., 66-70.
97
Gallant, Principle of Legality, 74.
98
Curiously though, Churchill seems concerned to work within a British legal framework, as his cabinet
discussions show he attempted to revive the old English legal designation of “outlaw” for the Axis
leaders, which had been a designation for suspects of serious crimes who did not appear for trial—they
could be legally killed by anyone who captured them. See Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 215.

141

concept of the rule of law internationally beyond the idea of punishing a defeated enemy under
the guise of legal terminology—he was even prepared for Britain to commit war crimes in direct
retaliation for German atrocities.99
The Allies were persuaded to establish actual trials for the Axis leadership by several
political, normative, and, most weakly, legal factors. On the American side, there was opposition
within the US cabinet, yet Secretary of State Cordell Hull was persuaded to support trials by
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who argued that they were “consistent with the advance of
civilization.”100 The death of Roosevelt and his replacement by Vice President Harry S. Truman
in April 1945 was perhaps the most significant issue leading to the US change of heart: Truman
had “an idealistic belief in the beneficent power of law and the wisdom of judges.”101 Churchill
seems to have been concerned about German retaliation against British POWs and by the
evolving US position.102
Other reasons include publicizing the evidence of Axis atrocities so as to preclude later
denials—the political goal of narrative construction—and the related issue of educating the
citizens of the defeated nations about their leaders’ crimes—delegitimizing the enemy.103 That is,
the reasons for establishing trials were primarily political, with arguably only Truman among the
major Allied leaders concerned with the legal legitimacy of criminal justice standards.
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The Allies convened the International Conference on Military Trials (the London
Conference), from June 26 to August 8, 1945, to establish the ground rules for a military tribunal
for the Axis leaders. One of the most significant impacts of the resulting treaty, the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal104—or London Charter—on the development of international
criminal justice was that it provided a definition of crimes against humanity. While that
definition has shifted over time—there is no longer any necessary connection to armed conflict,
for example—its core features are still discernable today and crimes against humanity has
become central to international criminal prosecution. The creation of the crime was intended by
the Allies to enable prosecution for offenses against civilians in occupied territory, especially the
Holocaust in central and eastern Europe. The retroactive enforcement of this new law
consequently constituted a major trial fairness weakness at the IMT.
General issues relating to legal fairness standards for defendants at the IMT and the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at Tokyo are discussed here, including
their contribution to the development of international criminal justice. Specific issues relating to
the research indicators at the IMT, however, are analyzed in detail in the last section of the
chapter.
The international humanitarian law upon which international criminal justice is significantly
based was intended to have a largely preventive function and had not been designed with
individual punishment as a core feature. So while international criminal law contains significant
substantive prohibitions it provides little guidance on criminal prosecution. This has enabled
courts—starting with the IMT—to have a vastly greater role than typically found in an
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established domestic legal system in creating the procedural rules that shape the conduct of trials
and provide them with—or not—the legitimacy of a fair trial with adequate protections for the
accused.105
The complete Allied victory in World War II made possible the international prosecution of
senior war criminals. This established at the outset a connection within international criminal
justice between the level of coercive state power involved in the establishment of an international
court, and its effectiveness: this is demonstrated, in particular, by the ease or otherwise for courts
to obtain suspects and evidence.106 In Europe, the victorious Allied states—the United States, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France—established the IMT at Nuremberg in 1945 to
try the Nazi leadership for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The
trial lasted from November 20, 1945 until final statements were made on August 31, 1946. The
verdicts were announced on October 1 of the latter year: of the 24 individuals who were initially
indicted, 19 were convicted,107 three were acquitted, one was found unfit for trial, and one
committed suicide before the trial began.
The United States alone created a similar court in Tokyo in 1946, the IMTFE, under the
control of the supreme Allied commander, General Douglas MacArthur, to try high-level
Japanese offenders for the same crimes.108 In the end only crimes against peace were prosecuted.
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Eleven judges were appointed, all by MacArthur. The legal basis for the court’s creation was
very different to that of the IMT: instead of the latter’s multilateral treaty (the London Charter)—
which excluded Germany—the IMTFE’s basis was the 1945 Instrument of Surrender of Japan to
the United States, and therefore the tribunal arguably possessed the legal consent of the occupied
state. When the trial came to a close in November 1948, of the 28 accused, all 25 of those who
had lived until the verdict was presented were convicted.109
There were also prosecutions held for lower ranking offenders in each of the Allied Zones of
Occupation, and in East Asia by the United States. Under Control Council Law No. 10 the Allies
prosecuted German defendants for the same crimes as under the IMT. In the Philippines, Japan,
and elsewhere the Allies prosecuted around 6,000 Japanese.110 Some of these trials developed
substantive criminal law, including command responsibility as a mode of criminal liability.111
For the purposes of the dissertation, the IMT is important for establishing that, as stated in
the Nuremberg judgment, in international trials defendants are to “receive a fair trial on the facts
and law,” encapsulating both features of legitimacy explored in the research.112 However, what
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constitutes fairness has been subject to much debate, as discussed below. The London Charter
established an adversarial trial structure at Nuremberg, with prosecutors attempting to persuade
the court’s four judges—one appointed by each of the major Allied states—of the guilt of the
defendants, who had access to legal counsel. The primary concessions to the civil law system
were trial by judges rather than jury (the former would decide guilt or innocence as well as
sentence), and very loose rules of evidence (including reliance on hearsay, not typically
admissible in common law jurisdictions).
In broad terms, “[e]xcept for guaranteeing a right to counsel…[the IMT and IMTFE] paid
very little attention to the rights of the accused.”113 Positive aspects of fairness towards
defendants at the IMT include the right to counsel, to present evidence and cross-examine
prosecution witnesses, and to be presented with the charges and with a translation.114 Additional
rights were contained in the court’s Rules of Procedure, including that of the defense to request
the court’s assistance in locating evidence.115 The trials were also translated into the defendants’
own languages, and defendants had access to a detailed indictment. The IMTFE Charter and
Rules of Evidence established basic defense rights in relation to the indictment, counsel,
evidence, and translation.116 Despite the similarity of fair trial provisions between the tribunals,
fairness at the IMTFE was in practice significantly weaker, due to the control over the
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proceedings exercised by General MacArthur, who was more concerned with how the trial might
negatively affect the US occupation of Japan than with the fairness of the trial itself.117
Fairness weaknesses at both tribunals include limited access to copies of many prosecution
evidence documents (i.e. poor disclosure); inability of defense counsel to travel abroad to
conduct investigations; all prosecutors and judges were from Allied states; defense lawyers could
only come from Germany, and so were unused to the Anglo-American adversarial trial system
used by the tribunals; there were limited facilities for defense to prepare their cases; and there
was no appeals process.118 The defendants were also prohibited from using the tu quoque legal
argument: you have also committed the crimes that I have.119
The IMTFE trial was characterized by pressure to come to a swift conclusion, with harmful
effects on defense parity, including evidentiary standards. There was lax judicial oversight of
evidence the prosecution wished to introduce, in contrast to standard practice in adversarial trial
proceedings. The judges gave increasingly less scrutiny over time, allowing a great deal of
dubious documentation to be presented against the defendants, including documents without
authentication, excerpts, and written statements without the presence of the witness for crossexamination.120 When it came time for the defense to present its case the judges applied stricter
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standards for evidentiary inclusion—claiming now that the opposite approach for the other side
would help to speed up the trial.121
Both tribunals suffered from the partiality of all judges and prosecutors being chosen by the
Allies, and only the losers being tried, leading to the charge of victor’s justice.122 In addition,
allegations of bias were aimed at two of the IMTFE judges: William Web, for his participation in
the Australian War Crimes Commission investigations into Japanese atrocities; and especially
Delfin Jaranilla, who had been a prisoner of war on the infamous Bataan Death March in the
Philippines in 1942, on which thousands of Filipino and American POWs died due to their brutal
treatment at the hands of their Japanese captors.123 Additionally, MacArthur, as mentioned,
appointed all 11 judges and the prosecutor at the IMTFE.124
The Nuremberg tribunal has had a greater impact on the development of international
criminal justice than the Tokyo tribunal partly because of the greater partiality of the latter.125
The French judge at the IMTFE, Henri Bernard, suggested that the very fact that the Allies had
not just executed Japan’s leadership out of hand, which it might easily have done, was enough to
justify the trials. They were conceived of as the best justice the leaders could expect: the legal
status of the trials was justified on normative grounds, not legal.126
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Post-Nuremberg developments
In the immediate postwar period, the IMT generated interest in substantive law and a possible
permanent court. However, the UN General Assembly consistently postponed consideration of a
court, primarily due to disputes about the definition of aggression and the basis for establishing
jurisdiction.
The UNWCC had recommended in 1944 that a post-war international criminal tribunal have
jurisdiction over crimes committed “because of race, nationality, religious or political belief,”
and regardless of where committed.127 This appears to be the first discussion in an official legal
context of prosecution for Axis crimes during World War II committed on the basis of the
identity of the victim. Three of these forms of social identity (all but political beliefs) also found
their way into the 1948 Genocide Convention. The term “genocide” was first utilized legally at
the international level in the context of the IMT—the American delegation to the 1945 London
Conference had even proposed that genocide be prosecuted as a specific crime.128
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During the Cold War, there were various developments in substantive international criminal
law, including the creation of the Genocide Convention; and the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the 1977 Additional Protocols, which developed the elements of war crimes. There were also
developments of procedural protections for defendants, but no international tribunals were
created, and so there was no evolution in the practice of legal fairness standards.129
Over 40 years after the IMTs, the collapse of superpower rivalry generated a major shift in
the global political environment, which led to improved prospects for cooperation in the UN
Security Council. The early post-Gulf War euphoria about the possibilities for robust council
action quickly soured in the wake of the debacle in Somalia in 1993, the inability to end the war
and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, and the lack of political will among major powers in the
Security Council to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Instead of military action, the council created
tribunals to prosecute those responsible for atrocities in the latter two contexts.
In resolution 827 in May 1993 the counsel created the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, based in The Hague, Netherlands. In November the following year, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, based in Arusha, Tanzania, was established in
resolution 955. The legal basis for the tribunals was initially controversial because the UN
Charter does not explicitly provide the Security Council with the authority to establish judicial
bodies. The objection that the council was acting ultra vires—beyond its legal authority—was
raised during negotiations over both tribunals, especially by China and Brazil.130 However, the
129
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secretary-general’s argument became accepted: that the legal basis for the tribunal lay in the
council’s Chapter VII authority to respond to threats to international peace and security with
non-military measures that are binding on all member states.131
The secretary-general and the Security Council demonstrated far greater concern with
legality and defense parity than was demonstrated by the Allies in creating the IMT. The
secretary-general’s report made basic recommendations for guaranteeing the rights of the
accused,132 and these were included in the court’s statute.133 Specific issues relating to the
research indicators are analyzed in Chapter 4.
The establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 can be traced back to a
coalition of 16 Caribbean and Latin American states led by Trinidad and Tobago,134 which
encouraged the General Assembly in 1989 to request the ILC to study the possibility of creating
a court to combat drug trafficking.135 The ILC continued its research into a draft code of
international crimes,136 producing a draft court statute in 1994.137 Building on the momentum of
the initial operations of the ad hoc Security Council tribunals, and learning from their experience,
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the ILC’s draft became the basis for the founding Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998.138 Legality
of crimes and punishment in particular were acknowledged explicitly in the statute,139 though
there are concerns with its implementation, as there are for defense parity.140
In broad terms, fairness towards defendants has improved significantly since the first
international criminal tribunal was created in 1945. However, as explained in Chapters 4 and 5,
when the most important indicators of legal legitimacy are examined, the trajectory towards a
modern system of international criminal justice with very high levels of defense protection is not
so clear cut.

The IMT: Institutional power and bias towards prosecution
This section provides an exploration of the research indicators in relation to the IMT at
Nuremberg, and the role of institutional power and other political factors in shaping the legal
dynamic between the prosecution and defense at the tribunal. This enables a comparison to the
more detailed examination of these indicators at the ICTY and ICC in later chapters. First, the
legality of crimes and punishment is examined in relation to the two mass atrocity crimes
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prosecuted at Nuremberg: war crimes and crimes against humanity.141 Second, the defense parity
indicators of institutional support and procedural guarantees are examined. The institutional
support sub-indicators of court structure and court support for investigation and evidence
gathering are explored, followed by the procedural guarantee sub-indicators of disclosure and the
cross-examination of witnesses. The data sources utilized include the London Charter and Rules
of Procedure, the trial judgment and other IMT documents, UNWCC documents, personal
memoirs, and secondary historical sources.
See Table 3.1 below for a summary of defendant information. Some of the defendants and
their counsel are referred to in the analysis below. Columns three and four, detailing crimes
charged and sentence, relate to the legality of crimes and punishment, respectively.

Table 3.1 Defendants at the IMT at Nuremberg
Defendant142

Chief counsel

Crimes charged (and Sentence
verdict)143

Bormann, Martin (in

NA

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Otto Kranzbühler

WC (G)

10 years

absentia)
Dönitz, Karl

141
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Frank, Hans

Alfred Seidl

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Frick, Wilhelm

Otto Pannenbecker

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Fritzsche, Hans

Heinz Fritz

WC (NG)

Acquitted

Funk, Walther

Walther Funk

WC (G), CAH (G)

Life

Göring, Hermann

Otto Stahmer

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Hess, Rudolf

Günther von

WC (NG), CAH (NG)

Life144

Rohrscheidt
Jodl, Alfred

Franz Exner

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Kaltenbrunner, Ernst

Kurt Kauffmann

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Keitel, Wilhelm

Otto Nelte

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Neurath, Konstantin

Otto Freiherr von

WC (G), CAH (G)

15 years

von

Ludinghausen

Papen, Franz von

Egon Kubuschok

None

Acquitted145

Raeder, Erich

Walter Siemens

WC (G)

Life

Ribbentrop, Joachim

Fritz Sauter

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Rosenberg, Alfred

Alfred Thoma

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Sauckel, Fritz

Robert Servatius

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Schacht, Hjalmar

Herbert Kraus

None

Acquitted146

Schirach, Baldur von

Fritz Sauter

CAH (G)

20 years

von
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Seyss-Inquart, Arthur

Gustav Steinbauer

WC (G), CAH (G)

Death

Speer, Albert

Hans Flächsner

WC (G), CAH (G)

20 years

Streicher, Julius

Hanns Marx

CAH (G)

Death

Source: Robert E. Conot, Justice At Nuremberg (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1983); Roderick
Stackelberg, The Routledge Companion to Nazi Germany (New York: Routledge, 2007), 172; Eugene
Davidson, Trial of the Germans: Account of the Twenty-two Defendants Before the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1969); the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum, “Nuremberg Military Tribunal: The Defendants,”
www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007070; and various IMT documents at Yale Law
School, The Avalon Project, “Nuremberg Trial Proceedings,” avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp.

Legality indicator 1: Non-retroactivity of crimes
This section first discusses broad issues of the legality of the crimes prosecuted at the IMT, and
then specifically in relation to the enforcement of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
American, British, and French delegations to the London Conference, which created the IMT
charter, expressed concern that the offenses they wished to prosecute were not established as
crimes in international law and so could be challenged within the IMT. In response, the British
chief representative—and chairman of the conference—David Maxwell Fyfe stated during one
of the final conference discussions, in regard to the proposed charter: “I want to make it clear in

155

this document what are the things for which the tribunal can punish the defendants…It should
not be left to the tribunal to say what is or is not a violation of international law.”147
André Gros, the assistant to the French representative, disagreed—arguing that this
constituted retroactive lawmaking.148 However, the French delegation came around to accepting
the British position, and the final charter draft reflected the eventual joint Allied position that the
tribunal would be unable to challenge the Allied political declaration—as opposed to legal
determination—of what constituted existing law.149 As Cherif Bassiouni states, this position was
“clearly tautological and self-serving.”150 The Allied debates in relation to constructing the IMT
illustrate how the legality of crimes, from the very beginning of international criminal
prosecution, has been shaped as much by the institutional power of dominant states, bargaining
over their political preferences within influential decision-making forums, as it has by legal
determinations.
In relation to determining the legality of prosecution for war crimes, by the time period of the
commission of the acts for which the IMT defendants were on trial—the late 1930s to 1945—
some acts by soldiers in war had been outlawed by treaty: in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907, and the Geneva Conventions I to III of 1864, 1906, and 1929, respectively.151 Germany,
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whose citizens were prosecuted at the IMT, had ratified the 1907 Hague Convention (with
reservations), though not the 1899 one; and had ratified Geneva Convention III, relating to
POWs.152 Also various authorities during the war, including Allied state representatives at the
UNWCC, agreed that individuals could be tried for violations of the laws and customs of war.153
Nevertheless, the British Foreign Office expressed concern during the war that prosecuting Axis
leaders for war crimes would be in breach of the principle of legality, as no specific provision for
prosecution for violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions was envisaged when they were
created.154
However, precedents were set for prosecution for war crimes during the war which have been
argued to demonstrate that it had attained customary law status by 1945.155 The Soviets were the
first to prosecute German POWs during the war, at Kharkov in Ukraine.156 The United States
prosecuted a few Germans captured on American soil, though concern that its own POWs might
be prosecuted encouraged the United States to lead the German government to believe that it
would not prosecute German POWs in Europe.157 The British government consistently
maintained the right to try German POWs throughout the war.158 From the prior existence of war
crimes law, in treaty and customary form, and the wartime practice of prosecuting German
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POWs, war crimes are generally agreed to have attained a high level of non-retroactivity of
enforcement at the IMT.
In relation to the legality of prosecution for crimes against humanity, some of the atrocities
committed during World War II had similarities to those during World War I in that they were
not covered under the existing international law of war crimes. This included acts perpetrated by
a government or individuals against the state’s own population; persecution on a political or
racial basis in occupied territory; and attacks on the population of states not formally under
occupation.159 Providing the IMT with jurisdiction over this new category of crime gave the
allies a way to prosecute such acts by the German government, including for the atrocities of the
Holocaust—“genocide” only came into existence as a non-retroactively enforceable crime in its
own right with the creation of the Genocide Convention in 1948.160
The UNWCC provided legal and judicial recommendations that developed the customary
international law of crimes against humanity applied by international and domestic war crimes
trials after 1945.161 Its Allied representatives were using the term “crimes against humanity” by
at least the spring of 1944: from its origins the UNWCC seems to have been concerned to extend
war crimes prosecutions beyond its traditional boundaries into actions committed outside of
war.162
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The lack of agreement and consistency of national positions, however, on whether
individuals should be prosecuted for crimes against humanity is evident in UNWCC votes on a
motion for expanding its investigations to include atrocities committed by German citizens
against Axis citizens, and a motion on whether crimes against humanity “are war crimes within
the jurisdiction of the UNWCC.” In the former, votes in favor included Czechoslovakia, the
Netherlands, and the United States, while those against included Greece, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom.163 On the latter, those in favor included the Western states of Australia,
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, and
Yugoslavia, plus India. While there were no votes against, the following Western states
abstained: France, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the United States, plus China.164
This suggests that there was little agreement on the existence of the crime during the war.
However, evidence for the legality of enforcement of crimes against humanity is suggested by an
Allied declaration during World War I in response to reports of systematic attacks on Armenians
by the Ottoman government: “In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and
civilization, the Allied governments announce publically to the Sublime Porte that they will hold
personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman Government and those of
their agents who are implicated in such massacres.”165 This is significant not only for being the
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first official use of the term “crimes against humanity,” but also for the claim by major powers
that individuals should be held criminally accountable.
After World War I, a commission set up by the allies to investigate war responsibility
recommended in its report to the Paris Peace Conference, which established the terms of the
postwar settlement, that an international tribunal be created to try the defeated states for, among
other crimes, acts “in violation of the elementary laws of humanity” and individuals for
“offenses against…the laws of humanity.”166 The report lists 32 specific offenses, some of which
constitute what have become the core underlying offenses of crimes against humanity, including
murder, rape, and torture. However, due to the objection by US representatives that this would
require applying law retroactively, crimes against humanity were not included in the proposed
court’s remit.167 Therefore while there was discussion of prosecution for this nascent offense,
there was no agreement among states that would constitute the basis for claiming customary law
status before World War II—partly due to concern about retroactive enforcement.
Dan Plesch and Shanti Sattler nevertheless argue that crimes against humanity were not
created retroactively by the London Charter, as they were in the process of becoming customary
law during the work of the UNWCC, from 1943 to 1948. This is implausible, as many of the
crimes prosecuted at the IMT were committed before 1943 and it is questionable to claim that a
customary law had crystalized before that point—i.e. before the commission of the crimes, which
would be necessary for prosecution to avoid retroactivity. Furthermore, even the UNWCC did
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not investigate actions other than those constituting war crimes.168 At this stage, there was no
consensus among Western states on the breadth of scope that international criminal law should
have going forward beyond the IMT. The legality of the prosecutions for crimes against
humanity at the IMT and IMTFE was also questioned at the time by such legal notables as
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas and an Indian judge at the Tokyo tribunal, Rahadbinod
Pal.169
Christian Tomuschat argues that non-retroactivity of crimes is not applicable at the
international level. Its purpose is to protect “legitimate confidence” by legal subjects in the
legality of their acts: if subjects cannot reasonably be conceived of as being confident that their
acts were legal then they may be legally prosecuted, whether or not a specific law exists at the
time of commission: “Nobody should be prosecuted on account of a conduct, the punishable
character of which he was not aware of, and could not be expected to have been aware of, when
he practised that conduct.”170 As he goes on to argue in relation to the crime under discussion:
“crimes against humanity are not only morally objectionable, but deserve to be punished and
must be punished because of their abhorrent character if peaceful coexistence in human society is
to be maintained.”171 His argument is entirely normative and political, disregarding the legal
character of the principle and conflating legal and substantive justice.
The IMT charter did not include non-retroactivity of crimes as a defendant right. Despite this
the court considered a defense motion challenging the legality of enforcement for crimes against
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humanity.172 This is significant as “one beginning of a doctrine of international legal personality
of individuals,” whereby individuals can assert international rights in relation to states and
IGOs.173 Nevertheless, the Nuremberg judges dismissed the motion, arguing that neither the
defense nor prosecution had authority under the IMT charter to challenge the court’s substantive
jurisdiction over crimes.174
According to Antonio Cassese, the demands of political justice significantly overrode
pressure for legal justice in terms of non-retroactivity.175 Instead, the IMT judgment in 1946
makes clear that the tribunal saw political justice—that is, the political goals of the tribunal—as
supreme over legal justice at the international level: “the maxim ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ [nonretroactivity of crimes] is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice.
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked
neighbouring States without warning is obviously untrue.”176 The judgment went on to argue
that: “The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the
countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of
these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized
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world.”177 The judges claimed that political authorities—the Allied states—had the right, or
jurisdiction, to perform legislative functions and determine what constitutes law—unrestricted by
any principles of legality that define what constitutes law.
Thus, crimes against humanity were enforced retroactively at the IMT. Despite some
disagreement among contemporary lawyers, the court’s dismissal of such a fundamental breach
of legal protections for criminal defendants was nevertheless largely accepted at that time178—
although it has sustained greater criticism since.179 Contemporary acceptance was partly due, as
mentioned, to concern with achieving the court’s political goals, and the acknowledgment that its
justice was the best the defendants could expect—better, that is, than the alternative of extrajudicial execution. Acceptance was also due to the lack of any international humanitarian or
human rights legal provision at that time prohibiting retroactive enforcement of crimes.
Ultimately the IMT decided that while non-retroactivity of crimes was an accepted principle
of domestic law, and arguably even of international law at that time due to consistency of state
practice, it was not a limitation of the legal right of the Allies to create law binding on the
tribunal and its defendants. That is, the judges argued that at that time legality was a binding
principle in domestic law, and an international normative standard, but not a binding
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international legal principle.180 The judges privileged substantive justice over legal justice,
diminishing the legitimacy of the trial. This judgment has been relied upon since 1945 to argue
that the IMT prosecutions were not in breach of legality.181 Ultimately, however, the dissertation
agrees with Marko Milanovic, vice-president of the European Society of International Law, who
argues that such an approach is not “intellectually honest.”182

Legality indicator 2: Non-retroactivity of punishment
No punishment guidelines for committing war crimes are delineated in the applicable
international treaty and customary law of war crimes during World War II, and as crimes against
humanity were not established in either form of law there were, similarly, no punishment
guidelines for commission of that offense. Therefore, while war crimes were not in breach of the
retroactivity of crimes, and crimes against humanity were, the enforcement of both crimes at the
IMT disregarded the principle of legality in regards to punishment.
An important concern in regards to the legality of punishment was the extent to which
judicial discretion in determining sentences was guided and restricted by law—thereby
diminishing the opportunities for judges to apply excessive, and inconsistent, discretion in
sentencing practice. With no punishments laid out in treaty or customary law at that time for any
international crime, such guidance can only be found in the London Charter: in regard to all
crimes prosecuted by the court, it states that “[t]he Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a
180
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Defendant, on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be
just.”183
This is problematic for a breadth and vagueness that provided effectively no judicial
guidance and allowed for excessive discretion—in addition to the death penalty, absolutely any
custodial sentence could be applied. Furthermore there was no possibility of appeal, with the
charter stating: “The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of any Defendant
shall give the reasons on which it is based, and shall be final and not subject to review.”184 No
further guidance for judges as to punishment was provided in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. This is especially problematic as, of the 19 defendants convicted at the IMT, 12 were
sentenced to death. As Table 3.1 shows, the other seven were given custodial sentences: life
(three defendants), 20 years (two), 15 years (one), and 10 years (one).
The court’s judgment made little reference to the issue of retroactivity of sentencing, despite
devoting considerable attention to dismissing the accusation of retroactivity of crimes.185 At this
time, sentencing issues do not appear to have been considered a significant moral, let alone legal,
constraint on the powers of international courts.
Ultimately legality was breached in a more definitive and expansive manner in terms of
punishment than of crimes. The irony is that the breaches of legality at Nuremberg and Tokyo—
both of crimes and punishment—led to the later determination that prosecution and punishment
by international courts for breaches of war crimes and crimes against humanity were legal. The
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breach of legality created the legal precedent relied upon to establish prosecution and
punishment in the post-Cold War period.

Defense parity indicator 1: Institutional support
This section first discusses parity in relation to the defense and prosecution’s official positions
within the IMT’s institutional structure. It then analyzes the support afforded by the court to both
sides in pre-trial investigations.
While the IMT prosecutors were given distinct duties in the London Charter, as a whole they
lacked any official institutional status within the court’s structure. However, the charter did
establish within the IMT a “committee for the investigation and prosecution of major war
criminals,” consisting of the four chief prosecutors.186 They were charged with such duties as
recommending rules of procedure for the trial to the judges, and deciding on the indictment and
the evidence to be submitted. The prosecution did not possess an official status to enable them to
formally request procedural decision-making changes.
Nevertheless, the chief prosecutors were provided with significant influence over the
proceedings through their function, as stipulated in the charter, of devising the court’s Rules of
Procedure.187 The rules they created derived mostly from the practice of American military
commissions, with the emphasis in their construction primarily not on legal fairness standards,
but “workability and expedition.”188 The rules themselves were inconsistently applied, but the
186
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most significant problem lay in their being “so flexible they were open to abuse.”189 The
prosecution’s central role in constructing the procedural and evidentiary rules of the court
therefore provided it with an enormous advantage in its courtroom confrontation with defense
counsel. Counsel had no official institutional status within the court’s structure. It is indicative
that counsel is only mentioned within three articles of the IMT charter, as opposed to eight for
the prosecution.190
Attitudes towards defense counsel at the IMT are arguably an indicator of how the issue of
the heinousness of international crimes interferes with the presumption of innocence in
international trials. It illustrates the different dynamic between a court and the prosecution, and
the court and defense counsel, despite their ostensibly equivalent courtroom roles in competing
to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused. Defense counsel do not seem to have been
perceived by the IMT judges and prosecutors as part of a process of pursuing genuine legal
justice, but merely as an adjunct of the accused. As described by IMT prosecutor Telford Taylor,
“[s]ocially, the…defense counsel were no part of the war crimes community,”191 which consisted
of Allied judges, prosecutors, and judicial staff. Taylor acknowledged the distinct way that
defense counsel were perceived by the prosecution, tainted by atrocities that they had not been
accused of committing and that had not at that point been legally proven against their clients:
“the relations between the German lawyers [defense counsel] and ourselves could not be like that
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of British barristers on circuit, where those who had been at each other’s throats in court that day
could settle down together that evening for a friendly drink and chat. The appalling organized
atrocities of the Nazi leaders lay between us.”192
The discussion now turns to institutional support for investigation and evidence gathering by
the defense in comparison with the prosecution at the IMT. The same conditions of territorial
occupation that ultimately led to the accusations of victors’ justice in relation to the IMT, also
meant that the prosecution had direct access to a vast number documents and witnesses germane
to making their case.193 The London Charter gave the defense the right to present evidence, but
did not provide aid to counsel in conducting investigations or gathering evidence. The Rules of
Procedure stated that the defense might request the court’s assistance in locating evidence, and
the court could then request states to locate the information.194 States were not required to hand
over documents, and the court provided no aid in investigating or securing evidence beyond
making these requests. In practice, Allied states were very reluctant to provide information to
counsel.
A dramatic demonstration of the lack of parity in evidence gathering and ultimately
presentation—and a distinct breach of current standards of access to information—is found in the
prohibition on defense counsel access to the Allied-controlled German archives in conducting
their investigations. According to Otto Kranzbühler, defense counsel for Admiral Dönitz,
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counsel were also barred from all domestic records of the Allies themselves.195 This severely
restricted the ability of defense counsel to investigate and search for exculpatory or mitigating
material, and thereby to construct an adequate defense.196
In making the prosecution’s case against the defendants, the US chief prosecutor at the IMT,
US Supreme Court justice Robert H. Jackson, decided to rely largely on documentary evidence
in the trial—primarily gathered within Germany from government archives—as opposed to
witnesses.197 This was partly due to their perceived ability to aid in the construction of a
historical narrative—discussed later. It was also because of the availability of a vast trove of
documents, a result of the German government’s meticulous recordkeeping and its swift collapse
and the occupation of Germany, putting much of this material in Allied hands.198 For example,
after Hitler’s death, the new government of Admiral Karl Dönitz left huge quantities of
government and military records behind when it moved from Flensburg to Mondorf, and German
air force files were recovered from a salt mine in Bavaria. At Hitler’s retreat in Berchtesgaden
were found the plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and official reports on the killing of half
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a million Galician Jews. Such records were essential to the prosecution’s case at the IMT in
relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity.199

Defense parity indicator 2: Evidentiary procedures
Dealing with the large volume of documentary evidence during trial proved problematic for the
prosecution in that it risked slowing down proceedings—something Jackson was keen to
avoid.200 The prosecution, however, were provided with significant leeway in their presentation
of evidence. As the charter stated: “The tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of
evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and nontechnical
procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to be of probative value.”201 Perhaps at
least partly due to his critical attitude towards the IMT’s evidentiary standards, Goldstone, as the
first chief prosecutor of the ICTY, stated to the author that he thought there was little in the way
of lessons to be learnt for the ICTY from the practice of the IMT.202
This wording was constructed to facilitate the introduction of any material even vaguely
relevant as prosecution evidence without effective legal challenge. Former ICTY chief
prosecutor Richard Goldstone and Adam Smith argue that the excessive latitude given to the
prosecution in the London Charter seems to have been intended to calm British concerns that a
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genuinely fair trial would lead to too many acquittals.203 The virtually non-existent rules of
evidence meant that hearsay evidence—prohibited in most adversarial trial systems—was
permitted at the IMT. Such evidence is problematic because it may be very indirect and is more
likely to be in error than even direct witness testimony, which is also often suspect.204
The presentation of evidence in the IMT prosecution’s case exhibits weaknesses in terms of
defense parity that seem to stem at least partly from the Allies’ concern that the volume of
evidence they intended to introduce would lengthen the trial excessively. Justice Jackson stated
during a prosecutors’ meeting that his staff had introduced 331 documents as evidence against
the accused within the first four hours of the trial. The presentation of the evidence took the form
of reading a summary of a brief (that is, a summary of a summary of the original document)
which largely declared the validity of the originals in making the prosecution case. Prosecutor
Taylor believed that at such a pace and with such methods of introduction, the defense could not
follow the case being presented—especially as the briefs were also initially made available to the
defense only in English.205
The Allied states which created the tribunal were determined to deal swiftly with the leaders
of the losing side of the war—and to find them guilty and execute punishment. This is in spite of
the time that is necessary to conduct criminal trials with comprehensive due process protections
for defendants at the domestic level in liberal legal systems. The Soviet position at the London
Conference and during the trial was especially clear: defense protections were never a concern
for the conference negotiators or for the Russian judges and prosecutors, as it was not
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domestically. The leader of the Soviet delegation to the London Conference, General Iona
Timofeevich Nikitchenko, who had been a show trial judge during Stalin’s purges in the late
1930s, stated this clearly during the conference debates: “The fact that the Nazi leaders are
criminals has already been established. The task of the tribunal is only to determine the measure
of guilt of each particular person and mete out the necessary punishment.”206
However, institutional power bargaining dynamics are frequently characterized by an
inequality of influence over the final rule-making outcomes. This is evident at the conference, as
the American and British positions became a far more significant factor in determining the
evidentiary procedures provided for in the London Charter than those of Russia and France. The
American and British representatives at the conference—and their chief prosecutors at the
court—took a far more active role in constructing the tribunal’s investigatory and trial
procedures. The British government’s earlier decision that—under extrapolation from an old
English law on the advice of Lord Chancellor Simon—the Nazi leaders should be shot within six
hours of apprehension as “outlaws,”207 changed only at the eleventh hour due to the new
American position.
The British maintained their concern that strong defendant protections would undermine the
goal of successful prosecutions. Even the Americans—who at one point had been the only major
Allied government pushing for legal trials (as opposed to purely show trials)—expressed
misgivings about the wisdom of a fair trial.208 US State Department staff claimed in a 1944

206

Jackson, “Report of Robert H. Jackson,” 303, quoted in Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 240.
Richard Overy, Interrogations: The Nazi elite in Allied Hands, 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2001), 54.
208
Goldstone and Smith, International Judicial Institutions, 59.
207

172

memorandum that a fair trial would be dangerous as it might allow the defendants to use the
platform of such a trial to grandstand—to justify their actions and attack the Allies.209
In terms of the first evidentiary indicator, the right of defense counsel to disclosure of
prosecution evidence before the beginning of trial, the “crude but…workable” solution to
merging Anglo-American and Continental trial approaches involved the prosecution providing
some evidence to the defense at the indictment stage (before trial), with the right to introduce
more evidence later.210 This approach went beyond US requirements at the time, but was lower
than the contemporary Continental requirement of full disclosure of all prosecution evidence in
the indictment, and the common-law practice as it developed during the Cold War towards full
disclosure before the start of trial.211
Provision of evidence to counsel by the prosecution seems to have been inadequate
throughout the trial. According to a later account by Otto Pannenbecker, defendant Wilhelm
Frick’s chief counsel, on numerous occasions counsel complained that they had not seen
evidence before it was presented at trial, clearly leaving little time to adequately respond in
defense of their clients.212 For example, during the first month of the trial, Judge Geoffrey
Lawrence criticized prosecutor Robert Storey for providing hundreds of copies of prosecution
documents to the press, but only about five to counsel—less than one for every four
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defendants.213 Counsel Carl Haensel details prosecution refusal to provide the defense with
copies of German documents related to the mass murder of POWs: only indexes were provided,
listing documents by name.214
Combined with the fact that many documents were presented in court via a brief rather than
presenting the documentary evidence directly (the usual practice), these evidentiary access
problems led the IMT judges to require changes to how evidence could be introduced:
documents had to be read directly into the record during trial (no brief allowed) and a translation
typed during the reading and handed to defense at the end of each day. By slowing proceedings
the judges ameliorated some of the evidence-related problems generated by the prosecution’s
trial methods. However, this approach only lasted for a few weeks, as Justice Jackson sought
ways to speed up the pace of the trial again.215
In an indicative example of the negative effect on disclosure of the prosecution desire for a
swifter trial, Kranzbühler, Dönitz’s chief counsel, requested a meeting with the judges and
prosecutors to discuss his demand that documents be made available to the defense—and in the
original German—before their presentation in court.216 Jackson’s prosecution team had been
providing documents to the court in English which had not yet been seen by the defense (in
English or the original German). According to Kranzbühler, during the subsequent in camera
meeting (in judges’ chambers, and not in the official record) Jackson stated that it would be too
time-consuming and would conflict with the aims of the trial to have to provide the defense with
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German copies of all documentary evidence. When pressed by Judge Lawrence on what he saw
those aims to be, Jackson is claimed to have stated what amounted to political goals of
delegitimization and historical narrative construction: to prove that German conduct in the war
was unjustified and illegal, as the United States had claimed all along; and “to make it clear to
the German people that it deserved severe punishment, and to prepare them for such
punishment.”217
The prosecution was also not required to disclose exculpatory material to defense counsel,
and the latter were given little time to examine what they were given.218 This is especially
problematic in the context of the IMT because, as mentioned, defense counsel had little ability to
gather evidence of their own to present at trial because they had no access to information outside
of Germany and were barred from archives in Allied hands.219
Many of the evidentiary issues—such as the weight of documentary evidence introduced, its
availability and disclosure to the defense, and the language of the summaries—result from the
prosecution being overwhelmed with the size of the task at hand considering the time scale the
Allies seem to have envisaged, and the consequent desire by Jackson to facilitate the trial by
cutting procedural corners. The speed of trial was a constant factor for the defense even when its
direct impact was on the prosecution, by disadvantaging the defense in gaining adequate and
timely access to the prosecution’s case.
The problems surrounding the volume of evidence introduced were partly caused by
Jackson’s desire to use the trial for narrative construction purposes: in order to legitimize the
217
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punishment of the losers as well as to construct a historical record.220 The volume of
documentary evidence introduced by the prosecution was vastly greater than that needed to
construct its case, and Jackson was hesitant to rely on the testimony of witnesses, whose
reliability could not be guaranteed and who might be induced by defense counsel, in Jackson’s
words, “to waver in their statements.”221
Jackson later described the success of the IMT to President Truman partly in terms of the
narrative objective: “We have documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions,
persecutions, and atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no
responsible denial of these crimes in the future.”222 The historical narrative goal of the trial was
partly responsible for the weaknesses in defense parity resulting from the inability—and
unwillingness—of the prosecution to enable defense access to the huge volume of documentary
evidence.
Jackson was not the only individual involved in the legal process who shaped legal questions
and procedures surrounding the defendants for political ends. Kim Priemel and Alexa Stiller
argue that a—largely American and European émigré—epistemic community concerning Nazi
Germany constructed the knowledge base on Nazi actions which created the legal categories
pursued at the various Nuremberg trials. This community consisted of lawyers, such as Raphael
Lemkin and Hersch Lauterpacht, and other relevant experts, such as historian Walter L. Dorn
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and economist Edward Mason.223 Their goals were partly political and partly legal, but one of
their greatest influences was over the composition of the indictment and opening statements: “the
prime documents to phrase the narratives and arguments.”224
The discussion now turns to the second evidentiary issue—witness cross-examination.225 The
London Charter provided defendants with the right to present their own witnesses and crossexamine those of the prosecution.226 The international criminal trial practitioners interviewed for
this project almost all agreed that one of the most important issues—if not the most—that aids
the accused in presenting an adequate defense is the quality of counsel. They considered quality
to reside in significant knowledge of the relevant trial system—adversarial at the IMT (as at all
later international courts)—and the skills and judgment to respond effectively to the
prosecution’s case, especially in cross-examining witnesses.227 Cross-examination is “the
hallmark of party-managed presentation of evidence,” with “party-managed” referring to an
adversarial structure dominated by prosecution and defense, rather than the judge-dominated
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Continental inquisitorial system. In an adversarial system, cross-examination is central to
defendants’ right to challenge the evidence presented against them.228
The task of cross-examination is complicated enormously in situations in which defense
counsel are unfamiliar with the adversarial system. The IMT charter prohibited the accused from
retaining counsel from any country except Germany.229 Counsel were therefore all experienced
in an inquisitorial trial system, and consequently unfamiliar with the central function of crossexamination of prosecution witnesses. In inquisitorial trials, judges rather than the attorneys tend
to question witnesses and there is no cross-examination, in which witness statements can be
questioned and they can be specifically asked leading questions (not allowed in questioning
one’s own witnesses).230
Given this context, the defense attorneys at the IMT have been said to have performed poorly
at cross-examining the prosecution’s witnesses. The shortcomings include asking questions that
had no bearing on defendants’ culpability, and others which led to witnesses confirming the
accused’s responsibility and so ultimately aiding the prosecution.231 This led to the defense
calling many more witnesses than the prosecution (61 and 33, respectively), but doing poorly at
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utilizing them to address the issues at hand: instead Justice Lawrence warned counsel that their
questions were not relevant.232
Cross-examination by the defense, like their access to documentary evidence, was also
affected by the prosecution’s desire to speed up trial at the expense of defense protections. There
were also attempts by the prosecution to block counsel from cross-examining witness testimony
at all, by presenting oral transcripts with no appearance by the witness at trial. When preparing to
present their case against the German General Staff defendants, Justice Jackson attempted to
persuade the judges to allow the prosecution to present sworn affidavits by witnesses in court,
where the witnesses would not need to attend. His justification was that not only did the charter
not bind the court to “technical rules of evidence” but that cross-examination of witness
affidavits would slow down the proceedings excessively. The IMT’s rules, however, make no
mention of the admissibility of a written witness statement in lieu of live testimony.
The judges largely rejected this maneuver, arguing that, except in very unusual
circumstances, affidavits could only be introduced as evidence if the witness could be called for
cross-examination upon the request of the defense.233 As on various other occasions—some
discussed above—the IMT judges acted as a brake on the prosecution’s attempt to weaken
procedural defense protections in order to speed up the trial. Nevertheless, the use of written
testimony at the court was extensive and inconsistent.234 After the trial, Jackson could boast to
President Truman that “If it were not that the comparison might be deemed invidious, I could
232

Douglas, The Memory of Judgment, 15.
Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 240-3.
234
Megan A. Fairlie, “Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY,” California
Western International Law Journal 34 (2003): 52-3; and Richard May and Marieke Wierda, “Trends in
International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha,” Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 37 (1999): 749.
233

179

cite many anti-trust actions, rate cases, original cases in the United States Supreme Court, and
other large litigations that have taken much longer to try.”235

Conclusion
This chapter has placed legality and defense parity in historical and legal context at the state and
international levels to demonstrate their centrality to legitimacy through legal fairness towards
defendants in international criminal trials. The explanation of the evolution of protections for
defendants throughout the development of international criminal justice illustrates the role of
political actors in shaping the fairness standards that they can expect, both through the
institutional power states exert in the construction of a court, and in their influence over the
conduct of trials through differential support offered to defendants and prosecution.
The analysis of the research’s defense protection indicators at the IMT in the final section of
the chapter demonstrates that the court did not meet the standards found within the domestic law
of liberal states at the time or international law today, providing little legitimacy through fairness
towards defendants. The reluctance of Allied states to agree to trials for the Nazi leadership—
when they had much earlier and more easily agreed to prosecute German military personnel—
did not bode well for the attention to fairness in terms of legality or defense parity.
The major breaches of legality of crimes and punishment at the London Conference provide a
clear illustration of the political goals of prosecution undermining what were already
fundamental defense protections at the domestic level in liberal states. Domestic pressure on
Allied governments as more atrocities came to light led to the broadening of the charges into new

235

Jackson, “Report to the President,” avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack63.asp.

180

crimes, which fit conveniently with the Allied desire to delegitimize the Nazi leadership through
a public exposure of the full extent of their brutality.
Defense parity issues at the IMT have received less critical attention than legality. This is
especially the case within IR, where fair trial analyses of Nuremberg have concentrated upon
such issues as selectivity of prosecution, and the partiality of judges and prosecutors. The chapter
has demonstrated that institutional support for the defense was extremely weak by contemporary
domestic and modern international standards, leaving counsel in a far inferior position to the
prosecution by the beginning of the trial due to an inadequate ability to investigate and prepare a
defense to the prosecution’s case. The Allies, before and during the London Conference, were
clear that the primary goals of the trial were retribution and delegitimization of the Nazi
leadership, and so parity in institutional support was not a relevant issue to their decision-making
regarding the creation of the IMT. These concerns were reflected in the nature of the London
Charter, which contained few and vague protections, and left the creation of detailed rules
regarding procedure in the hands of one of the competing parties—the prosecution.
In addition, evidentiary procedural standards were harmed by the desire by US chief
prosecutor Jackson to conclude the trial quickly and with little opportunity for the defense to
present an adequate rebuttal. Evidence disclosure problems were also generated by the goal of
historical narrative construction, which shaped the nature and extent of evidence presented by the
prosecution. A further problematic issue for defense parity was the apparent lack of
understanding of, or deep concern for, the role of defendants in criminal trials by the Allied
governments. The criminal trial approaches of the Allies which created the IMT came from two
distinct systems: the common law adversarial approach of the Americans and British; and
various forms of civil law inquisitorial approach. Yet, according to prosecutor Taylor, “there is
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no evidence that either group had given any prior attention to the problem of how, if at all, the
two systems could be married,” and how this would affect defendants and their counsel.236 This
lack of understanding, generating confusion between arguably incompatible systems, combined
with the political goals of various participants, led to very weak defense parity standards.
It is ironic that the evidence against many of the defendants was so overwhelming that a
genuinely fair trial in terms of parity would have almost certainly led to a very similar outcome
while offering the defendants full legal protection from the arbitrary power of international legal
institutions, and afforded the trial with far higher standards of legal legitimacy, diminishing the
charges at the time and subsequently of “victor’s justice” in relation to the trial.237
There are a number of lessons from the IMT case that we will encounter in Chapters 4 and 5.
As a foreshadowing of themes discussed in those chapters, this chapter will end with a brief
comparison between the legality and defense parity at the IMT and those at the ICTY and ICC.
In relation to institutional support features of defense parity, the IMT was much less formally
structured than post-Cold War courts, which have provided the prosecution with an official
institutional status. This has enabled the office of the prosecutor at later courts to formally
request procedural decision-making changes, unlike at the IMT. This elevation of the
institutional position of the prosecution has not been matched by a similar elevation of the
defense.
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Because the Allies occupied Germany, where many of the IMT crimes allegedly occurred,
the prosecution had direct access to enormous volumes of evidence before trial. In contrast, at
the ICTY and ICC access to territories for investigation has had to be mediated through domestic
legal and political authorities. Prosecutors and defense have therefore been reliant on the
cooperation of external authorities, including states, IGOs such as the UN and NATO, and
human rights NGOs for authorizing and aiding in investigations and evidence gathering. This has
arguably put the defense on a more equal footing, but there have been substantial inequalities
generated by unequal institutional support and state bias.
In terms of evidentiary procedures, one of the most important factors shaping tribunals’ rules
and their application has been state concern to contain costs and accelerate trials. Judges have
been less successful at the ICTY and ICC at resisting attempts to speed up trials at the expense of
defense parity than they were at Nuremberg. These political influences shaping legality and
defense parity are analyzed in depth in the following two chapters.
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4 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
This chapter examines the legal fairness of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)1 in relation to criminal defendants, and how the adequacy of their legal
representation has been affected by the institutional power of states, and the political goals of and
influences on judicial actors at the court by states, IGOs, and NGO actors. It provides an
assessment of the tribunal’s legal fairness legitimacy between the effective start of the tribunal’s
operation in July 1994 and July 2016.
The chapter provides a critique of the common assumption among IR and other social
science scholars that the ICTY is characterized by fair trials.2 Fairness tends to be assumed from
a simplistic assessment that basic due process principles are implemented at the tribunal and that
it was not created as a direct expression of victor’s justice. Few political scientists appear to have
appreciated the knowledge of legal procedure necessary to understand how legal principles are
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implemented and therefore the avenues through which political considerations impact trial
fairness.
The research argues that a fusion of legal and political functions at the ICTY has distorted the
role of the prosecutor and moved the tribunal away from the legalist position which claims there
is complete separation of legal and political decision-making within trials.3 This fusion of
functions affects the dynamic between prosecution and defense, demonstrating the weakness in
the position of Rachel Kerr on the separation between law and politics at the ICTY: “Whilst they
are intertwined, law and politics are not merged: The boundary exists at the doorway to the
courtroom…[L]aw informed the political decision to establish and politics determined the
application of legal norms for a political purpose—international peace and security.”4 Kerr does
not consider that political decisions before the courtroom affect what goes on within—due to
their effect on the legal dynamic between prosecution and defense. There is no courtroom
insulation from political interference in the judicial process.
The chapter begins with an examination of the effect of the nature of the creation of the
tribunal by the UN on fairness for defendants. Sections two and three analyze the indicators of
the principle of legality: the level of retroactivity in the mass atrocity crimes within the tribunal’s
jurisdiction; and its sentencing guidelines and practices. Sections four and five examine
indicators of the dynamic between the prosecution and defense in the pre-trial and trial stages.
First, the impact of the court’s structure on this dynamic is analyzed, followed by the impact of
structure and the external perception of the prosecution and defense on their ability to conduct
3
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investigations and acquire evidence. Second, procedures relating to evidence presentation and
witnesses are examined in terms of how they impact parity during trial.
The evidence relied upon in the research includes the ICTY statute5 and Rules of Procedure
and Evidence (RPE);6 case law, including motions and court judgments; court administrative
documents and website data; participant memoires; interviews with prosecutors, defense counsel,
and other close court observers; and secondary legal, political, and historical sources.

Conflation of legal and political justice goals in the creation of the tribunal
In July 1992, as the Security Council began to address reports of atrocities committed during the
ongoing armed conflict in the Balkans, it declared that individuals guilty of “grave breaches” of
the Geneva Conventions in the former Yugoslavia would be held accountable.7 A commission of
experts established by the secretary-general to examine evidence of violations recommended in
its first interim report in February 1993 the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal to try
suspects for gross violations of international humanitarian law.8 The Security Council took the
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commission’s advice and asked the secretary-general to develop specific proposals.9 His report
included a statute for the ICTY,10 which the council approved in resolution 827 in May 1993.11
According to Thomas Weiss there was a broad lack of political will by powerful states to
countenance substantial action in relation to Yugoslavia.12 The council’s reaction was instead
characterized by rhetoric condemning war crimes, authorizing sanctions and weak protection
forces,13 and supporting a settlement under plans such as the Vance-Owen process.14 The move
towards a legal solution was a half-hearted response when the Security Council had resisted
military approaches which required greater commitment.15 The creation of the ICTY was also
driven by domestic political and public pressure on US president Bill Clinton to react to the
atrocities in the Balkans, which were depicted widely in the media in the early 1990s.16
The stage was set for action by the Security Council in 1992, when it indicated that it was
willing to consider a broader range of situations to constitute a threat to international peace and

9

Security Council resolution 808, February 22, 1993, www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm.
UN Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993),” UN doc. S/25704, May 3, 1993 (“secretary-general’s report”),
www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf. Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, annex to UN doc. S/25704, 36-48.
11
UN doc. S/RES/827, May 25, 1993, preamble, www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm.
12
Thomas G. Weiss, “UN Responses in the Former Yugoslavia: Moral and Operational Choices,” Ethics
& International Affairs 8, no. 1 (1994): 1-22.
13
For example, in resolution 713, September 25, 1991, the Security Council expressed deep concern over
the fighting, and, in para. 6, authorized an arms embargo on Yugoslavia; and in resolution 764, July 13,
1992, the council condemned the fighting in Bosnia and, in para. 2, authorized the deployment of a UN
force to protect the Sarajevo airport and humanitarian aid deliveries.
14
The 1993 Vance-Owen Plan involved attempting to secure peace in Bosnia while maintaining a unified
central government, but was not accepted by Bosnian Serbs and was soon defunct. See Steven L. Burg
and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (New
York: Routledge, 1999), 189-262. In Security Council resolution 836, June 4, 1993, para. 6,
www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930604a.htm, the council encouraged the local implementation of the Vance-Owen
Plan by affirming its importance to peace and stability in the region.
15
Weiss, “UN Responses in the Former Yugoslavia:” 20.
16
Forsythe, “‘Political Trials’?” 480.
10

187

security—the threshold for invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and thereby passing
resolutions that are legally binding on all UN member states. During the Cold War, in contrast,
the council interpreted its mandate as almost totally excluding domestic conflicts.17
In January 1992, a note by the president of the Security Council acknowledged that while the
end of the Cold War had brought about positive change, it had also generated “new risks for
stability and security”—including economic and humanitarian situations.18 According to Rachel
Kerr, “[t]his set the tone for future UN responses and represented a watershed in the
determination of a threat to international peace and security within the terms of Article 39 of the
UN Charter. It directly opened the way for the establishment of a Tribunal, since it meant that
violations of international humanitarian law could be formally determined a threat to
international peace and security.”19
According to Paul Tavernier, the creation of the ICTY in 1993, and the ICTR one year later,
“amounted to allowing the imperative of maintaining peace to take precedence over those of law
and justice.”20 From the first post-Cold War tribunal an explicit link was made by powerful states
and the UN that international criminal courts were expected to perform the political goals of
promoting peace and security as a mechanism of transitional justice. The very decision-making,
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or lack of political will rather, that led to the creation of the ICTY is characterized by a legal
mechanism as a substitute for military action and a political solution. The chapter highlights
throughout the consequences for the legal fairness of the criminal justice meted out by the
tribunal of attempting to utilize a criminal justice mechanism to ameliorate international political
problems.
The commission of experts, created by the Security Council in a unanimous vote in October
1992,21 was tasked by the secretary-general with investigating violations of international
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and to explore responses to ongoing atrocities. Gary
Bass argues that despite their positive votes, both France and the United Kingdom saw legal
investigations and prosecutions as a possible obstacle to future peace negotiations.22 In addition
to the difficulty for democratic governments of dealing with war criminals would be the
presumed disincentive for such individuals to compromise politically.23
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The UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA),24 and especially a British member, Ralph Zacklin,
obstructed the work of the commission, according to commissioners and ICTY staff.25 The
commission’s members seem to have been chosen to ensure a slow work pace, “stuffed with
academic ‘old fogeys’” according to one commissioner, only one full-time member of staff—an
“elderly retired law professor”—and without the resources to meet frequently or investigate
effectively. The commission was a “low-budget-scapegoat.”26 According to Cherif Bassiouni,
who took over leadership of the commission in August 1993, financing issues and investigations
were characterized by a complete lack of cooperation from the British and French, and in April
1994 the Secretariat closed the commission. The evidence unearthed implicated political leaders
which the major powers were negotiating with, and so “it became politically necessary to
terminate the work of the Commission while attempting to avoid the negative consequences of
such a direct action.”27
The commission’s success, despite resistance, is also what led the British to reject the
nomination of Bassiouni as first chief prosecutor of the tribunal.28 Richard Goldstone, who
became the first chief prosecutor to officially take up the position, reports that political resistance
and unwillingness to cooperate were not confined to the UN. Former British prime minister
Edward Health had asked Goldstone why he had accepted such a “ridiculous job,” saying that it
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was no concern of the British government if people wanted to kill each other as long as they did
it outside of Britain.29
Nevertheless, the ICTY finally became operational in November 1993 when 11 judges began
their terms of office in The Hague. After a “protracted, politicized fiasco” over the selection of
the first chief prosecutor of the court,30 Goldstone was approved by the Security Council in July
1994 and started working in August—marking the true start of the operation of the tribunal.31
At the final tally the ICTY has indicted 161 individuals for these crimes. As of July 2016,
cases against nine of them were ongoing: one at trial stage, that of the Bosnian-Serb military
commander, Ratko Mladić, and eight at the appeals stage. In relation to the cases that have
closed at the tribunal, 81 individuals were convicted (including the Bosnian-Serb political leader,
Radovan Karadžić), 19 acquitted, two are to be retried by the Mechanism for International
Criminal Tribunals (MICT),32 13 had their cases transferred to national jurisdictions, 17 died
before the start or completion of their trial (including former president of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia Slobodan Milošević),33 and the other 20 had their indictments withdrawn. Karadžić’s
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appeal to his March 2016 conviction will be heard by the MICT, as will that of Mladić if he is
convicted by the ICTY.34

Legality indicator 1: Non-retroactivity of crimes
This section provides an assessment of legality at the court by examining the extent and nature of
retroactive enforcement of crimes. It begins by analyzing the UN debate surrounding legality
during the process of creating the tribunal. Then the three mass atrocity crimes over which the
tribunal has jurisdiction are examined: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. As an
illustration of the relative numerical importance of these crimes within ICTY prosecutions, in the
first 19 years of the tribunal’s existence, 56.9 percent of all indicted charges were for war crimes
(939 counts), 40.6 percent for crimes against humanity (670 counts), and 2.4 percent for
genocide (40 counts). Of total convictions at the tribunal, war crimes constitute 58.9 percent (201
counts), crimes against humanity 40.7 percent (139 counts), and genocide less than one percent
(one count).35
The analysis explores, where appropriate: first, issues relating to the commission of experts,
the secretary-general’s report on the creation of the court, and Security Council decision-making;
second, the ICTY statute and RPE; and third, the practice of the tribunal. In determining the
extent to which the court has adhered to the principle of legality, the analysis applies the
admonition quoted in Chapter 1 of the dissertation: conforming case law must involve “a
measured clarification or interpretation…[I]t should not permit judges the freedom to create law
34
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aimed at correcting lacunae of international criminal law.”36 Judicial interpretation may shape
law without breaching legality,37 but expansion of the law in this manner risks violating the line
between clarification and correcting lacunae—the latter task is assigned to the legislature in a
democratic legal system.38

The UN and the legality of the tribunal’s crimes
The secretary-general’s report directly acknowledged the importance of adhering to the principle
of legality.39 This is evident in the recognition of the council’s lack of legislative authority in the
report, with the tribunal not provided with legislative competence beyond the council’s own.
That is, unlike at the IMT, there would be no establishment of new international crimes.40 The
report recommended only prosecuting crimes that had attained customary international law
status, and which would therefore be considered binding on all UN member states.41 As stated in
the report: “In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum crimen
sine lege [non-retroactivity of crimes] requires that the international tribunal should apply rules
of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the
36
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problem of adherence of some but not all states to specific conventions does not arise.”42 The
tribunal itself has also expressed concern that it refrain from creating law, stating that “the
principle of legality demands that the Tribunal shall apply the law which was binding on
individuals at the time of the acts charged”—that is, customary law.43
Kenneth Gallant argues that the customary law status of legality as a core principle of
international criminal justice was in fact established by the UN process surrounding the creation
of the ICTY. The secretary-general’s report articulates the opinio juris, or juridical
determination, of the UN Secretariat that the principle of legality is binding on the UN. The
Security Council’s acceptance of this in creating the court demonstrates the practice of states,
which forms the other required component for the establishment of the existence of a customary
international legal obligation. The acceptance of the secretary-general’s report by the council
also demonstrates the council’s opinio juris on this issue.44
The secretary-general’s report argued that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide had attained customary status by 1993. War crimes were customary due to the almost
universal state acceptance of the 1907 Hague Convention IV and 1949 Geneva Conventions IIV; crimes against humanity through the 1945 IMT charter; and genocide through wide state
ratification of the 1948 Genocide Convention.45

42

Secretary-general’s report, para. 34.
Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, case no. IT-99-37-AR72, May 21, 2003, para. 10,
www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/00207160-00207178.pdf.
44
Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 306.
45
Secretary-general’s report, para. 35. The treaty and customary law referred to consists of the Geneva
Conventions I-IV (on land and sea warfare, POWs, and civilians, respectively), August 12, 1949; Hague
Convention IV (land warfare) and annexed regulations, October 18, 1907; the Charter of the International
43

194

However, the secretary-general’s strategy of relying on customary law in order to avoid
retroactivity in prosecuting crimes is legally questionable. The principle of legality is founded on
the normative importance of predictability, and the clarity and specificity of legal prohibitions.
The unwritten and often imprecise nature of customary international law means that it arguably
provides a poor fit with the requirements of legality.46 Nevertheless, when defendants have
challenged the legality of any of the crimes at the court, they have rarely been successful.47 The
ICTY has determined that it can interpret and clarify the elements of crimes without retroactively
creating law,48 and can even progressively develop the law, as long as it does not stray into
creating new law or interpreting the law, as the court stated, “beyond the reasonable limits of
acceptable clarification.”49 This may well be a fine line, however, as the discussion below in
relation to each crime illustrates.

War crimes
During Security Council debates on the laws to be included in the ICTY charter, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France argued that customary law should not exhaust the
applicable law of war crimes, but that any humanitarian treaty (in addition to Geneva I-IV and
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Hague IV) that was applicable to the former Yugoslavia at the time of an offense could be
legally enforced by the ICTY,50 including the 1977 Additional Protocols.51 This significantly
broadens the law prosecutable by the court from the secretary-general’s cautious approach to
legality. The tribunal itself later accepted this position, thereby expanding the law from its
statute, but only to be applicable in the territory of a former Yugoslav state which had already
transposed the treaty provisions into domestic law—an attempt to adhere to legality despite the
broadening of crimes.52
In contrast to the Western powers, non-western states on the Security Council, such as
Venezuela, seemed concerned to limit the court’s jurisdiction over crimes by stating that it
should only apply customary law—the position of the Secretariat.53 Venezuela also appeared just
as concerned with ensuring that the court perform political functions as legal ones, especially
narrative construction: “we suggest that the Prosecutor should not confine himself to bringing
cases before the Tribunal, but should also present an overall report on all of the violations of
international humanitarian law that come to his knowledge, which will provide him with an
historical record of great importance.”54 Even less powerful states concerned about providing
expansive legal powers to the court saw political functions as key to its purpose. As explained
later in the chapter, the prosecution’s role in narrative construction—an aspect of the political
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objective of encouraging transitional justice through the tribunal—has shaped defendant rights,
especially in high-profile cases.
In the statute, customary war crimes are defined in articles 2 and 3 as grave breaches of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws of customs of war, respectively. The latter
relied largely on the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.55 In the case law, ICTY judges have
determined a distinct “division of labour” between these aspects of war crimes, with article 3
encapsulating “all violations of international humanitarian law other than ‘grave breaches’ of the
four Geneva Conventions falling under Article 2.”56 Article 3 is therefore a broad category,
whose list of underlying offenses, including plunder and “wanton destruction of cities,” is
illustrative, not exhaustive.57
The ICRC, “the world’s leading authority on international humanitarian law,”58 had
determined in 1993 that “the notion of war crimes is limited to situations of international armed
conflict.”59 However, in the first case before the tribunal, that of Duško Tadić, a low-level
Bosnian Serb militia member, the court expanded the application of the customary law of war to
55
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also apply to internal conflict, which has had profound implications for prosecution at the ICTY
and later international courts.60 Relying partly on the IMT Trial Judgement,61 the ICTY rejected
Tadić’s defense argument that there is no individual criminal responsibility for war crimes in
internal conflicts,62 and determined that:
[T]he distinction between interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as human
beings are concerned. Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape,
torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as
well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are
engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same
protection when armed violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign
State? If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of
States, must gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the
aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its weight.63
Grant Niemann, an ICTY prosecutor at the time, argues that this interpretation is legally sound
because the tribunal and the Security Council which created the ICTY are not signatories to and
so not bound by the Geneva Conventions. He claims that the ICTY interpretation of
humanitarian law—that the states which created the humanitarian conventions did not wish them
to be used to permit other states to intervene in their internal affairs—is legally irrelevant. All
60
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that matters is that the UN Charter provides the Security Council the authority, under Chapter
VII, to intervene in states’ internal affairs.64
However, the tribunal claimed to be identifying an already existing customary rule, as well as
to be interpreting the purpose of the creators of the court’s statute—states in the Security
Council—as requiring an expansion of customary law to effectively implement their political
goals of security and peace in the Balkans—a conflation of legal and political factors in
determining law.65 Additionally, this expansion of war crimes was “quite explicitly excluded” by
the drafters of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977.66
The dissertation agrees with Michael Scharf’s contention that the court’s approach to war
crimes constituted a “novel interpretation” that clearly breaches the legality of crimes: “such
recognition would constitute progressive development of international law, rather than
acknowledgment of a rule that is beyond doubt entrenched in existing law,” and falls foul of “the
ex post facto criticism.”67 Scharf fears that such a determination will diminish the legal
legitimacy of the court: “states will not have faith in the integrity of the Tribunal as a precedent
for other ad hoc tribunals and for a permanent international criminal court if the Tribunal is
perceived as prone to expansive interpretations of international law.”68
From a human rights perspective, in contrast, the expansion of war crimes to internal
conflicts was “one of the most significant jurisprudential achievements [of the ICTY] as far as
64

Grant Niemann, “The Life and Times of a Senior Trial Attorney at the ICTY from 1994 to 2000,”
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, no. 2 (2004): 439.
65
Alexander Grabert, Dynamic Interpretation of International Criminal Law: Striking a Balance between
Stability and Change (Munich: Herbert Utz Verlag, 2015), 40.
66
William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4th ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 123.
67
Scharf, “Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nuremberg?” 3.
68
Ibid.

199

war crimes are concerned.”69 This clash between human rights and criminal justice
interpretations of legal determinations illustrates a trade-off of legitimacy at the tribunal. By
expanding the enforcement reach of the international humanitarian law of war crimes, the court
created new criminal jurisdiction, thereby retroactively creating new law. Ultimately the Tadić
decision is an “example of a dynamic interpretation which is highly desirable from a humanrights perspective while problematic from the perspective of the principle of legality.”70
One of most significant developments in the expansion of underlying offenses at the ICTY in
relation to war crimes has been the inclusion of sexual offenses, over which there was no
jurisdiction at the IMT. Despite political resistance and lack of support, the commission of
experts established by the secretary-general was able to do valuable investigative work,
especially in relation to sexual crimes,71 including by conducting fact-finding missions which
determined that Bosnian Serb sexual violence was systematic.72 This encouraged NGOs and
women’s civil society organizations to analyze sexual violence during the war as a “specific,
gendered war strategy.”73 It also led to their prosecution at the tribunal as underlying offenses of
war crimes and crimes against humanity, so that “[i]n relation to the sexual exploitation of
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women during the course of armed conflict, the ad hoc tribunals have made a significant
contribution to redressing the injustices of the past.”74
While Geneva Convention IV does prohibit sexual violence against civilians,75 in Delalić et
al. the court acknowledged that it is not included in the treaty as a grave breach,76 nor is it found
in Common Article 3,77 and so the justices argued that it cannot be prosecuted as an underlying
offense of war crimes in its own right.78 The court has consequently been careful to demonstrate
that prosecutions for sexual offenses are consistent with legality. In the same case, the court
identified the prohibitions on rape within the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to
determine that rape constitutes an international criminal act—prohibited as an aspect of the
underlying offense of torture.79 In Furundžija the court carefully laid out other existing sources
for rape as a war crime,80 including the US Civil War-era military Leiber Code,81 Hague
Convention IV,82 and the practice of the IMTFE at Tokyo.83 Given the prior existing law and
practice, the apparent expansion of the application of war crimes to sexual offenses is clearly an
interpretation that is consistent with the principle of legality and so expands the human rights
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legitimacy of increasing substantive protections for all individuals, while not undermining the
legal legitimacy of protecting the rights of defendants.

Crimes against humanity
Cherif Bassiouni drafted the definition of crimes against humanity that was submitted by the
commission of experts to the secretary-general and subsequently included in the statute by the
Security Council. He argues that the commission maintained the IMT legal requirement that the
crime be committed within the context of armed conflict (domestic or international) because of
concern with breaching the principle of legality.84 While a 1950 report by the International Law
Commission85 had removed this connection, the commission of experts was concerned that this
determination did not constitute customary law and would thereby constitute retroactive crime
expansion by the ICTY.86
Contrary to the commission of experts’ advice,87 the secretary-general’s report removed the
armed conflict requirement,88 but it was added back in to the final statute by the Security
Council.89 According to Bassiouni the council shared the commission’s concern with the legality
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of removing the armed conflict nexus.90 This represents a greatly improved attitude towards the
non-retroactivity of crimes against humanity than demonstrated by the Allies and IMT judges
after World War II, reflecting the growth in acceptance of the applicability of legality to
international law.
The legality of crimes against humanity was, however, the most uncertain of the crimes in
the ICTY statute as it still lacked a treaty foundation. The ILC had spent decades working on the
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which provided a
determination of international crimes, including crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, while it
was adopted by the ILC in 1996,91 it has not been adopted by the General Assembly.
The court has established what has become a core definition in customary law of the context
for the commission of the crime. Underlying offenses must have been committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, and the perpetrator must have been
aware that the offense constituted part of the attack.92 The tribunal also clarified that
“widespread” refers to the number of civilian victims, and “systematic” to “the organised nature
of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.”93 To be “systematic”
thereby requires planning—effectively a policy which the attacks are designed to implement.
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The tribunal also determined the intent element of the crime to require that a perpetrator of an
underlying offense is aware that their acts constitute part of this plan.
Bassiouni argues that the existence of a plan (of which the attack constitutes part) is inherent
to what constitutes crimes against humanity as a distinctive crime.94 However, the ICTY has
largely ignored the existence of a policy as a requirement to establish culpability, following a
“mistaken” appeals court judgment which determined that the attacks must be either—but are not
required to be both of—widespread or systematic.95 There is disagreement on this point,
however. Antonio Cassese, a judge at the ICTY from 1993 to 2000, and its first president, argues
that the tribunal was correct in necessitating only one of these context requirements rather than
both.96 Another legal commentator argues that, while some domestic case law supports the
policy requirement, this constitutes a misunderstanding of national judicial interpretations.97
So there is dispute over whether the tribunal has diluted the crime’s distinctive nature and
thereby diminished its legality. Arguably one consequence of the tribunal’s weakening of the
context requirements has been its ability to prosecute a particularly large number of individuals
for the crime—as mentioned earlier, 670 counts, constituting 40.6 percent of all indicted
offenses.98 The ICTY and ICTR could have solely tried individuals for crimes against humanity
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with little effect on the number of prosecutions:99 the ad hoc tribunals have for this reason been
labeled “crimes against humanity courts.”100
The tribunal has also removed the contextual requirement of a connection to armed conflict,
a position which the commission of experts and the Security Council believed would be contrary
to customary law. Bassiouni perceives no conflict with legality here, arguing that as the crime
has developed in customary law it no longer requires the armed conflict connection.101 The
policy requirement and the lack of a necessary connection to armed conflict constitute the
distinctive aspects of crimes against humanity as a mass atrocity crime.102 Therefore the court
has established one distinctive feature of the crime—no dependence on an armed conflict
context—while undermining another arguably defining characteristic—its systematic nature.
The statute lists the underlying offenses of crimes against humanity as murder;
extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; “persecutions on political,
racial and religious grounds;” and “other inhumane acts.”103 Sexual crimes are therefore clearly
included as an underlying offense.104 However, rape is not found in the IMT charter—the textual
basis for the crime in the ICTY statute—and therefore this potentially constitutes a beach of
legality. Rape was included in the statute due to findings by the commission of experts on the use
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of sexual violence as an aspect of ethnic cleansing,105 a reasoning which would appear a clear
breach of legality by inventing crimes for the purpose of ex post facto prosecution. However,
customary law has developed since 1945 to recognize rape as an underlying offense, as it had
been included implicitly in prior international humanitarian law under such euphemisms as
“[f]amily honour and rights.”106 As a consequence, in 2001 the ICTY became the first
international court to convict an individual of rape as a crime against humanity.107 Nevertheless,
as discussed previously, customary law is a less sure basis for determining legality than treaty.
Other underlying offenses have also been clarified and further specified by the tribunal.108
Most significantly, it has addressed the issue of whether the offense of “other inhumane acts”109
is so vague and broad that it violates legality.110 The trial chamber in Stakić found the defendant
not guilty of “forcible transfers”111—including the transfer to detention facilities—as a form of
“other inhumane acts.”112 The court took a firm stance towards protecting legality by not
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permitting the expansion of the law through the development of vague categories of offenses
which effectively constitute the creation of new criminal offenses.113

Genocide
The secretary-general’s report included genocide in the statute,114 relying on a 1951
determination by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the convention had already become
customary law, primarily on account of the “universal character” of the UN and the unanimous
adoption of the convention by the members of the General Assembly.115 The Security Council
accepted the secretary-general’s position. The customary law status of genocide, and thereby the
legality of prosecuting it at the ICTY, was later affirmed by the ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia,116 and
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by the tribunal itself.117 The ICTY became the first international court to specifically try the
crime of genocide,118 and so the first to implement the Genocide Convention’s provision calling
for trials before “such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.”119
The statute’s definition of genocide,120 its underlying offenses, and modes of liability are a
verbatim copy of articles 2 and 3 of the convention. For conviction, these require evidence of the
physical element of the crime: the accused committed an underlying act against members of a
protected identity group.121 It also requires two mental elements (of intent): the “ordinary” intent
to commit an underlying offense,122 and the “dolus specialis” or special genocidal intent to
destroy the group.123
Special intent makes genocide particularly difficult to convict for, which has made
prosecutors reluctant to bring charges for the crime at the tribunal.124 This caution has been borne
out by acquittals in most attempts to convict at the court.125 The few convictions for genocide

117

Krstić, Trial Judgment, case no. IT-98-33, August 2, 2001, para. 541,
www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf.
118
At the IMT at Nuremberg, acts that might now be considered genocide were prosecuted as
“persecution,” an underlying offense of crimes against humanity. See IMT charter, article 6.c.
119
Genocide Convention, article 6.
120
ICTY statute, article 4.
121
Ibid., article 4.2.
122
Ibid., articles 4.3 and 7.1.
123
Ibid., article 4.2.
124
Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2nd ed., 457.
125
Radislav Krstić’s conviction was overturned on appeal: Krstić, Appeals Judgement, case no. IT-98-33A, April 19, 2004, www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf. The 2005 conviction of
Vidoje Blagojević for aiding and abetting was also overturned on appeal: Blagojević et al., Appeals
Judgement, case no. IT-02-60-A, May 9, 2007, www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajokjud070509.pdf.

208

means that, according to the ICTY itself, “there is little case-law on genocide,”126 allowing for
more flexibility in the determination of each trial chamber.
The word “genocide” has a “specific power” as representing the “crime of crimes.”127 This
has given it a distinct “role in the vicious cycle of competitive victimhood in the Balkans,” as
stated by Marko Milanovic, vice-president of the European Society of International Law.128 He
predicts that Karadžić’s 2016 acquittal on one count of genocide, in relation to seven
municipalities in Bosnia during 1992, will encourage the authorities in the Bosnian Serb
autonomous region of Republika Srpska in their argument that the political entity is legitimate.
This is a response to accusations such as those of Bosniak politican and Bosnian presidency
member Haris Silajdžić, who has called the Republika Srpska a “genocidal creation.”129
Karadžić’s prosecution for genocide constitutes an important aspect of the clash of historical
narratives of the war in Bosnia in relation to the creation of Republika Srpska in the 1995 Dayton
Peace Agreement.130 Genocide has a distinctive place in the historical narrative function of the
tribunal, especially in the case of high-profile figures such as Karadžić, who, along Slobodan
126
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Milošević and Ratko Mladić, is the most significant figure prosecuted at the ICTY in relation to
the Bosnian war. Most convictions for genocide at the tribunal have been for the modes of
criminal liability of “aiding and abetting,” “complicity,”131 and “joint criminal enterprise.”132
These modes have largely been utilized by the court to convict individuals without the core
requirement of special genocidal intent.133 In Krstić134 and Blagojević et al.135 the court held that
the defendants were guilty of genocide because they had been aware of the intent of the
perpetrators that they aided, even though they were not proven to share that special intent
themselves. Knowledge of another’s intent was taken as proof of intent for the defendants,
contrary to customary legal practice.136
Consequently, the court’s chambers have been “interpreting the Genocide Convention in a
broad and contradictory fashion and are diluting the essence of the crime when they apply the
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statutory modes of liability to the crime of genocide.”137 Similarly to Bassiouni’s argument that
the court has ignored what is distinctive about crimes against humanity—the requirement of a
policy—the ICTY has insufficiently taken into account the centrality of special intent to the
crime in convicting defendants for genocide.
The court determined that Karadžić demonstrated special genocidal intent in relation to a
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) concerning the massacre at Srebrenica.138 The rationale for JCE,
according to Cassese, is that “if all those who take part in a common criminal action are aware of
the purpose and character of the criminal action and share the requisite criminal intent, they must
perforce share criminal liability, whatever the role and position they may have played in the
commission of the crime.”139
However, according to Milanovic, “the Prosecution’s case was essentially circumstantial,
requiring the Chamber to draw inferences from indirect evidence, which is what it did.”140 These
were inferences about Karadžić’s intent solely from third party reports of his conversations with
Miroslav Deronjic, whom Karadžić had appointed as the administrator of Srebrenica. From this
evidence, genocidal intent on the part of Karadžić is “a reasonable inference…[I]t’s not as clear
that this is the ONLY such reasonable inference, which is what they [sic] beyond a reasonable
doubt evidentiary standard requires. For example, the phone conversation with Deronjic could be
interpreted as Karadžić’s agreement with the forcible removal of the Bosniak males, but not
necessarily with their extermination.”141
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While Karadžić’s conviction for superior responsibility for crimes against humanity is
reasonable in this context, the conviction for genocide as well is arguably a case of the court
applying the crime in a legally dubiously manner because of its dramatic rhetorical nature linked
to its historical narrative importance in relation to Karadžić. Securing a conviction for genocide
against the individual with ultimate political authority over the Bosnian Serb forces which
conducted the Srebrenica massacre is an important capstone to the tribunal’s legal history.
Ultimately genocide has been prosecuted far less frequently at the court than the other crimes,
but its application suffers from a weakening of the special intent feature, again undermining what
is distinct about the crime and permitting its prosecution more broadly than merited by the nature
of the applicable modes of liability.

Legality indicator 2: Non-retroactivity of punishment
This section analyzes sentencing procedures at the tribunal. First the impact of the UN debate on
the sentencing guidelines is assessed, as well as the guidelines themselves, as delineated in the
statute and RPE. Second, the level of coherence and consistency between the sentencing
guidelines and the tribunal’s practice is analyzed. Finally, punishment in relation to the doctrine
of command responsibility is explored, as it provides a particularly telling and controversial
example of sentencing practices.

Sentencing rules: UN and judicial decision-making
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The statute does not contain specific penalties for the crimes within its jurisdiction.142 The only
guidelines for sentencing limit penalties for all crimes to imprisonment, as the death penalty was
“quite emphatically rejected” in the secretary-general’s report to the Security Council on the
court’s establishment.143 The statute provides most guidance through its mention that punishment
“shall” be—suggesting a requirement on the judges—consistent with sentencing practices “in the
courts of the former Yugoslavia.”144 However, the phrase “have recourse to” national practices
suggests guidance rather than a requirement.145 The only other reference in the statute is to vague
guidance in relation to aggravating and mitigating circumstances: to “take into account such
factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”146
Part of the reason for this lack of specificity is that the customary and treaty law upon which
the definitions of the court’s crimes are based similarly do not specify penalties. The Hague and
Geneva Conventions, and the Genocide Convention were intended primarily to encourage
national prosecution, with sentencing left up to each state to approach according to the guidelines
of their national implementing legislation.147 In light of this, states within the Security Council,
while debating the creation of the tribunal, seemed concerned to avoid breaching legality of
punishments through the creation of penalties to fill this gap. The Italian permanent
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representative stated his government’s opinio juris that to adhere to the legality of punishment,
an international court would thereby require conformity to national standards existing in the
territory where the crimes prosecuted were committed: “the need to respect the principle nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege [non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment], the basis of
fundamental human rights, has induced the [Commission of Italian Jurists] to decide in favor of
the penalties set forth by the criminal law of the State of the locus commissi delicti [location of
the crimes].”148
Similarly, a proposal for a Yugoslav tribunal under the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism,149 submitted to the UN,
argued that a tribunal must avoid retroactivity of punishment, by following Yugoslav domestic
practice.150 This proposal was contained in one of several reports submitted to the commission of
experts established by the secretary-general, and was based on a text created by Bassiouni and
published by the International Association of Penal Law.151 Similar attitudes were voiced during
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Security Council debates by The Netherlands and Russia.152 Slovenia also expressed concern
with specificity, but not adherence to customary law, arguing that the statute should include both
maximum and minimum penalties. The United States, France, and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference on the other hand expressed no specific concern with avoiding retroactivity
of punishment.153
The lack of any specific punishments, and the poor clarity and specificity in the sentencing
guidelines provided by the statute and RPE, arguably constitute a significant breach of the
legality of punishment: the authority creating the court had not delineated the specific law of
penalties it was to implement. Bassiouni in contrast argues that the prior existence of specific
penalties in the codes of the territories of the former Yugoslavia for crimes within the ICTY’s
jurisdiction means that the tribunal has not enforced punishments retroactively.154 This argument
only applies to war crimes and genocide, as crimes against humanity had not been codified in the
region’s legal systems.
While arguably not directly breaching the legality of punishment, the court’s guidelines may
have applied it weakly due to insufficient clarity and specificity. The legal foundation of
punishment at the court has provided the judges with “large amounts of sentencing discretion and
is not sufficient to ensure a development of consistent jurisprudence.”155
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Sentencing practice
The tribunal early on exercised its discretion in ways inconsistent with the position of the
Security Council, deciding that it would not be bound by the statute’s national guidelines
provision.156 In constructing their own rules on punishment within the RPE, the judges included
the possibility of life imprisonment,157 despite this penalty not existing in the early 1990s in the
law of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).158 The republic’s law regarding
genocide and war crimes provided for a 5-15 year term of imprisonment or the death penalty—
the SFRY code also considered life imprisonment a worse punishment than a death sentence. In
the early case law, the court also determined that it would not be restricted by national Yugoslav
practice to sentences of under 16 years.159 This practice has continued, and in the last ten years
the number of individuals sentenced to over 20 years has increased,160 with little indication the
tribunal has taken domestic guidelines into account.161
To determine whether the purposes of punishment have guided the court in determining
sentencing the statute is of no utility as it does not mention any such purposes. They are,
however, described in the Security Council resolution that created the court, in primarily political
rather than solely criminal justice terms: to “put an end to” the perpetration of mass atrocity
156
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crimes, and to “bring to justice,” which would “contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
peace.”162
For more clarity in relation to ICTY practice, the beginning of the sentencing portion of trial
judgments can be examined, as the purposes of the punishment in each conviction is expressed
here. The tribunal has demonstrated a considerable range of sentencing goals in its trial
judgments, including: “retribution, justice, deterrence (general and specific), rehabilitation,
expressivism, reprobation, stigmatisation, affirmative prevention, incapacitation, protection of
society, social defence and finally restoration/maintenance of peace and reconciliation.”163 In
2000, the appeals chamber emphasized that while deterrence was one of the most important
criteria, “[a]n equally important factor is retribution. This is not to be understood as fulfilling a
desire for revenge but as duly expressing the outrage of the international community at these
crimes.”164
Such a broad array of legal, normative, and political aims has combined with lack of
statutory clarity on penalties to generate weak consistency in sentencing. Patricia Wald, a trial
judge at the tribunal between 1999 and 2001, was critical of sentencing practices during the first
decade of its operation: “my ICTY experience led me to conclude there are presently insufficient
norms or guidelines to control sentencing discretion.”165 The lack of clarity on how the court
determines sentencing, and the inconsistency of judicial practice, continued in the subsequent
decade, undermining support for, and the legitimacy of, the court.166
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Especially in the light of the lack of legal guidance, and unwillingness to rely on national
legislation, sentencing practices have tended to rely heavily on the determination of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in relation to such issues as level of culpability.167 The chambers
have themselves justified lack of coherence and their discretion by arguing that this enables them
to individualize punishments to the circumstances and gravity of the offenses convicted.
Aggravating factors include the directness of involvement in the crime and the level of
premeditation; mitigating ones include duress, a guilty plea, and victim-related factors such as
expressing remorse, and providing assistance to, and attempting redress toward, victims. Two
other sentencing factors that have also been relevant are the principle of proportionality to the
gravity of the offense (what harm was done and to how many people),168 and the principle of
gradation or the significance of the convicted individual’s acts in relation to the broader context
of violence.169
In terms of sentencing practice, between May 1997, when the first sentence was handed
down, and May 2006, there were 49 final (post-appeals) sentences, ranging between 2.5 and 40
years—no life terms survived appeal.170 These sentences do not reflect a coherent policy of
effective individualization, but “an erratic quantification of sentence,” that has been further
exacerbated by “fairly active appellate intervention lead[ing] to additional discretion and
unpredictability.”171 Research in 2009 claimed to be able to account for 60 percent of the
variation in ICTY sentencing, concluding that this provided a reasonable degree of predictability
167
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in sentencing practice, with the other 40 percent accounted for by the individual (mitigating and
aggravating) circumstances.172 The research also acknowledged, however, that it was “difficult to
judge the adequacy” of the 60 percent number.173 More recent sentencing practice continues to
be characterized by a “lack of transparency and clarity.”174
Another relevant factor in determining the legality of punishments is the doctrine of
command responsibility: the criminal liability of a superior under international criminal law for
the illegal acts of their political or military subordinates. This does not require complicity or
providing direct orders. In the prosecution of General Tomoyuki Yamashita by the US military
in the Philippines in 1945—the case which led to the “first fully fledged enunciation of the
doctrine”175—the defendant was found guilty of “unlawfully disregarding and failing to
discharge his duty as commander to control the acts of members of his command by permitting
them to commit war crimes.”176 Responsibility for the acts of Yamashita’s subordinates
ultimately rested with the general, regardless of his intent with regards to these acts.177
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The ICTY’s provisions for command responsibility have generated excessively broad
responsibility for superiors, constituting “vicarious liability.”178 The tribunal has gone beyond
the existing doctrine by deciding that, according to the Kunarac judgment, “the criminal
culpability of those leading others is higher than those who follow.”179 However, the tribunal has
been reluctant to actually enforce harsher penalties for command responsibility on the basis of
joint criminal enterprise, leading to sentencing that has not been consistent with this
determination. In the most high-profile case of command responsibility that led to a conviction,
Karadžić received a 40 year sentence for 10 counts, including one of genocide180—whereas some
victims argued he should have received a life sentence.181 This compares to Duško Tadić’s 20
year sentence for killing and torture as a prison camp guard.182 Former ICTY prosecutors Mark
Harmon and Fergal Gaynor argue that sentencing for JCE at the tribunal has amounted to “a slap
on the wrist” and therefore “a slap in the face of the victims.”183
The tribunal’s problems with consistency and coherence in sentencing stem significantly
from the lack of guidance provided by the UN secretary-general and the Security Council. While
178
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acute to the need to provide a specific framework on the substance of laws, they provided little
guidance in relation to penalties. The lack of Cold War development of international criminal
procedure led to weak agreement on sentencing within the Security Council, in contrast to the
elaboration of international human rights and humanitarian law, which generated far greater
agreement on the substance of crimes the ICTY should prosecute.
This lack of prior development has arguably harmed the post-Cold War development of
international criminal justice by permitting too great a discretion to judges, who have not
developed a consistent structure of penalties, which makes claims of selective justice easier to
sustain. As legal scholar Mark Drumbl states, “[i]n the end, although individualizing the penalty
certainly is desirable, the benefits thereof dissipate when there is no coherent framework in
which to predictably consider the factors germane to, or the goals of, sentencing,” which
diminishes the legitimacy of the tribunal.184

Defense parity indicator 1: Institutional support
In this section, first the defense’s position within the court’s institutional structure vis-à-vis that
of the prosecution is analyzed, as well as its implications for adequacy of defense representation.
Second, the institutional support provided by the ICTY to prosecutors and defense counsel to
investigate on-site through immunities and privileges is compared, as well as the investigatory
support provided in relation to external actors.

Structural parity
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Structurally, the tribunal consists of three primary organs: Chambers (initially two trial chambers
and an appeals chamber, with a president chosen from the appeals chamber); an Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP); and Registry.185 The latter is the tribunal’s administrative body, and provides
support to the other two organs, as well as assistance to defense counsel, victims, and
witnesses.186
Before a restructuring of the OTP in 2008, its Investigations Division, now eliminated,
conducted pre-trial investigations.187 The “muscle tissue” of the OTP, according to former chief
prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, consists of “trial attorneys and jurists, forensic experts, police
officers, and analysts of the history, culture, languages, and other aspects of the former
Yugoslavia.”188 According to the tribunal, its researchers have mostly had “backgrounds in
police work,” expertise aiding enormously in their task of collecting evidence, including through
the identification and questioning of witnesses and conducting on-site investigations.189 The
OTP’s Prosecution Division selects evidence and conducts first instance trials. See Figure 4.1
below for the organizational structure of the court.
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Figure 4.1 Organizational structure of the ICTY
Source: ICTY, Organisational Chart, October 2015, www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/organisational-chart.
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The OTP’s Immediate Office also has functions that impinge upon the courtroom dynamic with
the defense: including providing the prosecution with a voice in decision-making with the other
organs of the court concerning rule changes; and liaising with states, which involves ensuring
cooperation with investigations.
In stark contrast to the position of the prosecution, the statute did not designate any official
position within its structure for defense counsel. The structural position of the accused was
largely overlooked in the construction of the court, as Registrar John Hocking acknowledged in
2010: “In the early days of ICTY, support for defence counsel was rudimentary. The Statute did
not foresee defence counsel as institutionally part of the Tribunal, and defence counsel were at
times treated with mistrust. They were not allowed to freely access the ICTY building and had to
be escorted to and from the courtrooms by security.”190 While the dissertation agrees with
Hocking that the situation has improved since then, as the analysis below makes clear, defense
counsel continue to lack an autonomous institutional position within the court, and the
consequences of this structural imbalance for decision-making influence persist.
Defense counsel have always been considered independent of the ICTY, with their official
representation occurring solely through the Registry. The primary liaison for defense is the
Registry’s Office of Legal Aid and Defense (OLAD),191 whose defense responsibilities include
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providing legal aid for accused unable to pay for their own defense,192 and determining which
attorneys qualify to represent accused at the court and assigning counsel.193 The Registry is the
only official organ of the court with authority in relation to defense issues, ostensibly
representing its interests at the court—including in budgetary and rule-change decision-making
forums. However, the Registry also represents the interests of the other major parties at the court:
the Chambers, the prosecution, and victims and witnesses. It cannot effectively represent defense
interests in intra-court communications and decision-making negotiations as it remains neutral as
an administrative body for all major actors at the court. Frustration with lack of perceived
support has led “some defence counsel [to] consider the Registry as their worst enemy.”194
ICTY judge David Hunt has criticized the Registry for not requiring staff to have a legal
background or experience representing criminal defendants in a domestic or international
context, while it provides the sole communication and coordination mechanism for counsel
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within the ICTY’s structure. He argued this was a result of a lack of understanding of the role
and needs of counsel at the ICTY.195 Numerous instances of “abuse” of the Registry’s authority
in regard to such defense issues as assigning counsel have been acknowledged, and occasionally
rectified, by the court.196
This imbalance between the position of the prosecution and defense in the structure of the
ICTY is replicated in most international courts,197 and is an ongoing problem in international
criminal justice.198According to Elise Groulx, a former honorary president of the International
Criminal Bar (BPI-ICB), and head of the advisory board of the Business and Human Rights
project of the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights, the defense constitutes a
missing “third pillar” in the structure of international courts:
In addition to an independent judiciary and prosecution, the international criminal justice
system requires an independent legal profession (including both defence and victims’
counsel). The incorporation of a ‘third pillar’ will help to legitimize the new justice system
195
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and strengthen the rule of law by providing a formal voice for lawyers and enabling the
protection of individual rights.199
Cassese acknowledged in a 2006 report to the Special Court for Sierra Leone that the creation of
the latter’s Defense Office “has proved successful by giving the various defence teams an
institutional voice that is not present at the ICTY.”200 In 1997, for example, in order to cut costs
the ICTY Registry decided to reduce the maximum number of hours counsel could bill for and
reduce the number of investigators they could hire.201 Defense counsel had no institutional voice
with which to resist such cuts, unlike the OTP.202
In recognition of the need for a third pillar organization for the defense at the ICTY,
providing them with such a voice, in September 2002 ICTY judges, working with defense
counsel, created a bar association: the Association of Defence Counsel practising before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ADC-ICTY).203 It represents the
collective interests of the accused and defense counsel at the court while remaining outside the
court’s structure,204 and was “an effort to offset some of the disadvantages of the Defence not
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being institutionally represented.”205 It took so long to create such an organization partly due to
the decentralized nature of defense counsel. Unlike prosecutors, who live in the Hague area,
working for the court full-time, many counsel are on a list of those the Registry (and now ADC)
deems to be qualified to serve at the court, but many only live at the Hague when they have been
assigned to a case. This provides counsel with far less cohesion, and institutional memory, even
since the creation of the ADC.206
The ICTY’s RPE was modified after the creation of the ADC to require that all defense
counsel are in good standing with an association of counsel practicing at the tribunal recognized
by the Registry—of which the ADC is the only one.207 The ICTY describes the ADC’s role as
that of providing a voice for defense counsel within the tribunal’s committees and projects,
including consultation on policies affecting them, such as those relating to legal aid.208
The ADC president from 2013 to 2015, Colleen Rohan, claims that the organization has had
a significant positive impact on accused and defense counsel at the tribunal. Changes include
acquiring more substantive aid to facilitate defense, including through counsel training, which
the ADC provides in relation to substantive and procedural international criminal law and
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courtroom skills.209 According to former ADC Executive Board member and ICTY Rules
Committee member Peter Robinson, the ADC’s effect has been “positive, but not significant”—
it has fought for increased resources and training for counsel, with mixed results.210
The ADC sits on the Rules Committee and the Disciplinary Board and Disciplinary Panel,211
which Rohan argues has given the organization a useful voice in policy-making, which it did not
effectively have before 2002.212 Other positive changes include ADC amicus briefs213 being
increasingly considered by the court, providing the organization with more of a role in aiding
counsel in adequately representing their clients.214 Nevertheless, the organization has “had to
struggle over the years to effectuate” its vision of a partnership with the court to create greater
trial fairness, “and overcome resistance to it from those who did not understand the scope of the
Defence function or the importance of a Defence voice in the development of the law and
practices within the international courts.”215 There is also only limited evidence of ADC
influence in decision-making. Robinson, for example, proposed three rule changes while serving
as an ADC representative on the ICTY Rules Committee, none of which were accepted.216
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According to Gabrielle McIntyre, chef de cabinet, or most senior legal advisor, to four
presidents of the ICTY, and current chef de cabinet of the MICT, significant advantages for the
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beneﬁt of being a homogeneous body, in that material secured by it will be available to
prosecutors concerned with other cases.”217 The OTP’s Military Analyst Team (MAT) and
Leadership Research Team (LRT) are staffed by former military officers and regional specialists,
respectively, and support requests for assistance from trial prosecutors.218 They have been
especially importance sources of institutional memory for the prosecution in relation to local
knowledge, expert witnesses, and identifying evidence.219
This advantage especially applies in cases that relate to a situation already litigated at the
court. Multiple cases repeating the same situation occur only infrequently in most domestic
contexts, but is a common feature of ICTY prosecutions. Rohan confirms that while defending
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defense lawyer for whom this is the first case dealing with a particular situation is at a distinct
disadvantage in terms of familiarity with and knowledge of the documentary evidence.220
In relation to the dual roles of prosecutors, Rohan feels that overall the chief prosecutors at
the tribunal have not acted effectively as officers of justice, misusing their public profile to skew
public perception against defendants. She feels it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to comment on
the merits of a pending case in that way. For example, speaking about defendant Ramush
Haradinaj221 during his trial, Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte stated in an interview with Der
Spiegel that “there is no doubt about his guilt.”222 It is the task of the trial chamber to determine
the guilt or innocence of a defendant—not that of the prosecution. The chief prosecutor was
conflating her roles as an officer of the court—with a responsibility to ensure that justice is
done—with her role as a competitor with the defense in an adversarial trial, arguable misusing
her officer-of-the-court position, with its advantages of a high international profile, to make a
public case.
Rohan, who was counsel for Idriz Balaj during the Haradinaj et al. trial, filed a motion
claiming that Del Ponte’s remarks were inappropriate, and in violation of the Standards of
Professional Conduct for Prosecution Counsel at the ICTY.223 In its decision, the court was
ambiguous about whether the prosecutor had breached the standards and her obligation for
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neutrality outside the court, denying the motion on the grounds that it could not be proven that
the statement had negatively affected the trial.224
This is an example of an issue which occurs in relation to many circumstances within
international courts, and has been the subject of debate by the European Court of Human Rights:
whether a breach of court standards that exist to protect the accused is sufficient to demand
remedy, or whether actual harm needs to be proven.225 As discussed in Chapter 3, the dissertation
adopts the more cautious approach, from the perspective of protecting the rights of defendants, of
recognizing breaches of guarantees whether or not they have been determined by a court to have
prejudiced a trial.

Investigatory support and cooperation
To enable effective investigations and evidence gathering, the statute provides “the judges, the
Prosecutor and the Registrar…[with] the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities
accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law” and “[t]he staff of the
Prosecutor and of the Registrar shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded to officials of
the United Nations under articles V and VII”226 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, including functional immunity and the right to use UN
“laissez-passer” travel documents.227 Functional immunity provides prosecutors with immunity
224
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from local criminal jurisdictions in relation to actions performed in an official capacity—that is,
while investigating crimes for the ICTY.228 UN laissez-passer travel documents facilitate faster
acceptance of visa requests, faster travel, and access to diplomatic envoy facilities for
prosecutors.
Court provision of legal protections during pre-trial investigation can also be central to the
ability of defense counsel to effectively defend their clients: “In the international criminal
tribunals, where investigation occurs on the territory of states, but representation occurs in an
international court, international law doctrines of privileges and immunities of actors in
international organisations may well define the ability of defence counsel to prepare and present
their clients’ cases.”229 Yet such protections were not directly afforded in the statute to defense
counsel. Instead, more vaguely, the statute mentions that: “Other persons, including the accused,
required at the seat of the International Tribunal shall be accorded such treatment as is necessary
for the proper functioning of the International Tribunal.”230
The meaning of this phrase for defense investigators only became an issue at the court when
Croatian authorities filed an indictment against Marin Ivanović, a member of the Gotovina
defense team, in November 2008, charging him with concealing archival documents,231 and in
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December 2009 arresting him and several other members of the team on this charge.232 The
ICTY appeals chamber later ruled in relation to the situation that functional immunity also
applies to defense counsel and ordered Croatia to cease all criminal proceedings against those
arrested.233 The tribunal therefore eventually settled the immunity issue on the basis of parity.
The statute institutionalizes other investigative imbalances between prosecution and defense,
including in terms of state cooperation. The statute requires states to cooperate “in the
investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of
international humanitarian law,” including in locating individuals and documentary evidence,
and arresting suspects and transferring them to the tribunal.234
Prosecutors and the chambers can apply diplomatic pressure to states to cooperate with
investigations and can report lack of cooperation to the Security Council.235 These advantages
privilege the prosecution’s cooperation with states and provide them with greater access to
information. The prosecution is a primary organ of the court whose requests for assistance are
considered the conduct of official court business, whereas defense counsel, as independently
operating individuals, do not have their requests for assistance considered official court business
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by external political and legal actors, such as states’ foreign offices and justice departments, with
a consequently lower priority attached to those requests.236
The statute also provides the chief prosecutor with a political role that has implications for
his or her ability to acquire evidence. The chief prosecutor is nominated by the UN secretarygeneral and appointed by the Security Council,237 and the latter has required the prosecutor to
report on certain activities. For example, in resolution 1503 the council requested “the Presidents
of the ICTY and the ICTR and their Prosecutors, in their annual reports to the Council, to explain
their plans to implement the ICTY and ICTR Completion Strategies.”238 Chief Prosecutor Del
Ponte addressed the council on this issue, also discussing progress on gaining cooperation from
reluctant states, including Croatia.239 This political function provides a voice and a forum for
encouraging cooperation and requesting assistance in investigations.
The chief prosecutor also has a diplomatic role that has been used to urge states to cooperate.
In May 1996, for example, Richard Goldstone met with top US officials—Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff John Shalikashvili—to encourage them to use NATO troops to arrest Karadžić and
Mladić.240 Goldstone also acknowledges that he secured changes to the tribunal’s RPE to aid him
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in encouraging states to hand over confidential material during “personal visits” with top state
officials.241
In her official capacity, Del Ponte attended such major international political gatherings as
the World Economic Forum in Davos, and met with the heads of NATO and the European
Commission, as well as Western diplomats.242 In a meeting with US secretary of state Colin
Powell, she encouraged him to condition US financial aid to Yugoslavia on its cooperation with
her investigations. According to Del Ponte, in a secret meeting in March 2001, six months after
Milošević’s ouster as president of Yugoslavia, the prime minister, Zoran Djondjić,
acknowledged that the United States had threatened to cut off aid if it did not cooperate. At the
meeting Del Ponte agreed to coordinate her requests to Yugoslavia in such a way as to bolster
the prime minster’s political position vis-à-vis the new president, Vojislav Koštunica.243
The lack of a comparable institutional voice, and diplomatic position, access, and influence
for defense counsel creates enormous disparity in gaining assistance with investigations,
including gathering documentary evidence and accessing witnesses.244 There are various other
ways in which defense counsel are also structurally disadvantaged in conducting investigations.
They are, for example, reliant upon the court for diplomatic or legal action to encourage or
compel external assistance.245 This generates a significant inequality in official mechanisms for
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gaining state cooperation,246 despite the fact that on-site investigations tend to be seen as
essential by defense teams in order to obtain exculpatory evidence and to attempt to adequately
refute the prosecution’s case by assessing the accuracy and validity of prosecution evidence.247
As a practical matter, local authorities in states with a civil law system also expect a prosecutor
to perform all investigations—not defense counsel—and so are unprepared for, and more
resistant to, requests from defense investigators.248
States outside the region are also reluctant to aid the defense of those that international media
have already condemned. According to Henri Astier of the BBC, a news database search in 2000
listed more than one thousand instances of the term “indicted war criminals” that year,249 one of
which was by the BBC itself to refer to the Yugoslav defense minister at the time, Dragoljub
Ojdanić. Astier warns that “[a] trainee on a local newspaper who referred to someone charged
with selling crack cocaine as an ‘indicted drug dealer’ would get a rap over the knuckles from his
editor and a stern lecture on the presumption of innocence. Yet major news organizations ignore
this basic principle in reporting on war crimes cases.”250 This is typical, he argues, of
international media coverage of the ICTY, which largely takes the perspective of the
prosecution.
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Similar attitudes towards cooperating with the tribunal as synonymous with cooperating
solely with the prosecution are seen within states. During a US House of Representatives hearing
on the ICTY and ICTR, an attorney from a major law firm called as a witness, was asked by a
Congressman about US cooperation with the tribunals. He responded that “when we decide in
the name of international justice to prosecute someone, we ought to have the backbone to stand
behind that…There is no reason why we should be ashamed or afraid to have our witnesses go
and testify…And if they have relevant information, it ought to be heard. And if we are not
prepared to do that, then we should not be convicting these people.”251 A 2008 research
monograph by an American IR scholar on cooperation between states and the ad hoc tribunals
focuses exclusively on cooperation with prosecutions.252 Outside the ICTY, defense counsel are
considered as non-official and almost peripheral actors, and “the accused is, oddly, the great
forgotten figure of the international criminal trial.”253
In the first 15 years of the tribunal’s operation, Serbia was extremely reluctant to cooperate,
arguing that Serbs could not receive a fair trial there, leading to various fruitless complaints by
the president of the court to the Security Council.254 This significantly worsened after President
Slobodan Milošević was indicted by the tribunal in 1999.255 A letter from the Serbian minister of
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justice, Petar Jojić, in May 2000, responding to the chief prosecutor’s request for cooperation in
arresting a Serbian colonel, opened with “To the Whore Del Ponte, Self-Proclaimed Prosecutor,
Criminal Hague Tribunal.”256 This attitude began to shift with changes of government and
Milošević’s death in March 2006. International pressure, especially from the European Union,
offering the possibility of accession talks,257 led to Serbia surrendering the last two remaining
major ICTY indictees, Karadžić and Mladić, in 2008 and 2011, respectively.258 This is a
particularly prominent example of the kind of significant political pressure that Western states
have, selectively, applied to aid the court’s attempts to prosecute individuals, but that is rarely
available to the defense.
Initially there was reluctance from NATO and the Croatian government to cooperate with the
prosecution at the tribunal. However, this declined in the late 1990s, leading to the majority of
indictees being in the tribunal’s custody by 2001.259 Del Ponte acknowledged reluctance to
investigate and indict NATO personnel in relation to the 1999 air campaign in Serbia: “If I went
forward with an investigation of NATO…I would render my office incapable of continuing to
investigate and prosecute the crimes committed by the local forces during the wars of the 1990s”
due to the need for NATO intelligence and security on the ground during investigations.260 She
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consequently experienced a significant increase in cooperation with investigations a result of the
NATO bombing campaign, with the United States, Britain, France, and Germany eager to
provide information to aid in prosecutions of Yugoslav leaders.261
Again the Croatian turnaround is substantially due to Western state pressure to prosecute
indictees. President Franjo Tuđman initially resisted handing over Croatian general Tihomir
Blaškić, who was indicted in November 1995,262 due to reluctance to cooperate with the court.
Tuđman did not wish to appear to be aiding the court and thereby legitimizing its prosecutions.263
However, after the United States put pressure on Croatia, by threatening to cut off aid, the
general was handed over in April 1996.264
In terms of cooperation with defendants, in the appeal of Tadić, the first individual convicted
by the court, the appellant alleged “lack of cooperation” and “obstruction” by the government of
Republika Srpska, contending that the resultant lack of ability to present evidence from relevant
witnesses prejudiced the outcome of his trial.265 General Blaskić’s case also provides a
particularly egregious example of state political motivations in decisions to release evidence to
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the tribunal. At the trial stage, the Croatian government refused to release evidence requested.266
However, days after Blaskić’s conviction by the tribunal the government handed over thousands
of pages of documents which it claimed were exculpatory.267 Relying on this evidence, the
defendant’s appeal experienced significant success, reducing the number of charges on which he
was convicted from 19 to three, and his sentence from 45 years to nine.268
When states have been unwilling to cooperate, the court has determined that it possesses the
international legal authority to compel compliance with orders to provide witnesses or evidence
from states and government officials.269 In 1999 this led to the adoption of an additional rule in
the RPE, rule 54bis, which describes the right of the prosecution and defense to request that the
tribunal order a state to cooperate in providing information to the parties. This right was slow in
coming for the defense, vindicating Bassiouni’s assessment in 1993 that the accused’s right to
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access information “is largely neglected even though its importance to a defense is
immeasurable.”270
According to ICTY and MICT chef de cabinet McIntyre, the prosecution has been able to
utilize the court to compel cooperation much more effectively than has the defense.271 For the
court to issue an order compelling a state to cooperate, the party requesting the information must
establish that the documents contain evidence likely to be relevant to their case.272 They cannot
conduct a “fishing expedition” in the hope of finding something relevant, in the words of Judge
David Hunt.273
In contrast, the prosecution’s mandate from the Security Council to investigate allegations of
crimes within the court’s jurisdiction274 means that the OTP has much more latitude than defense
counsel in terms of requests for state cooperation. Instead of an order, a prosecutor can request a
warrant to seize documents in a state’s archives, which does not require demonstrating direct
relevance. According to Judge Hunt, for the OTP this is “a very powerful weapon in its hands,”
which additionally denies the defense direct access to that potential evidence—counsel can only
later access that subset of documents acquired through a warrant by the OTP that the prosecution
decides to disclose to the defense.275 This denies counsel the ability to search such documents for
exculpatory material—they are reliant on the prosecution identifying such documents during
270

M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International
Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions,” Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law 3, no. 2 (1993): 279.
271
McIntyre, “Equality of Arms:” 278.
272
ICTY RPE, rule 54bis.A.ii.
273
Delalić et al., Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Motion by Esad Landžo to Preserve and
Provide Evidence, case no. IT-96-21-A, April 22, 1999,
www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acdec/en/90422EV37230.htm#3.
274
ICTY statute, article 16.
275
Judge Hunt, “Reconsideration of order of 9 May 2002,” case no. IT-02-55-Misc4, July 17, 2002,
www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp39-e/misc.htm.

242

their examination, and then disclosing them in a timely manner. As discussed in the evidentiary
procedures section below, timely disclosure of prosecution evidence to the defense has been a
significant concern at the court.
The ICTY has decided that as issues of non-cooperation by external actors with
investigations by defense counsel are outside of its direct control they are not the tribunal’s
responsibility to resolve.276 That is, if the court cannot directly ensure parity—in relation to
assess to information, or other issues—it cannot be brought to the court as a matter for redress.
Because of this, according to defense counsel and former ADC president Gregor Guy-Smith,
lack of access to exculpatory material has significantly impacted the ability of counsel to mount
an effective defense and thereby threatens to undermine the credibility of the proceedings.277
The tribunal attitude towards defense problems outside of its direct control is concerning as it
indicates that the court does not acknowledge that an actual disadvantage to a defendant in
gathering evidence can be caused by their weaker institutional position within the court and the
reluctance of states to cooperate.278 This approach is consistent with the position of the court that
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the right to parity between the parties is only procedural and not substantive—if the procedures
are followed but the defense is disadvantaged in their outcome it requires no action from the
court to rectify.279 Therefore a poor ability to effectively exercise status procedural rights is not
perceived by the court as a challenge to due process. According to McIntyre, this attitude is
problematic for defense parity because procedural guarantees require institutional power to
effectuate them: “In a practical sense…the institutional advantages of the Ofﬁce of the
Prosecutor as an organ of the Tribunal with an independent budget means that there is a great
disparity in identifying and locating evidence.”280
Mechanisms for compelling external actor cooperation with international tribunals to ensure
a reasonable parity of access to potential evidence remain inadequate,281 enabling states to
exercise significant influence over evidence gathering: “While international law formally
addresses the issue of state cooperation through the core legal instruments of international
criminal law, trial practice is informally marked by the invisible state actor in the public
gallery.”282 The multi-level governance structure of international criminal justice ensures that
cooperation is dependent upon the political will and interests of external actors,283 but reluctance
to cooperate seems to be a far greater problem for defendants than prosecutors.
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A potential remedy, proposed by defense counsel interviewed, would be suspending
proceedings until a state begins to cooperate with the defense by permitting access.284 Otherwise,
if the defense is unable to investigate adequately to prepare for trial, there can be no adequate
defense. Such problems should be the responsibility of the court to deal with, especially because
they have capacities and resources that could ameliorate these problems, including a complaint to
the Security Council.285 However, according to Robinson, Karadžić’s chief legal advisor, the
court is reluctant to provide such aid as it does not want to be perceived as aiding the defense of
those widely perceived before trial to be war criminals.286
The prosecution is also able to rely on investigatory aid from the UN, NGOs, and individual
states. Even before the creation of the tribunal, the UN commission of experts had conducted
fact-finding missions. Its final report, in May 1994, detailed investigations and substantive
findings concerning: an alleged genocide in Opština Prijedor, the siege of Sarajevo, detention
facilities, sexual violence, mass graves, and the destruction of cultural property.287 The report led
to the initiation of various investigations by the tribunal’s OTP. While some of the material was
too general to be of direct use, it provided leads to more relevant evidence.288 According to
Richard Goldstone, the work of his office was augmented by investigations by the ICRC,
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Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,289 and Human Rights
Watch.290 According to former ICTY prosecutor Eliott Behar, the latter organization interviewed
a number of victims and witnesses to the Kosovo conflict, on the ground, in 1999. This greatly
assisted the OTP’s access to information in the Kosovo case he helped to prosecute.291 Goldstone
also remarked that his initial prosecution team was provided with training in international
criminal law, paid for by the American Bar Association.292
David Scheffer, senior advisor to Ambassador Albright, and later the first US ambassador-atlarge for war crimes issues, details significant investigatory aid to the OTP from the United
States.293 Scheffer co-chaired an Interagency Working Group on War Crimes Evidence, created
specifically to investigate crimes in the Balkans conflict, and which interviewed witnesses,
including refugees, collected intelligence, and attempted to construct “a ‘paper trail’ tying
atrocities to the military and civilian leaders at senior levels.”294 This amounts to an enormous
volume of investigatory aid and support that states and NGOs are rarely willing to make
available to defendants and counsel.
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This section analyzes issues relating to the effect of documentary and witness evidence on the
courtroom dynamic between prosecution and defense. The first section explores the problems
created by the hybrid nature of the trial system at the tribunal and the large scope of international
trials, and addresses the procedural defendant right of disclosure of prosecution evidence. The
second section discusses witness procedures in the statute and rules before analyzing in more
detail those permitting the introduction into the record of affidavits—written witness statements
and transcripts in lieu of in-person testimony. These are a core feature of witness rules that affect
the dynamic between prosecution and defense.
The report of the secretary-general to the Security Council recommending the establishment
of the tribunal acknowledged the need for international criminal justice to go far beyond the
defense protection standards employed at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The tribunal’s first
president,295 Antonio Cassese, was also aware of the necessity for the court to implement
substantial rights for defendants in order to achieve both normative and sociological legitimacy:
“Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done.”296 The report also stated that “[i]t is
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axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized standards
regarding the rights of the accused.”297
Nevertheless, the report was vague on procedural standards regarding core evidentiary issues,
unwilling to establish procedures when there was no agreement on the specifics of these
standards and how to implement them in international law.298 It made basic recommendations for
guaranteeing due process, including the rights of the accused,299 in particular those found in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,300 and these were included in the court’s
statute.301 These procedures were a hybrid of those found in the adversarial common law and
inquisitorial civil law trial systems, with the former predominant, as the statute was largely
drafted by common law tradition lawyers in the UN Department of Legal Affairs, with US
assistance.302
The Security Council made no changes to the statute as received in the report, perceiving
such issues to be technical details best left to the court to decide for itself. That is, they were seen
as peripheral, not as essential to the council in establishing the credibility and legitimacy of the
court—as the rhetoric it used implied.303 During council debates on the court’s creation, states
tended to express a concern that crimes be prosecuted, but not with careful trial deliberation to
ascertain truth or that the rights of the accused be respected. That is, they focused on outcomes,
not process, even though the latter is precisely what distinguishes genuine criminal justice from
297
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show trials. The US permanent representative to the UN at that time, Madeline Albright, for
example, stated during a council meeting in May 1993 that her country “hope[d] to contribute to
this critical process of developing the rules that the Tribunal can expeditiously adopt so that the
Prosecutor will then be in a position to begin prosecuting cases without further delay.”304 Speed
in prosecuting, not legal fairness, has always been the primary procedural focus of the Security
Council in relation to the tribunal.
The statute is consequently much more detailed on substantive than procedural law;
providing the judges with the authority to decide upon rules of procedure and evidence
themselves, which were adopted in February 1994,305 after the tribunal had received suggestions
from states,306 as provided for by the Security Council.307 The most influential suggestions were
from the United States, among the approximately 75 pages of material it submitted, which was a
significant factor in the establishment of a largely adversarial trial model.308 A danger in
authorizing the court’s judges to construct their own rules is that, as stated by Judge Wald,
“ICTY Judges are chosen by the UN General Assembly, from countries across the globe, many
of which have dubious records on human rights or observance of international humanitarian
law.”309 This background could also lead to poor decision-making by trial and appeal chambers,
yet, according to Wald, the judges have “faithfully [followed] the rules and procedures agreed
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upon by the Court.”310 However, this attitude demonstrates no acknowledgment that this largely
means following the rules that the judges themselves created.
By 1997, within three years of the RPE’s creation, it had been amended several times,
“which may give the impression of a certain amount of improvisation” by the judges.311 By July
2015 it had been revised 50 times, and currently consists of 127 rules (and multiple sub-rules)
covering a broad range of issues for all significant participants at the court in the pre-trial, trial,
appeals, and post-appeal stages.312 Such amendments are not subject to any oversight by the
Security Council or any other body.313 This is problematic in the light of some of the evidentiary
procedural changes discussed below.

Documentary evidence and disclosure
The RPE contain extremely permissive evidentiary standards, especially by adversarial trial
standards, allowing any material to be admitted as evidence in trial, by either party, which an
ICTY chamber “deems to have probative value.”314 This standard was challenged by the defense
in an early case before the court, arguing that it reflected an essentially civil law approach of
permitting virtually any relevant information to be used as evidence, including hearsay.315 The
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defense argued that this standard was too lax and was inappropriate to the adversarial common
law trial procedure utilized by the tribunal. Legal systems applying the adversarial model usually
restrict what evidence can be introduced—especially hearsay.316
The trial chamber rejected this argument, stating that the tribunal’s trial system conformed to
neither trial model, but was instead “sui generis” and “moving towards a more hybrid system.”317
This a problematic position from the perspective of protecting the rights of the accused because
the ICTY’s trial procedure is actually largely adversarial, in that it consists of two competing
parties independent of the bench,318 which present and challenge the evidence on behalf of their
client—the defendant on one side, and the court, or arguably the Security Council, on the other.
Clearly Prosecutor Del Ponte saw that she was representing a broad political constituency during
trials. In commencing her opening statement at the beginning of the trial of the former president
of Yugoslavia she stated: “I bring the accused, Milošević, before you to face the charges against
him. I do so on behalf of the international community and in the name of all member-states of
the United Nations.”319
Scholars of international criminal justice have gradually moved away from conceptualizing
the defining feature of the tribunals’ legal systems as a “clash of legal cultures”—conflict
between arguably incompatible adversarial and inquisitorial systems—“to one which recognizes
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the convergence of influences at play in developing a sui generis body of law.”320 However, that
clash is still enormously significant for the parity achieved by defense counsel, as they struggle
with the consequences of a system built on conflicting conceptualizations of the role of defense
and the parity it is therefore deemed to require for trials to be considered fair.
While the tribunal largely follows the adversarial model in its courtroom procedures, its rules
of evidence, as mentioned above, are the more permissive ones associated with an inquisitorial
system.321 This does arguably create a form of hybrid, but one poorly suited to preserving the
trial rights of defendants, with neither the expectation of a neutral search for truth of an
inquisitorial approach nor the extra protections provided for defendants in a competitive
adversarial procedure. As stated by legal scholars Stephanos Bibas and William Burke-White on
the problem of creating a hybrid legal system at the tribunal that adequately protects defendant
rights:
Fundamentally, adversarial and inquisitorial systems specify very different roles for judges,
prosecutors, and even defendants. Adversarial judges are detached umpires, with prosecutors
and defense counsel serving as zealous investigators and advocates for their clients. In
contrast, inquisitorial judges and investigating magistrates are active truth-seekers, collecting
and reviewing evidence to determine facts.
Our argument is not that a pure adversarial or inquisitorial system is preferable. Our fear
is that the mishmash of the two systems has abandoned some distinctive checks on which
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each system depends. The lack of appropriate mental models for the role of judges,
prosecutors, and defense counsel results in confusion and perhaps even systemic failure.322
They provide the example of a French judge at the tribunal criticizing an American defense
attorney for introducing procedural objections on behalf of his client—an expected and necessary
right for counsel within an adversarial trial approach: “If the system is going to be
adversarial…it needs to allow zealous adversarial testing of the evidence instead of censuring
American lawyers for playing their roles. If, however, the system is going to be inquisitorial at
root, it needs to retain more inquisitorial safeguards.”323
A former ICTY prosecutor provided an account in a case he tried of defense counsel
pursuing perhaps not the most effective tactical choices in the courtroom. Counsel tended to
322
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deny facts and the occurrence of events which he says were difficult to disprove and did not need
to be disproven to make the defense case. Another perhaps questionable choice was focusing
attention on unrelated acts of violence committed by the victimized ethnic group, which may
have given the appearance that counsel were trying to justify their client’s role in atrocities.
Viewing the trial and acting through a broader ethnic lens also tends to occur much less
frequently in domestic trials.324
Judge Wald argues that the expansiveness of the court’s evidentiary standards is one of the
most significant problems for defense protection at the tribunal. She rejects the argument that a
panel of judges requires less guidance in examining evidence than a jury, stating that “It is
simply not true, in my opinion, that only juries—not judges—need such restrictions. Donning a
robe does not enshroud its occupant with a seventh sense of whether something written on paper
is true or false. In that sense, the judge is on a par with the juror, who must rely on his or her
human instincts in evaluating the person doing the testifying.”325
Judge Bakone Moloto acknowledged the harm that dubious evidence can cause to judicial
perceptions when he objected to the introduction of a certain book as evidence during trial: “we,
the Chamber, cannot accept that we hear what you are going to say only to throw the book out
later. The book might be out, but the mind—it’s still in the mind. And the purpose for
admissibility is to make sure that the mind of the Chamber is not coloured by what might turn
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out to be inadmissible.”326 The problem of hearsay evidence is also discussed in the witness
testimony subsection below.
In relation to the core due process procedural guarantee of the disclosure of prosecution
evidence to the defense, the tribunal’s RPE requires all evidence presented in the indictment be
made available within 30 days of the first pre-trial appearance of the accused in court.327
Evidence that will be presented at trial—including archival materials and other documents, and
witness statements—must be made available within a time period set by the pre-trial or trial
chamber,328 and evidence discovered after the time limit must be handed over to the defense
immediately.329 There is also an obligation on the prosecution to disclose any potentially
exculpatory material in their possession.330 This last requirement is particularly important, as
disclosure of “information that suggests actual innocence…is fundamental to notions of due
process under…international law.”331
There are, however, substantial limitations on disclosure imposed by the court. Most
importantly, all documents from states or other third parties relied upon by the prosecution may
only be released to the defense with the permission of the providing entity.332 This even applies
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to exculpatory material.333 To keep from defendants material that suggests their innocence is
clearly an absurdity in any trial system with pretentions to fairness. Witnesses may also not be
ordered to testify in relation to such evidence.
This restriction was designed to protect sensitive information provided by states, and so to
encourage them to hand over intelligence information that might be useful to the OTP.334 While
the restriction no doubt achieved its aim, it was only ever designed to aid the prosecution—there
is no parity in access to evidence through such rules. For the defense it means that information
may not have been disclosed prior to trial, making it more difficult for counsel to provide an
adequate response to the evidence against their clients—even leaving aside the issue of
exculpatory material.335
Much state confidential evidence has not been presented during ICTY trials—to maintain its
confidentiality providing states have often required that such material only be used to lead the
prosecution to other evidence. However, with a state’s permission such evidence can be
presented in court, subject to the approval of the chambers, and the judges have been reluctant to
exclude such information. In Brđanin, the defense moved for the exclusion of evidence obtained
through phone conversation intercepts, arguing that electronic surveillance was illegal under
Bosnia and Herzegovina state law and that it was in breach of the right to privacy in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human
Rights.336 The judges ruled against the defendant,337 unwilling to expand defendant protections
333
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through reliance on existing and international and state law as they had been willing to rely on it
to expand the definition of crimes.338 This is one of several problems for the defense created by
the necessary reliance of the court on external actors for evidence gathering.
In terms of court practice, legal scholar Jenia Turner states that, in interviews with her, ICTY
defense attorneys criticized prosecutors for tardiness in disclosing evidence, and reluctance to
hand over exculpatory material.339 It was also one of the strongest criticisms of prosecution
behavior made by counsel I interviewed. Defense attorneys claim especially that delays in
releasing exculpatory material to defendants at the tribunal are an:
ongoing problem…even though the prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence
is essential to providing the accused with adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence.
Timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence is also, as an ethical matter, prerequisite to the
prosecution discharging its duty to assist the Trial Chamber in arriving at the truth and to
providing ‘justice for the international community, victims and the accused.’340
According to defense attorneys interviewed, this occurs mostly because the prosecution is
overwhelmed with the sheer volume of evidence it has to deal with, and in that mammoth task,
finding and handing over information to the defense is not a high priority.341 This is a
prosecutorial resources issue that negatively impacts defense counsel. Therefore the situation is
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not as simple as summed up by former chief prosecutor Goldstone when asked about resources at
the court. He argues that the under-resourcing of the OTP that he experienced as chief prosecutor
in 1994-6 was directly advantageous to defense counsel.342
Counsel claim that disclosure has always been a major problem and has not improved.343
While they sympathize with prosecutors as human beings who are reluctant to hand over
evidence that might undermine the case they are trying to make, at the same time prosecutors are
an arm of the international criminal justice system, tasked with finding justice, not just proving
the accused guilty. One knowledgeable observer close to the court defended the OTP against
accusations of tardiness in handing over evidence, arguing that the disclosure requirements at the
court are very exacting, perhaps too much so considering the volume of evidence involved, and
considerably higher than in the United States.344 Former prosecutor Behar, who had worked in
this role in Canada before moving to The Hague, felt that, from his background as a Canadian
prosecutor, disclosure standards were not excessive at the Hague—they were lower than those in
Canada.345
On occasion the court has strongly criticized prosecutors for disclosure violations. In 1998, a
trial chamber censured prosecutors and issued a formal complaint to the OTP for “conduct close
to negligence” relating to disclosure, listing numerous examples.346 However, it also noted that
there was no code of conduct for prosecutors at the tribunal and that the chambers had no power
342
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to discipline them; it also acknowledged that defense counsel were so bound and could be
sanctioned.347 The court had in fact just prior to this determined that it had no power to even
consider the issue of a code of conduct for the prosecution.348
One of the most telling examples of lack of prosecutorial accountability occurred more
recently, in 2012, when the court reprimanded a prosecutor—without professional or financial
penalties—for purposeful failure to hand over information that might have discredited a
prosecution witness.349 The appeals chamber reversed the censure, holding that only the OTP can
be censured by the court, not individual prosecutors. Nevertheless, the court did not reprimand
the office.350 Colleen Rohan, who was defense counsel in that case, has not heard of any
sanctioning of prosecution for misconduct acknowledged by the court.351 She argues that this
disparity in accountability for procedural violations between prosecution and defense is a serious
problem as it disadvantages the latter through providing little incentive for prosecutors to comply
with their disclosure obligations, and creates “a climate of impunity regarding disclosure
violations.”352
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Some of the problems for defense rights caused by unreliable disclosure are a result of the
broad scope of ICTY trials.353 The sheer volume of evidence presented by prosecutors at the trial
due to the large number of charges often brought places a significant burden on the limited
resources of the defense. There are thousands and sometimes millions of pages of documents
disclosed, often with inadequate time for the defense to make adequate use of them: introduced
immediately before the trial begins, during the trial, or immediately before closing arguments,
for example.354 While some defense counsel argue that prosecutors purposefully time disclosure
so as to disadvantage the defense,355 those I interviewed largely ascribed the problem to the
scope of trials, as mentioned placing a disclosure burden on the prosecution that they have
insufficient resources to adequately respond to.356
Close court observers sympathetic to the prosecution also recognize that there have been
problems with disclosure and agree that it is due to the overwhelming volume of material
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gathered by the OTP for each trial. The problem may have been ameliorated by the introduction
of an electronic system for storing documents, with many files text searchable.357 Former chief
prosecutor Del Ponte has acknowledged, however, that many documents are often not uploaded
to the system, leading to a continuation of disclosure problems due to the volume of evidence:
“we did not even know whether the mounds of documents in our custody held exculpatory
evidence.”358
The scope of trials is an ongoing problem created not only by the nature of mass atrocity
crimes, but also by prosecutorial charging decisions. According to Judge Wald:
Judges have sometimes seemed perplexed and even irritated as to why particular indictments
or particular suspects have been brought at particular times. This was especially true when 60
or more separate counts were loaded in one indictment of a relatively low-level perpetrator.
The ICTY Statute has been construed reasonably as allowing Judges to reject an indictment
only if the evidence proferred [sic] by the Prosecutor does not make out a prima facie case,
and not on grounds that the Judges think that a particular case is a waste of the Tribunal’s
time.359
One argument for the large number of charges is a politicization of the prosecutorial charging
decision resulting from the international and political context within which ICTY trials occur.360
With international media attention and pressure from victim groups to see justice done for them,
prosecutors are argued to enlarge the scope of the charges brought against accused. A well357
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informed legal source has seen no evidence of charging decisions at the ICTY being affected by
such political considerations.361 Former prosecutor Behar felt that there may well be perceived
public or political pressure to pursue a broad range of charges, though he acknowledged that he
had no direct experience with making such charging decisions. He also felt that there may be
particular public attention paid to certain charging decisions—for example, in relation to crimes
of sexual violence, given a current focus on these issues—but that ultimately the prosecution
must be able to substantiate these charges with sufficient evidence to prove them in court.362
The Karadžić trial provides a prominent illustration of the harm caused to adequacy of
representation for defendants in relation to documentary evidence by the scope of international
trials. According to Karadžić’s chief trial legal advisor, Peter Robinson, the defense received two
million pages of evidence from the prosecution—of the nine million in the latter’s possession
relating to the case.363 There was so much material that the prosecution was required to prepare a
list of the evidence disclosed on a monthly basis.364 In February 2009 alone the prosecution
reported handing over 6,016 items, totaling 68,668 pages.365 Disclosure at similar levels
continued during Karadžić’s trial.366
One of the reasons for the amount of evidence in his trial was the number of charges made by
the prosecution—a total of 11. Of these, two were for genocide (Srebrenica and seven Bosnian
municipalities), five for crimes against humanity (persecution, extermination, murder,
361
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deportation, and inhuman acts), and four for war crimes (murder, terror, unlawful attacks on
civilians, and taking hostages).367 His trial lasted 499 days, with 337 prosecution and 248 defense
witnesses called.368
Robinson argues that Karadžić’s notoriety, the political need for the court to secure a
prosecution, and pressure from victim groups were factors leading prosecutors to charge him
with an especially large number and scope of offenses.369 Academics are also not immune from
media influence. European Society of International Law vice-president Marko Milanovic stated a
week before the Karadžić verdict was announced: “Broadly speaking he got a fair trial, it was
certainly fairer than he would have got anywhere else.” He does not seem to require a high
standard of legal fairness, presumably arguing that the ICTY is fairer than a Bosnian court would
have been. Milanovic then undermined his argument entirely by going on to say “there’s no way
he can be acquitted.”370
Former prosecutor Behar argues that international trials can have a strong historical narrative
dimension. Pursuing that dimension may encourage the prosecution to introduce more witnesses
and victims than necessary to tell their stories in court. However, this has to be balanced by
competing pressures on the prosecution, such as the court’s concern with the length of the trial—
leading the judges to limit the number of witnesses both prosecution and defense can
introduce.371
367
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The trial of Milošević also suffered from the emphasis on the trial as a public political event,
and the concern with narrative construction. During the accused’s first appearance at the court in
July 2001 he rejected the right to have his indictment read out in court. Prosecutor Del Ponte
later said that this was unfortunate, as “[t]his was an historic moment—the first trial of a head of
state before the international tribunal. Reading the indictment aloud, live on television in Serbia,
would have provided the public with a dramatic, definitive statement of the charges against the
man who had once been their leader.”372 The chief prosecutor’s reasoning for this procedural
trial preference relied on the political goal of delegitimizing the defendant at home by utilizing
the trial to reshape the narrative of his time as president.
Del Ponte was also critical of her prosecution team’s choice of the first witnesses presented
at Milošević’s trial, fearing that his cross-examination (he acted as his own counsel), shown on
television, was allowing him to “score political points in Serbia.” “‘This,’ I told them, ‘is not the
trial we wanted to present to the world.’…I wanted to see insider witnesses. I wanted to see
ranking diplomats and leaders from the international community who had dealt with Milošević
during the war. I did not want to see evidence of shootings and rapes and other crimes.”373 There
was no clear-cut separation between legal and political decision-making in relation to the
prosecution’s presentation of its case, again challenging the claim that politics outside the ICTY
courtroom have not affected the fairness of legal proceedings within it.374
Del Ponte was attempting to use the trial to create political theater. Martti Koskenniemi
argues that the prosecution’s decision-making during the Milošević trial was inherently political,
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and could only be so when prosecuting a political leader: “To accept the terms in which the trial
is conducted—what deeds are singled out, who is being accused—is to already accept one
interpretation of the context among those between which the political struggle has been
waged”—that is, between the West and Serbia.375 The prosecution strategy in Milošević can be
interpreted as the theater of demonstrating the validity of a Western interpretation of the
Yugoslavia conflict and combatting the alternative interpretation being offered by the accused.
As Koskenniemi argues, the international trial of political leaders requires the examination of
evidence relating to the broader political context of the conflict and the alleged atrocities in
dispute: “This is where a trial becomes inevitably a history lesson, and the dispute at the heart of
it a political debate about the plausibility of the historical ‘interpretations.’”376
The trial goal of constructing a historical narrative of the Balkans conflict affected charging
decisions by the OTP. Narrative construction for the conflict has required a comprehensive
approach to the actions prosecuted at trial. The tribunal has constructed narratives of guilt in
order to avoid the perception of impunity. This is especially problematic for accused with a high
level of notoriety, such as Milošević, Karadžić, and Mladić. In such cases the court is eager to
ensure the appearance of fairness to avoid the perception of a political trial of defeated leaders
(and to avoid successful defense appeals), but at the same time there is public, political, and
victim group pressure to ensure the conviction of the most notorious alleged war criminals from
the conflict. In this inevitably politicized and highly public context, “when the interests of the
criminal defendant and victims both vie for judicial attention, a point is soon reached beyond
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which the desire to satisfy the victims’ interests begins to impinge on considerations of fairness
toward the defendants.”377
Returning to the issue of disclosure during the Karadžić trial, there was also information the
defense requested that was not released. Robinson filed 101 disclosure violation motions with the
judges for refusal to hand over relevant material, of which the judges found for the defense in
85.378 The judges were nevertheless reluctant to allow a remedy because of the cost and time it
would require.379 Robinson believes the court acknowledges the problem of poor prosecutorial
disclosure but is not willing to effectively address the issue due to bureaucratic constraints—
unwilling or unable to provide the defense with more time and money.
According to Colleen Rohan, who acted as legal consultant to Karadžić’s Standby Counsel
Team,380 there were 38 prior related cases at the ICTY to the situations litigated in Karadžić—
that had either gone through a full trial, had a guilty plea, or were sent back to be tried locally—
so that material also needed to be looked at by the defense team for exculpatory material. She
called this “an overwhelming task.”381 There were 10 prior cases in relation to Srebrenica
alone.382 Without interns working for free for the Karadžić defense team—there were over 100
altogether—Rohan believes that it would have been impossible to put together a defense: “Is that
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the way we want to run a system of justice, based on essentially slave labor, with people who
happen to be able to afford to work with you for three months?”383
The incoherent hybrid nature of the tribunal’s trial system, combined with the huge scope of
international mass atrocity prosecutions, have had a significant effect on the ability of the
accused to present an adequate defense based upon access to the case against their clients. These
problems are perhaps inevitable in the legal and political environment of an international
criminal court. Such weaknesses in the ability to provide adequate protections for defendants call
into question the appropriateness of such courts for handling such cases.

Witnesses and defense cross-examination
The statute includes the right for the defense to cross-examine prosecution witnesses,384 which
effectuates the fundamental abstract right of a criminal defendant to challenge their accusers.
Corollary rights which protect the effectiveness of the right of cross-examination are found in the
RPE and include adequate prior notice of witness information and statements.385
In 2000, the appeals chamber established in Kordić et al. that it had an “express preference
for live, in-court testimony,”386 which is a core factor in the implementation of the right to crossexamine. In person testimony by witnesses was in fact the usual approach for the first several
years of the court’s existence.387 It is also in line with common law system practice to safeguard
383
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the rights of the accused by enabling testimony against them to be challenged. For example, in
the US federal court system, witnesses are required to testify in person, under oath, and with the
defense right to cross-examine, with only exceptional circumstances permitting deviation.388
However, the length and cost of trials at the tribunal have led to pressure since the late 1990s
to reduce both, with significant implications for defense parity through witness procedures, as
explained below. The cost of the first trial was around $20 million,389 with the average cost of a
trial throughout the ICTY’s existence estimated to be around $14 million.390 The tribunal’s 201415 budget was $180 million—down from $286 million in 2010-11 as the court winds down,
finishing existing trials and transferring others to local courts.391 The court’s total operating costs
will have been around $2.7 billion by the time it closes.392 In terms of the speed of trials, in its
first ten years each lasted on average nine months, with some running to two years.393 The more
complex trial of Radovan Karadžić lasted six and a half years394—not including the appeal.395
This does not compare poorly with the United States. A 2003 study of murder trials in eight
Southern states by researchers at Iowa State University found an average cost of around $24
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million, while trials for especially violent offenders cost of $150-160 million each.396 However,
the United States has unusually high costs for domestic violent crime trials, and many defendants
plea bargain, so many cases do not go to trial. In comparison, in the United Kingdom, according
to the British Treasury, the total cost, per murder, to the criminal justice system and health
services combined, is approximately $250,000.397
International trials present particular challenges that slow down and increase the cost of
proceedings, including the need to call a large number of witnesses from multiple countries, and
in relation to various different events, especially when prosecuting for command responsibility.
These witnesses’ preferences on timing need to be taken into account by the court as it can be
difficult to compel them to appear. Investigations, including exhuming mass burial sites, can take
years. Language is another complication: judges and other court officers often do not share one
in common with witnesses, and documents have to be translated.398
Furthermore, the vast majority of cases go to trial,399 whereas in most common law
systems—whose trials take longer partly because of the reliance on oral testimony—many cases
are plea bargained, as is typical in the United States. In contrast, few individuals are willing to
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admit to committing mass atrocity crimes.400 There is also no provision in the ICTY statute or
RPE for encouraging plea bargains between accused and prosecution, and the court is not bound
by such agreements between the parties.401 The tribunal has also assumed costs usually borne by
other aspects of the criminal justice system in a domestic context, such as investigators’ travel,
and the detention of defendants before and during trial, in addition to legal aid for defendants.
The latter cost alone accounts for 11 percent of the tribunal’s annual budget.402
Responding to pressure from states to address concerns about the length and cost of ICTY
trials,403 in 1998 the UN General Assembly requested the secretary-general to conduct a review
“evaluating the effective operation and functioning” of the ICTY in order to improve
efficiency.404 The report of the expert group assembled by the secretary-general recommended
procedural changes to expedite trials, including through an increased reliance on written
testimony, as live testimony takes up the most trial time—on average witnesses testify for one
whole day.405 In its seventh annual report to the UN, the tribunal itself acknowledged the
pressure to speed up proceedings, and that it came not only from the need to satisfy court actors,
but from state and UN pressure, to satisfy “the ever growing expectations of the international

400

Cassese, International Criminal Law, 387.
See Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, case no. IT-96-22-Tbis, para. 19.
402
ICTY, About the ICTY: The Cost of Justice, www.icty.org/sid/325.
403
Hafida Lahiouel, “The Right of the Accused to an Expeditious Trial,” in Essays on ICTY Procedure
and Evidence: In Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, ed. Richard May, David Tolbert, John Hocking,
Ken Roberts, Bing Bing Jia, Daryl Mundis, and Gabriël Oosthuizen (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill,
2001), 197.
404
General Assembly Resolution 53/212, December 18, 1998.
405
Secretary-General, “Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and
Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),” UN doc. A/54/634, 1999. See Wald, “To ‘Establish Incredible
Events by Credible Evidence:’” 535-6.
401

270

community.”406 As a result, since the late 1990s the Security Council has taken various actions to
speed up trials as part of its “completion strategy” for the court.407
Greater legitimacy might be argued to stem from the right of defendants to an expeditious
trial, which is undermined when they spend years behind bars before a verdict is delivered.
Rachel Kerr argues that a major political consideration in the Security Council’s push towards
speedier trials was that successfully completed prosecutions—presumably with guilty verdicts—
would aid transitional justice within the region408—bringing swifter and therefore more credible
justice to victims in order to aid in reconciliation and peacebuilding.409 The pressure also seems
to have stemmed from assessments of the poor achievements of the tribunal, which relied
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primarily on the number of total indictments and convictions—a measure of success appropriate
more for show trials than genuine criminal justice.410
Returning to the 2000 Kordić appeals chamber decision mentioned earlier—which reiterated
the court’s early preference for oral testimony—trial judges reacted to the decision by changing
the witness procedures in order to permit greater speed of trials through written testimony. Later
that year, at the twenty-third plenary session of the tribunal’s Judicial Practices Working Group,
it introduced a new rule to the RPE411 that has enabled a significantly greater reliance on written
witness testimony since then,412 rule 92bis.413 In 2006 the court moved to increase the reliance on
written testimony further by introducing rules 92ter and 92quater.
Rule 92bis allows the introduction of a written statement or transcript in lieu of the witness’s
appearance in court, as long as their testimony “goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and
conduct of the accused”414—that is, to establishing historical background and other aspects of the
context of the situation(s) examined in the case, known as the “crime base.”415 Rule 92ter
permits such testimony to be introduced even when it goes to the acts and conduct of the
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accused, as long as the witness is available in person for cross-examination. Rule 92quater
allows written testimony which goes to their acts and conduct even if the witness is unable to
appear before the court.416
The introduction of these rules has led to a substantially increased reliance on written
testimony.417 In the tribunal’s first trial,418 all evidence received from witnesses was oral except
for statements contained in an expert report provided by a witness who was a member of the
commission of experts established by the Security Council to investigate war crimes in the
former Yugoslavia.419 Less than ten years later, in Krajišnik, the prosecution was permitted by
the chamber to introduce 168 affidavit (92bis) witnesses vs. 101 oral:420 only 38 percent of
witnesses provided live testimony.
Court observers and former prosecutor Behar defend these rule changes, arguing that they
have helped speed up proceedings while not negatively affecting defendants’ rights.421 They
claim that 92bis witness statements are not problematic. Evidence admitted under this rule
cannot relate to the acts and conduct of the accused. Furthermore, such evidence cannot be used
as the sole basis to convict an accused.
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In contrast, Judge Wald warned as early as 2004 that the increasing use of such testimony
was a concern for justice, and that if the trend continued it would “seriously undermine the hardfought respect for [the tribunal’s] processes.”422 Permitting the introduction of testimony against
a defendant without the ability to question the witness, she argued, “threatens to squander the
ICTY’s most precious asset—its reputation for fairness and truth seeking.”423 In fact in its first
annual report to the UN, in 1994, the tribunal acknowledged that cross-examination (in this case
during depositions) of oral testimony was allowed “[i]n order to protect ‘equality of arms’ (and,
in particular, the rights of the accused).”424
This attitude changed, to the detriment of defendants, when the length and cost of
international trials became apparent. In its sixth annual report to the UN, the ICTY had
acknowledged the concern with the length of trials, but had also noted that it was nevertheless
important to maintain the centrality of oral testimony, despite its contribution to the problem:
“unlike the Nurnberg and Tokyo tribunals, a great deal of reliance is placed on the testimony of
witnesses rather than on Affidavits [at the ICTY], and the tribunal is committed to ensuring that
the rights of the accused are fully respected in accordance with contemporary human rights
norms.”425 In its eighth report—in which the court noted the introduction of 92bis—only two
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years later, “such declarations were notably absent.”426 The eighth report similarly only mentions
a major change in the policy of the court towards written testimony in an endnote. This was the
deletion of the rule stating a “preference for oral testimony” and replacing it with one “providing
for the Chamber to receive the evidence of a witness in written form, where the interests of
justice allow.”427
A year after the introduction of 92bis, Judge Wald called the move “a 180 degree turn” from
the preference for live testimony.428 In 2003 legal scholar Salvatore Zappalà expressed concern
at the trend, noting that affidavits “present the same drawbacks as hearsay evidence, since they
are out-of-court statements…Defendants are clearly not confronted with the source of evidence.
Additionally, affidavits lack those elements of orality and direct examination that should
characterize the presentation of evidence in adversarial trials.”429 Therefore the defense’s
fundamental due process “right of confrontation” of one’s accusers is diminished. This is why
such testimony tends to be forbidden or extremely limited in adversarial trials; such testimony is
a feature instead commonly seen in inquisitorial trials.430
In relation to 92bis, Gideon Boas, a former legal advisor to the ICTY trial chambers,
acknowledges that the effective implementation of the constraint against using written testimony

426

Fairlie, “Due Process Erosion:” 71.
ICTY, eighth annual report, para. 51, note 1. See Fairlie, “Due Process Erosion:” 72. Rule 89.F
replaced rule 90.A.
428
Wald, “To ‘Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence:’” 544.
429
Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 137.
430
Some states with inquisitorial systems permitting reliance on written testimony have shifted towards
an adversarial model reliant on oral testimony precisely because of concerns with the rights of defendants
in a non-oral setting. See, for example, the move in this direction by Mexico, due to be complete by 2016:
Paul J. Zwier and Alexander Barney, “Moving to an Oral Adversarial System in Mexico: Jurisprudential,
Criminal Procedure, Evidence Law, and Trial Advocacy Implications,” Emory International Law Review
26, no. 1 (2012): 189-225.
427

275

for acts of the accused is dependent upon the highly subjective interpretation of the judges.431 In
interviews counsel confirmed this concern, arguing that, despite prosecutors’ protestations to the
contrary, some of them have interpreted the rule too liberally, putting together statements that
breach the often fine line between background and direct relevance to the accused’s conduct.432
Judge Wald argues that:
In my time at the ICTY, I have seen countless statements made years earlier by a witness that
the same witness repudiates, contradicts, or ignores in his or her courtroom testimony. There
is no question in my mind that a very different aura surrounds a witness giving live testimony
to the judges in front of the accused and cross-examined by defense counsel than in an
interview with a prosecutor (or a defense) representative out of court, not subject to crossexamination. I have grown suspicious of many out-of-court statements that are the product of
a witness speaking one language to an interrogator speaking another who writes it down in
the interrogator’s language and has it read back to the witness in the witness’s native tongue
by a third party. There is much margin for error in such a system, and indeed in the
courtroom years later, many witnesses say they were misunderstood or misquoted in the
earlier statement. It is therefore essential, in my view, that any written statements truly be
limited to non-incriminating evidence.433
The shift towards written statements potentially harms defendants by eliminating the effect of
live testimony on the judges—who decide cases—and often denies defense counsel the right to
cross-examine witnesses, which constitutes a weakening of their trial right to confront their
431
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accusers. It also arguably undermines the principle of the presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof lying with the prosecution. Despite these serious concerns, written witness
testimony has been frequently and increasingly utilized at the court for incriminating evidence in
order to speed up trials.434 As the court completes its final cases there has not been a slowing
down, but rather a further “accelerated pace” in proceedings,435 attested to by defense counsel.436

Conclusion
The ICTY was the first international criminal tribunal created since the IMTFE. It faced a very
different context of international criminal law to the postwar tribunals, which made its legality of
crimes far less problematic. The agreement among powerful postwar states to create the IMT and
IMTFE, and the broad state agreement during the Cold War leading to the creation of global and
regional humanitarian and human rights legal instruments meant that the core crimes of the
ICTY were relatively well established by the beginning of the court’s jurisdiction in 1991.
The dissertation therefore disagrees with the assessment of William Schabas, who argues that
“[a]lthough formally professing rigid adherence to the nullum crimen principle, in practice the
judges at the ad hoc tribunals have taken a relatively relaxed approach, much in spirit to their
predecessors at Nuremberg.”437 It instead argues that while the lack of any provisions in the
statute protecting legality may have enabled some flexibility with interpreting crimes, the ICTY
434
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did not breach legality by enforcing laws that had not existed before, which had happened at the
IMT.438
The tribunal has developed crimes from their treaty and customary origins through
interpretations that have been positive from a broad human rights perspective of protecting
individuals. The tribunal’s interpretations have sometimes been questionable, especially in
relation to the context and underlying offenses of the crimes.439 The tribunal, however, generally
evinces a relatively high level of legality of crimes, at least compared to the only two previous
international tribunals.
The legality of penalties, however, has been significantly more problematic than that of
crimes. The UN was loath to compensate for the lack of Cold War development of international
criminal procedure by directly breaching legality through creating specific punishments. This
lacuna provided the tribunal with excessive leeway in creating its own sentencing practice,
ineffectively guided by the few specifics the judges created in the RPE. Incoherent and
inconsistent practice has generated little faith in the tribunal’s justice among victims.
438
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The legality of crimes and punishments was also shaped by the Security Council decision to
create the tribunal through a Chapter VII resolution, as an attempt to provide a swift political
response to armed conflict through legal means—or at least swift after the council finally
decided to take action. Creation through a treaty, while more time-consuming, would have
provided greater impetus towards generating clarity and specificity in relation to crimes and
punishments, as was the case with the ICC’s Rome Statute in 1998—discussed in the following
chapter.
The factors that determine defense parity were understood by the Security Council mostly in
terms of access to counsel and basic procedural guarantees, reflecting a lack of understanding of
the role of defense in criminal trials, and a lack of concern due to the emphasis on prosecution,
and on controlling the costs of the tribunal and the length of trials. This focus on basic
procedures is to the detriment of an emphasis on the structural dynamic within the court.
Structural parity is important to legal fairness because the institutional position of the defense in
a criminal justice system has a significant effect on their ability to secure adequate resources and
to maintain a voice in procedural policy reform. Structural parity therefore potentially shapes
defense counsels’ entire ability to fairly represent their clients. The extreme structural imbalance
at the tribunal, partially ameliorated by the creation of the Association of Defence Counsel,
reflects poorly on the legal fairness towards defendants originally envisioned by Security
Council members and practiced by the tribunal, and has shaped its ability to successfully address
problems affecting the ability of counsel to provide adequate representation.
Both the prosecution and defense have experienced significant state reluctance to cooperate
with pre-trial investigations, resulting from the political concerns of external actors who are
necessary for the court to function, and the weak ability of the tribunal to compel their
279

cooperation. Ultimately, however, the impact has been much greater on counsel’s ability to
present an adequate defense than on the prosecution’s ability to build a case. The former lack the
OTP’s advantages of institutional status and resources, and political and diplomatic contacts and
influence which aid in encouraging and pressuring states to cooperate.
Evidentiary procedure issues at the tribunal demonstrate the problems for defense parity
caused especially by: the massive scope of international trials, particularly those of top leaders;
the methods adopted to respond to UN and state pressure to speed up trial proceedings; the
incoherent hybrid nature of procedures; and lack of concern with the defense function by the
creators of the court. Evidentiary procedure issues are also impacted by broader concerns at the
court that impinge upon parity, including the tribunal’s necessary reliance on external legal and
political entities, and the relative accountability for prosecution and defense counsel provided for
in the court’s rules.
Pressures on the tribunal to decrease the cost and duration of trials have especially
encouraged rule changes that have weakened due process protections for defendants. Among
defense counsel practicing before the court there is “close to unanimous concern…that the
current procedural rules are moving in a direction which, though it may result in quicker trials,
will do so at the expense of providing fair trials.”440 Decreasing the duration of trials is of benefit
to the accused by effectuating their right to an expeditious trial, and so ensuring that if they are
innocent they will have spent less time incarcerated. However, the court has tended to press for
speedier trials except when this would be explicitly in the interests of the accused. The court’s
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approach is characterized by “[t]he placing of expedience to the forefront in limited and
inconsistent instances, while adopting a rather relaxed attitude in other circumstances.”441
The dissertation agrees with the position of the court and the Security Council that speeding
up trials would add to a perception of increased legitimacy from the perspective of efficacy. It
disagrees with the court and council, however, that overall this decision adds to the legitimacy of
the tribunal: there is a trade off between the—more obvious to casual observers—sociological
legitimacy of increased perceived efficacy, and the far more complex normative legitimacy of
decreased procedural fairness towards defendants. It is perhaps inevitable that a court created by
political actors for largely political purposes would distort the underlying legal framework away
from justice towards defendants towards broader perceptions of justice which focus on
prosecution. It is inadequately appreciated by political actors that the legitimacy of the tribunal
requires the fair legal treatment of a group traditionally scorned, if not despised: alleged war
criminals.
Defense protections at the ICTY have been harmed by various factors distinct to international
trials: the political origins of the court, the large scope of trials and the political pressure to speed
them up, the incoherent hybrid nature of the trial system, and the interference wrought by the
political goals of narrative construction and delegitimization. Ultimately, as argued in the
conclusion to the dissertation, an international criminal tribunal, created by states and dependent
on external political support, may be a far from ideal forum for pursuing criminal justice while
achieving a high degree of legitimacy through providing adequate protection for defendants.
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5 The International Criminal Court
Chapter 5 examines the legal fairness of the International Criminal Court between its
establishment in July 2002 and July 2016. It provides an analysis of fairness in relation to
criminal defendants, and explores how that fairness has been shaped by political influences on
judicial actors at the court, and by states, IGOs, and NGO actors.
As the first permanent international criminal court, the ICC has been portrayed as
representing an advancement in international criminal justice by human rights IR and legal
scholars in terms of fair trial standards.1 Others laud the ICC’s claims to justice on the basis of
prosecuting alleged war criminals and as a potential deterrent, while understating the
significance of the rights of defendants in the rules and practice of the court, and giving scant
notice to the idea that justice is not served if the rights of defendants are ignored and poorly
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understood.2 Yet other commentators are critical of the legitimacy of the ICC, on grounds of the
selectivity of cases prosecuted (currently confined to Africa);3 lack of autonomy of the court
from states and the UN Security Council;4 as a poor deterrent to atrocities and providing
insufficient justice to victims;5 and inefficiency in conducting trials.6
In contrast, this chapter demonstrates that there are significant weaknesses in the fairness of
trial standards and practice towards criminal defendants at the ICC. In doing so it highlights the
dangers of IR scholars and other public commentators claiming that trials are fair without an
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adequate understanding of what fairness towards defendants consists of, and without effectively
exploring these issues in relation to the ICC’s rules and practice.
In regards to practice, this chapter necessarily provides a more provisional, forward-looking
perspective on legal fairness legitimacy than that provided in Chapter 4. The ICTY has
completed 102 trials, ending in 81 convictions, 19 acquittals, and two defendants to undergo
retrial at the MICT.7 The ICC meanwhile had completed six trials by October 2016, with five
convictions and one acquittal.8 There is therefore far less case law to draw upon to enable a firm
assessment of the practice of the ICC in regards to both the legality of crimes and defense parity;
and far fewer opportunities for the OTP and defense counsel to interact with external actors such
as states and NGOs. The ICTY is also completing its last trials, encouraged by the Security
Council’s Completion Strategy.9 In contrast, the ICC is a permanent court,10 and so the findings
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here not only provide an assessment of its legal fairness legitimacy in the first 14 years of its
operation, but also suggest the future trajectory of defendant protections at the court.
The chapter begins with an examination of the dynamics during the negotiations which led to
the creation of the court and their impact on fairness standards for defendants. Sections two and
three analyze the principle of legality, focusing on the level of retroactivity in the mass atrocity
crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, and the court’s sentencing guidelines and practices,
respectively. The next two sections examine the dynamic between the prosecution and defense in
the pre-trial and trial stages of proceedings. In section four, the impact of the court’s structure on
this dynamic is analyzed, along with the effect of the court on defense teams’ ability to conduct
investigations and acquire evidence. In section five, the procedures relating to evidence
presentation and witnesses are examined in terms of how they impact parity during trial.
The evidence relied upon in the research for this chapter includes the ICC’s Rome Statute,
the Elements of Crimes (EC),11 Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE),12 the Regulations of the
Court,13 and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal
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Court;14 the court’s case law, including decisions and court judgments;15 court administrative
documents and website data; participant memoires; interviews; and secondary legal, political,
journalistic, and historical sources. Also relied upon is the case law of the ICTY, and
occasionally that of other international courts, as they constitute the legal context within which
the ICC operates for purposes of judicial interpretation of criminal law and procedural matters.

Legal and political justice conflict in the creation of the ICC
The UN International Law Commission produced a draft statute for a permanent international
criminal tribunal in 1994,16 encouraged by a coalition of 16 Caribbean and Latin American states
within the General Assembly.17 The draft was taken up as a starting point by an ad hoc group of
mid-sized and smaller states, known as the “like-minded group,” eventually numbering over 60
states.18 The group formed a prominent faction in the state negotiations leading to the creation of
the court’s statute at the June and July 1998 Rome Conference. It consisted of various Western
European and Latin American states, plus Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
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Political scientist David Bosco argues that the like-minded group “conceived of themselves
as depoliticized” in that they “lacked strong political interests and strategic entanglements,”19
and “[b]ecause they were not global powers, they thought of themselves as more able to
construct an international architecture that would be perceived as fair and legitimate by the rest
of the world. The usually unstated corollary of this thesis was clear: powerful states with
complex interests had limited ability to advance impartial international justice.”20 In the ICC
negotiations, in distinction to those within the Security Council in relation to the ICTY,
institutional power was exercised by less powerful states. This is considerably due to the
resistance to the idea of a universal court by China and Russia, and also the United States.
The significance of the like-minded group forms part of Bosco’s overarching argument in the
book Rough Justice that great-power politics has played a less important role in the creation and
working of the ICC than in most previous organizations established by states. His emphasis on
the role of traditional notions of political power underplays an issue of central importance in the
construction of the court: the inherent political bias towards successful prosecution—which is
one of the most important goals of such courts—and the extent to which those in the like-minded
group, and most other states at the Rome Conference, undervalued the importance of balance in
the powers afforded to the prosecution and defense in the structure and operation of the ICC.
There seems to have been a poor understanding among the conference participants that
privileging the rights of victims may be detrimental to the rights of accused within the legal
structure and processes constructed through the conference. Impartiality in international criminal
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justice requires looking beyond traditional state power interests to acknowledging the importance
to its legitimacy of addressing the human rights bias towards successful prosecution.
The UN General Assembly created two committees to generate a draft statute for the court:
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court worked
throughout 1995, and this was replaced in December that year with the Preparatory Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (PrepCom).21 Cherif Bassiouni, the chair
of the Drafting Committee of the Rome Conference, argues that by 1997 “only an unstructured
and substantially unusable compilation of all governmental proposals” had come out of the
PrepCom meetings, which was the preference of the P5 within the Security Council.22 A draft
statute was then prepared by the committee in Zutphen, Netherlands, in January 1998.23 While
this did not greatly advance the coherence and detail of the earlier proposals, it in turn led to a
final draft in April,24 to be considered by the Rome Conference in June and July.25
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The statute was eventually signed by 120 states at the conference,26 and the court came into
operation in 2002. The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) of the ICC consists of those states, 124
as of July 2016, which have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute, and provides oversight of
the court, as well as acting as its legislative body.27 The Rome Conference created a Preparatory
Commission of the International Criminal Court in 1999, through which the ASP created the
subsidiary rules to structure the operation of the court, including the RPE and Elements of
Crimes, which are discussed in relation to legality and defense parity throughout the chapter.28
The limited understanding and appreciation of the centrality of the rights of the accused to a
fair trial by the states negotiating the Rome Statute is demonstrated by the incoherent placement
of these rights as agreed at Rome.29 Five of the 12 articles found in part III of the statute, General
Principles of Criminal Law, delineate principles that establish core defendant rights, such as the
non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment, and individual criminal responsibility.30 Other
rights, such as ne bis in idem (no double jeopardy), the presumption of innocence, and a list of
specific rights of accused, are found in other sections.
While the research largely focuses on the role of states, institutional power over the ICC was
also exercised by other actors involved in the Rome and pre-Rome negotiations. They similarly
tended to exhibit a lack of appreciation for the importance of defendant rights, demonstrating an
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understanding of human rights that focuses on victims while neglecting the centrality of
defendant rights to the construction of a legitimate criminal justice institution characterized by
liberal legal norms.
Over 800 human rights NGOs were involved in the pre-Rome negotiations,31 with 238
present at Rome, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Carter Center, the
International Human Rights Law Institute, and the International Commission of Jurists.32 While
this may be thought to bode well for the inclusion of rights for all participants in the statute,
Geoffrey Robertson cautions that “what was truly ironic was [human rights NGOs’] zeal for a
court so tough that it would actually violate the basic human rights of its defendants.”33 Amnesty
International pushed for a prosecutor with the independence to be able to bring prosecutions even
“where the evidence is extremely weak,” and called for the court to exclude the defense of duress
and to significantly weaken that of self-defense.34
Many human rights NGOs downplayed the rights of defendants due to an eagerness to create
a strong court to prosecute atrocities and because of a lack of significant understanding of the
importance of balancing the ability of the prosecution to present an adequate case and the
accused to present an adequate defense. The broader implications for defendants of the positions
and decisions taken at Rome are analyzed in the four sections below.

Legality indicator 1: Non-retroactivity of crimes
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This section provides an assessment of legality at the court by examining the nature and extent of
the retroactive establishment and enforcement of the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. It
begins by analyzing the debates surrounding legality during the process of creating the court.
The contextual requirements and underlying offenses of the three mass atrocity crimes over
which the court currently has jurisdiction are then examined: war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide.35 The analysis below includes the definition of the crime only if it is
directly relevant to the analysis of legality and if it differs significantly from that in the ICTY
statute, as the crime definitions were provided at the beginning of the discussion of the legality
of each crime in Chapter 4.

The principle of legality in the statute and Elements of Crimes
The Rome Statute is the first founding legal document of an international criminal court to
explicitly incorporate the non-retroactivity of crimes as a principle constraining the court’s
ability to enforce law.36 First, as an international customary law principle, it is found in an article
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titled “Applicable Law:” “The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must
be consistent with internationally recognized human rights.”37 The statute goes further by listing
the prohibition against retroactive law in its own article, constituting the first provision in its
“General Principles of Criminal Law” section. This states that “[a] person shall not be criminally
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes
place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court,” and requires that judges do not interpret legal
provisions in ways inconsistent with legality.38 This provides a stronger protection against nonretroactivity of crimes than that found in customary international law as it prohibits any penalties
not previously written down in law—therefore ruling out expansion by judicial interpretation.39
There is no direct reference to custom in the sources of applicable law found in the statute,
which lists primarily the Rome Statute and associated documents, “applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law,” and general principles of domestic law.40 Only the
description of war crimes makes references to “laws and customs” of international and noninternational armed conflict.41 Therefore the ICC is much less subject than the ICTY to the
criticism of breaching legality by relying on customary international law, whose application

jurisdiction issue entirely, arguing that prosecution at the ICC is legal because the crimes have already
been established in international law.
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arguably weakens legality due to its imprecise and unwritten nature.42 Customary law is also less
relevant to the legality of crimes at the ICC because the Rome Statute is a treaty, and is therefore
binding on ratifying states, regardless of prior existing international law.43
The Rome Statute and Elements of Crimes are significantly more detailed with regards to the
definitions of the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction than was the statute of the ICTY,
providing them with a relatively high level of clarity and specificity—the secondary
requirements of the principle of legality of crimes. The Elements of Crimes was created after the
statute due to significant disagreement at the Rome Conference among state delegations as to the
details of each crime.44 Cherif Bassiouni argues that while the addition of later rules is usual in
international law, the fact that detailed definitions of crimes were established outside of the legal
document containing those crimes is “anomalous” in criminal law,45 and exemplifies the manner
in which political compromises shaped the legality of the crimes at the court, as discussed in
relation to each crime below. Nevertheless, he has elsewhere stated that the inclusion of non-
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retroactivity, and the delineation of crimes in the statute and Elements of Crimes, means that the
ICC’s founding documents “satisfy the requirements of legality.”46
International legal scholar Alain Pellet, in contrast, has criticized the high level of detail of
crimes in the ICC rules as an “excess of codification…the result of a veritable brainwashing
operation led by criminal lawyers, with the self-interested support of the United States” due to
their concern to conform with the principle of legality of crimes.47 Pellet downplays the value of
the principle to the legal fairness of a criminal court while arguing that greater specificity
constrains the flexibility of judges to interpret the law in ways that may lead to the expansion of
crime definitions. As discussed below, the desire to allow judges to create new law not only
infringes on the separation of functions or powers in a legal system, but is a direct breach of
legality.48
The definitions of crimes in the statute are a product of diplomatic negotiations between state
delegations at Rome—whose goal was consensus. This process led to a document described by
Cherif Bassiouni as a “diplomatic mule” which was “seldom in full compliance with legal
techniques and legal requirements.” For example, the political selection process for judges—via
General Assembly vote—has led to few judges possessing the necessary understanding of and
skills in international criminal law. Due to the paucity of ICC jurisprudence to date, however,

46

Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 349.
Alain Pellet, “Applicable Law,” in The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary,
Vol. 2, ed. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 1,057.
48
Pellet’s assertion that the high level of legal detail was intended to constrain the application of the law
is also undermined by Bassiouni’s claim that the level of detail at the Rome Conference was partly driven
by the preferences of the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Bassiouni,
“Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 455.
47

294

“the jury is still out” on how the court will deal with the interpretation of complex issues of
crime definition in relation to each defendant.49

War crimes
The Rome Statute lays out the definition of war crimes and its underlying offenses,50 with even
more detail provided in the Elements of Crimes and accompanying footnotes.51 Some of the
offenses which constitute war crimes are described in greater detail in the statute than in previous
court statutes and humanitarian treaties,52 providing a high level of clarity and specificity.
In terms of the context requirements for the commission of war crimes, as discussed in
Chapter 4, the ICTY in 1995 controversially expanded the traditional prohibitions on the conduct
of armed conflict to non-international situations.53 State acceptance of this dramatic extension
was swift, however, as demonstrated by the agreement to similarly expand war crimes at the
Rome Conference in 1998. The statute also expanded the protections afforded in interstate armed
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conflict, as acknowledged by the ICC in 2007, discussed below.54 This contextual expansion
represents a “progressive development” of law,55 as it was backed by broad state agreement and
is delineated legislatively in the statute. The inclusion of a broader context for war crimes is
therefore not subject to the criticism of breaching legality which Chapter 4 argued in relation to
the ICTY, where judges retroactively created new law.56
William Schabas notes the “excruciating detail” with which underlying offenses of war
crimes are described.57 He also argues that there is a “dark side to detailed codification”—that
“more loopholes exist for able defence arguments” and that states agreed to more detailed
54
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provisions not, as they claimed, to conform to legality, but in order to restrict judges from
making “dynamic or evolutive interpretations.”58 The danger inherent in this interpretation of the
drafters’ approach and attitude towards detailed legislation is that the purpose of the principle of
legality is exactly to avoid the sort of judicial expansion of crimes that the author, and Alain
Pellet, clearly favor.
Schabas privileges the ability to expand protections for potential victims at the expense of
defendants, and at the expense of a clear separation of powers in global legal governance, with a
legislative body (the ICC’s ASP) creating the laws and the ICC’s judges interpreting them—but
not permitted to expand on them. There is no reasonable legal argument for critiquing a clear and
detailed legislative delineation of a crime—only a human rights one that ultimately privileges
prosecution over trial fairness. As highlighted throughout the dissertation, this illustrates the
tension between the legitimacy of international courts through the protection of victims’ rights to
justice and promoting deterrence by enabling greater opportunities for prosecution, and the
legitimacy of trial fairness through protecting the rights of the accused.
Despite the contextual expansion of underlying offenses to non-international armed conflict,
two groupings of offenses in the statute do not apply to this type of armed conflict: grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs of
international armed conflict” (largely those known as “Hague Law”).59 The latter also contain
some of the additions to the Geneva Conventions’ grave breaches prohibitions found in
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Additional Protocol I.60 According to Schabas, this expansion is legally questionable in that
Additional Protocol I has not achieved the near universal level of support, and therefore
acknowledged customary status, as the grave breaches prohibitions of the Geneva Conventions.61
However, this position is undermined by the fact that the customary law status of underlying
offenses within the Rome Statute is less important to establishing their legality than was the case
with those within the ICTY statute. The latter was created by a small group of states—even if
within the Security Council acting under Chapter VII—and imposed retroactively for those acts
which occurred between the beginning of the ICTY’s jurisdiction, January 1991, and the
statute’s creation in February 1993.62 The Rome Statute, in contrast, was signed by a majority of
states, providing it with broad support, has now been ratified by approximately 60 percent of all
states,63 and only applies to acts which occurred after the court’s founding in July 2002.
There are also some new provisions within the laws and customs of war—ones not found in
Hague Law or Additional Protocol I, and first codified in the Rome Statute. The prohibition on
an occupying power transferring some of its own civilian population into occupied territory64
was especially controversial at the statute drafting stage, with Israel voting against the Rome
Statute because it felt it this provision was not consistent with customary law and had been
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aimed at criticizing its own activities,65 and Arab states insisting on its inclusion for that very
reason.66 However, the provision reflects a prohibition within the Geneva Conventions67 and so,
while not previously considered a grave breach, the ICTY has determined that it constitutes a
prohibition within international law under “other serious violations,” and so ICC prosecutions for
the offense would not violate legality.68
Another significant addition to the laws and customs of war offenses is that of causing
damage to the natural environment. While laudable from a human rights and environmental
perspective, the provision is written in a vague and open-ended manner.69 This is problematic for
legality because its determination requires judges to assess future events from the perspective of
the accused (whether they could have foreseen future environmental damage) and requires them
to make “value judgments” about what is excessive.70
Sexual war crimes in particular are delineated in significant detail in the statute,71 due to their
inclusion in the ICTY statute and lobbying by women’s human rights NGOs before and during
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the Rome Conference.72 Actions prohibited under the laws and customs of law in the statute
include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced
sterilization.73 The ICC’s first conviction for a sexual war crime, that of rape, was secured in the
case of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, in March 2016.74
Another violation of the laws and customs of war in the statute demonstrates the role of state
self-interest in the institutional power exercised in relation to the establishment of the definition
of crimes. The Rome Statute prohibits “[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.”75
The provision is based upon language in Additional Protocol I and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, which use the word “recruiting” instead.76 Those already existing prohibitions apply
solely to states, so the restriction to “national” militaries was specifically included at Rome to
allay Arab state fears that the provision could otherwise be used to prosecute for recruitment of
Palestinian youth into the intifada.77
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The first individual found guilty by the ICC, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, was convicted of
recruiting child soldiers.78 The court decided that “conscripting or enlisting” equates to
“recruiting” in the earlier conventions and includes voluntary recruitment.79 It also determined
that a conviction in relation to children used indirectly to support soldiers had to involve their
exposure to danger as a military target.80
The incorporation into Rome of the broader conflict context created by the ICTY constitutes
a significant improvement from the perspective of protecting human rights while also complying
with the principle of legality. Some aspects of the legality of the expansion of underlying
offenses remain unsettled, but the inclusion of sexual offenses similarly constitute human rights
advances without compromising legality. The generally high level of detail in the definitions of
underlying offenses of war crimes is also a significant improvement over prior international
courts. The ICC’s case law has yet to significantly modify the interpretation of the court’s rules
on war crimes.

Crimes against humanity
Crimes against humanity are described in the statute as various underlying acts committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population. This codified—at least for the
purposes of the ICC—two developments in relation to the contextual requirements of the crime
stemming from the practice of the ICTY discussed in Chapter 4. These are the removal of the
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requirement for an armed conflict,81 and that an attack only needs to be widespread or
systematic, not both.82 However, the former issue is not settled, and arguably the armed conflict
nexus is still a requirement under customary law. Several Arab, African, and Asian delegations
to the Rome Conference, including China and India, objected to the removal of this contextual
requirement, citing the statutes of the IMT, IMTFE, and ICTY.83 Meanwhile the majority of
delegations rejected this position at the conference, arguing that it is not required by the
Genocide Convention, the ICTR statute, and the practice of the ICTY.84
There was also disagreement among delegates as to the contextual requirement of a
widespread or systematic attack, as opposed to both.85 Before and during the Rome Conference,
some Arab and Asian states, and the Security Council P5, were concerned at the breadth of
application that such a lax requirement would permit. However, they eventually agreed to the
removal of the double requirement, because the other element in the contextual requirement, of
an “[a]ttack directed against any civilian population,” was defined in the statute so as to require
an “organizational policy.”86
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Nevertheless, this arguably requires a systematic attack or plan, which Bassiouni has argued
is essential to the definition of the crime—and for this reason he was critical of the ICTY
decision to remove it.87 Human Rights NGOs at the Rome Conference encouraged states to
remove the policy requirement in the statute’s definition of the crime. This position was a
“dragnet definition” that would have permitted a broad range of individuals to be prosecuted.88
The eventual compromise occurred on the agreement among states that “a State or organizational
policy” is a lower threshold than “systematic,” therefore moving some way towards Bassiouni’s
position.89
The list of underlying offenses90 is the same as that in the ICTY statute91 (including murder,
extermination, and enslavement, etc.), with two additions: enforced disappearance and
apartheid.92 No offenses were defined in the earlier statute, whereas Rome contains brief
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descriptions,93 and the Elements of Crimes elaborates much further on the nature of the acts and
required mental state of the perpetrator.94 The listing and definition of the offenses in the statute
significantly improves the specificity of crimes against humanity in international law.95
In particular, sexual crimes, which were an innovation in the ICTY statute, with the single
word offense of “rape,”96 are described in the Rome Statute as “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity.”97 The Elements of Crimes then provides significant detail and clarity for
each offense.98 The first conviction for the crime against humanity of rape at the ICC was that of
Bemba in 2016.99
Rome thereby considerably expanded the coverage of sexual offenses in international
criminal law, and its offenses and definitions have now arguably also been incorporated into
customary law. This expansion was encouraged at the Rome Conference by NGOs such as the
Asian Centre for Women’s Human Rights.100 The inclusion of sexual offenses was not without
controversy, however, with some states at the conference, including Saudi Arabia and Libya,
concerned that the inclusion of forced pregnancy under crimes against humanity and war crimes
93
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might lead to the provision of abortion facilities for victims.101 This led to the compromise of
including forced pregnancy but with the stipulation that the definition “shall not in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.”102 This definitional bargaining
illustrates the inherent politicization and cultural preference clashes at Rome, which are
responsible for the extra-legal factors agreed within the crimes’ compromise definitions.
Rome constitutes the first time that sexual slavery was directly prohibited by an international
court statute.103 As sexual slavery is not defined in any prior international human rights or
humanitarian treaty, this is arguably the legal creation of the states at the Rome Conference.104
However, Antonio Cassese, relying on the jurisprudence of the ICTY, argues that sexual slavery
was already prohibited before Rome by customary international law,105 although, as mentioned,
there is dispute as to the legality of customary crimes.
The most vague provision relating to the underlying offenses of any crime in the statute is the
crimes against humanity offense of “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”106 In 2000 the
ICTY expressed concern that the offense was so vague in its own statute—which is only slightly
101
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more vague than the Rome description—that it breached the legality of crimes.107 Kai Ambos
has expressed similar concern in relation to the ICC.108
The contextual element of a plan or policy arguably remains unsettled, as does its effect on
legality. Similarly to war crimes, however, the level of detail of underlying offenses and the
more comprehensive inclusion of sexual offenses constitute advances in human rights
protections which are essentially consistent with legality.

Genocide
As in the ICTY statute, apart from the introductory phrase, the Rome definition of genocide is
identical to that found in the Genocide Convention,109 indicating its uncontroversial customary
law status. However, since its creation in 1948 there has been concern that the convention’s
definition is too restrictive by excluding cultural acts of destruction, such as suppressing ethnic
languages and education.110 This was also a controversial issue at the Rome Conference, with
some states concerned about a push to prohibit such cultural suppression within the statute—
behavior which occurs at the national level in many states.111 In the end the definition was not
broadened. Bassiouni sees the statute’s definition of genocide thereby as weakened by “shar[ing]
the same gaps in the protected categories of victims as does the Convention.”112 The ICC
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approach is arguably problematic from a human rights perspective: perpetuating previous legal
limitations by failing to prohibit certain arguably genocidal actions. However, it is strong from a
position of legality as the convention definition was established well before the creation of the
Rome Statute, and is broadly agreed as establishing a universal obligation.113
The definition of ethnic, national, and religious groups in the convention, as applied by
international courts, has also been problematic. Instead of adopting objective criteria by which to
decide if a persecuted group falls within one of the protected categories, courts have tended to
adopt the subjective criteria of the perpetrator group’s perception of whether their victims
constituted such a group.114 Nevertheless, while the statute’s definition of genocide is no clearer
than that of earlier international legal instruments, the Elements of Crimes adds substantial detail
to the underlying offenses.
Importantly from a human rights perspective, this includes reference to sexual crimes,
missing from prior definitions, within the underlying offense of causing serious bodily or mental
harm.115 In fact the ICC is the first international criminal tribunal to specifically delineate sexual
offenses for all three mass atrocity crimes in its founding documents.116 In this sense the Rome
Statute “marks a victory for humankind in that it…acknowledges the criminality of several
113
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gender-based and sex-based crimes.”117 Sexual crimes (as underlying offenses of genocide) were
highlighted by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in a 2014 policy paper as “an integral
component of the pattern of destruction inflicted upon a particular group of people, and in such
circumstances, may be charged as genocide.”118 Rape was later referred to as an offense of
genocide in the OTP’s request for an arrest warrant for President Al Bashir—the only ICC
indictee who has to date been charged with genocide.119
Lubanga was being prosecuted for genocide within the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) before the government agreed to transfer him to the Hague for prosecution for war crimes
at the ICC. The court accepted “complementarity” as the reason for not charging the accused
with genocide. Complementarity is a limitation of the court’s jurisdiction whereby it cannot open
or continue a prosecution where there is also a domestic prosecution—the domestic jurisdiction
supersedes that of the ICC, unless “unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution.”120 Another likely factor was the OTP’s calculations concerning
the difficulty of prosecuting for genocide, considering the “special intent” requirement which has
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been a significant factor at the ICTY.121 A broader assessment of the court’s approach to defining
and prosecuting genocide will have to await genocide trials.

Legality indicator 2: Non-retroactivity of punishment
This section analyzes sentencing procedures at the court. First its sentencing guidelines are
examined, as laid out in the statute and RPE, and the impact of the Rome Conference debate. The
specific issues of command responsibility as a mode of criminal liability, and the effect of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances on sentencing rules, are also analyzed. Second, an
assessment of the limited sentencing practice to date is made in relation to these issues.

Sentencing rules: The Rome Statute and RPE
There was extensive agreement among states at the Rome Conference that the ICC’s sentencing
guidelines should conform to the principle of legality of punishments, and that this required
“penalties be defined in the draft statute of the ICC as precisely as possible.”122 The delegates
argued that the principle was necessary to ensure predictability and equality before the law,
which “may be an early sign that the positive justice dimension” of the principle “is being
considered in the international context.”123 As discussed in Chapter 1, the non-retroactivity of
punishment can be seen not only as a safeguard on basic defendant rights, but as promoting
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justice more broadly by encouraging consistency in sentencing, and protecting judicial autonomy
by safeguarding the judiciary from political pressure to determine the sentence of individuals of
executive concern, thereby also protecting the integrity of the legal system, as well as the public
perception of justice.124
The statute’s provision on punishment, while brief, provides a restriction on excessive
punishments: “A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this
Statute.”125 This prohibits the application of new punishments by the judges, and appears to
conform to a strict version of legality by requiring the application solely of prior written law.126
However, the standard is problematic because it does not prohibit the retroactive application
of penalties later added to the statute by the ASP.127 It also makes the quality of the restriction on
retroactivity contingent upon other provisions within the statute, and possibly the Elements of
Crimes and RPE.128 This creates a “reverse dependency,” which is “an awkward and unfamiliar
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position for a fundamental principle of criminal law, which is normally independent of
subsequent rules.”129
Arab states at the Rome Conference pushed for the ICC to apply the death penalty.130 This
was rejected by a majority of delegates, who agreed that the maximum punishment that may be
imposed is 30 years’ imprisonment, except for cases whose “extreme gravity” justifies life in
prison.131 This provides a restriction on both the nature and severity of punishment,132 which is
arguably consistent with legality as it provides clear limits.133
In terms of command responsibility, the statute provides for liability for military and nonmilitary superiors.134 A military commander is criminally liable for the crimes of subordinates
“under his or her effective command and control…as a result of his or her failure to exercise
control properly over such forces,” as long as they were aware, or should have been aware, that
their soldiers were committing or about to commit crimes and failed to take action to “prevent or
repress” them or present the matter to legal authorities for criminal investigation.135 For
conviction of non-military superiors it must to be proven that they “either knew, or consciously
disregarded information which clearly indicated”136 their subordinates had committed or were
about to commit such crimes.
This creates a higher standard of proof for non-military superiors: not the possibility that they
were aware (they should have known because they could have had such information in their
129
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possession, for example), but the necessity to prove with certainty that they knew or deliberately
ignored such information. Jamie Williamson, an ICRC legal advisor, has expressed concern that
this standard, which is higher for such commanders than found at the ICTY, would make it more
difficult to prosecute such individuals, while command responsibility has been a “particularly
vital conduit for prosecutors at the international tribunals.”137 In contrast, legal scholar Kai
Ambos argues that the Rome provisions on command responsibility are so broad that they may
constitute “vicarious liability,” similar to criticism he leveled at the ICTY.138 To date, the effect
of these standards on prosecutions is unclear, as only one completed trial has involved command
responsibility at the ICC, that of Bemba, a military commander, discussed in the practice section
below.
The discussion now moves to the role of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
determining sentences within the court’s rules. In determining the exact sentence in each case the
legality of punishments is arguably weakened by the open-ended provision for judges to “in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take into account such factors as the
gravity of the crime in determining penalties.”139 Such flexibility in relation to aggravating
circumstances arguably provides the court with excessive sentencing discretion in a similar
manner to the ICTY statute.140 Factors mentioned in the RPE include the number of victims and
the harm caused by the offenses, the perpetrator’s degree of intent, prior convictions for similar
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offenses, and abuse of power.141 The list of aggravating circumstances in the RPE is nonexhaustive, providing additional discretion to the judges.142
Another reason the aggravating circumstances rules provide weak guidance is because there
is no indication as to the weight to assign to each factor, “an aspect of international sentencing
that has remained murky since Nuremberg’s tendency to treat aggravating factors as implicit in
the offense.”143 Similarly to the ICTY, the stated purposes of punishment at the ICC are vaguely
expressed, including justice (crimes “must not go unpunished”), and deterrence (“put an end to
impunity…and thus contribute to…prevention”).144 This does little to provide additional
sentencing guidance,145 apparently a result of the lack of concern among state delegates at the
Rome Conference with clarifying the purposes of punishment.146
The RPE also allows for mitigating circumstances to be taken into account. The factors
mentioned include reduced mental capacity, duress, acknowledgment of guilt and expressions of
remorse, and cooperation with the ICC.147 Similarly to aggravating circumstances, the manner in
which mitigating circumstances guidelines are to be applied, including the weight given to each,
is not delineated.
It should be noted that the statute also contains a procedure for strengthening the application
of the legality of punishment, by requiring the court to review sentences after defendants have
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served two thirds of their time to determine if it should be reduced—or for life sentences, a
review after 25 years served.148 As Dana argues, this “extends the reach” of the principle of
legality beyond the sentencing phase of a trial to the “execution of sentences.”149 Reviews have
taken place in relation to two of the three convictions at the court; they are discussed below.

Sentencing practice
The ICC sentencing phase is separate from that of the main trial,150 as is the case in the US
common law system, and was initially the practice at the ICTY, before a change to merging the
phases, presumably to speed up proceedings. The ICC sentencing hearing allows for witness
testimony and other evidence not presented during the trial which may be relevant to determining
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.151
As of July 2016 there have been three convictions by the court, with sentences ranging from
12 to 18 years.152 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was convicted of war crimes in March 2012 in relation
to the situation in the DRC and sentenced in July that year to 14 years.153 Germain Katanga was
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convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to the situation in the DRC in
March 2014, and sentenced to 12 years in May.154 Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was convicted of
war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2016,
and sentenced to 18 years in June.155
These punishments are not excessive considering the guidelines and the gravity of the crimes,
and do not suggest a wildly disproportionate or incoherent approach to sentencing by the judges.
They may indicate a leniency in sentencing, especially in relation to command responsibility (in
the Bemba case), that the ICTY has been accused of.156 However, Bemba’s conviction was also
the first at the court for sexual and gender-base crimes: that the ICC’s first conviction for sexual
offenses also received the longest sentence has been seen as significant from a human rights
perspective.157
Bemba is the first and so far only individual convicted by the court for command
responsibility. This was in relation to actions by rebels under his authority in the CAR between
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October 2002 and March 2003.158 The judges decided that Bemba was made aware of the illegal
actions of his troops and of the aggravating circumstances surrounding the sexual offenses.159
While little in the way of firm conclusions can be drawn from this single conviction for the
responsibility of a military commander, it does not appear to have involved a tenuous
relationship to the crimes: there was significant evidence that Bemba was aware of the
allegations of his troops’ actions, and dismissed them as propaganda; he received regular
communications from field commanders; and made on-the-ground visits.160
Very little research has been conducted to date on the outcomes of these three trials in
relation to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. A review of the trial and sentencing
judgments shows that the court sentenced Lubanga to 14 years instead of the maximum of 30
requested by the prosecution due to a lack of aggravating factors, and the mitigating factor of
cooperation with the court, arguing that the maximum sentence should only apply where there
are aggravating circumstances.161 In Katanga the court also did not find any aggravating
factors.162 It did take into account two mitigating factors: his young age and family
circumstances (given little weight), and participating in the troop demobilization process was
considered, as was cooperation with the court (greater weight).163
In Bemba’s sentence, the judges decided that two aggravating circumstances applied: that the
rapes were committed against especially defenseless victims—including children as young as
ten—and were committed “with particular cruelty”—including mass rapes and whole families
158
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brutalized, and that pillaging was also committed with cruelty. It found no mitigating
circumstances.164 These judgments suggest that the trial chambers have been cautious in
accepting witness testimony,165 and have in fact only relied on aggravating circumstances to
determine sentences in one out of the three convictions so far.
In terms of sentencing review, in September 2015, in Lubanga, the appeals chamber
undertook its first examination, assessing factors such as cooperation with the court and conduct
while in detention. It ruled that there were no grounds to reduce his sentence.166 Meanwhile, in
November that year the sentence in the only other case to have undergone review, that of
Katanga, was reduced by three years and eight months from the original 12 years.167 The court
reduced Katanga’s sentence due to his cooperation with the court, his conduct within detention,
and demonstrations of remorse. Interestingly, the court also considered the political factor that
his early release “would give rise to some social instability in the DRC,” but in the end “found
no evidence to suggest that it would be of a significant level.”168 This political consideration is
not found in the list of relevant factors in the statute.169 With only two reviews to date it is too
early to assess the extent to which this mechanism will provide an effective protection against
excessive punishments.
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Overall, the sentencing rules and practice do not provide cause for concern in relation to the
legality of punishment. While there is ambiguity and arguably excessive leeway for judges this
does not appear to have been detrimental to those found guilty by the court.

Defense parity indicator 1: Institutional support
In this section, first the position of the defense and prosecution within the ICC’s institutional
structure is examined, as well as the implications of their structural dynamic for adequacy of
defense representation before and during trial. Second, a comparison is made of the support the
court provides to prosecutors and defense counsel to investigate on-site through immunities and
privileges, and the support provided in relation to external actors is examined.
Structural parity
The court consists of four primary institutions or “organs:”170 the Presidency, the Judicial
Divisions (pre-trial, trial, and appeals chambers), the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), and the
Registry.171 The Presidency is responsible for the judicial administration of the court, except for
that of the OTP, which operates autonomously.
The Registry’s functions include the non-judicial administration of the court,172 dealt with
through the Common Administrative Services Division, and providing judicial support through
the Division of Court services, including the management of court records, maintaining a list of
170
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qualified defense counsel, and managing the court’s external affairs.173 Defense and victim issues
are dealt with by the Counsel Support Section (CSS), which incorporates the Office of Public
Counsel for the Defence (OPCD) and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV),
discussed below with defense and victims structural issues. See Figure 5.1 below for a structural
chart of the ICC, including the subdivisions of the OTP and Registry. Note that the Registry
Division of Victims and Counsel, shown in Figure 5.1, has been dissolved. The CSS, created in
2009, is directly under the authority of the Office of the Registrar.174
The OTP is an independent organ of the court, with “full authority” over the management
and administration of its activities in the hands of the chief prosecutor, who is selected by the
ASP for a nine-year term.175 The OTP receives referrals of situations from ICC state parties and
the Security Council and conducts preliminary examinations. If it feels there is sufficient
evidence to warrant a full criminal investigation, the OTP applies to a pre-trial chamber for this
authority.176
The OTP consists of three main departments. First, the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and
Cooperation Division (JCCD) conducts preliminary investigations, provides the OTP with legal
advice, and coordinates the external relationships of the office. This involves examining “the
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broader regional and international political context,”177 a political function distinct from the
practice of prosecutor’s offices in most liberal legal systems.178 Second, the OTP’s Investigation
Division conducts on-site criminal investigations and analysis of evidence. Third, the
Prosecution Division conducts the courtroom prosecutions themselves, and prepares the
prosecutorial strategy pursued at each trial.179
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Figure 5.1 Organizational structure of the ICC
Source: “Courting History: The Landmark International Criminal Court’s First Years,” 2008, 3,
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/icc0708webwcover.pdf.
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In terms of the defense, according to Elise Groulx, the founder and former president of the
International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association, the organization proposed that the statute
include within the structure of the ICC an office with co-equal status to that of the OTP—that is,
a defense office would be a primary organ of the court. However, this proposal was not taken up
by the PrepCom or Rome Conference.180 This reflects both a lack of understanding and
underappreciation of the function of the defense by the Rome delegates, and the bias towards
prosecution in the establishment of the court, with the most attention paid to the prosecution
function, secondarily victims—they were given their own office, established within the Registry,
by the statute181—and thirdly the accused.
Therefore, similarly to the ICTY, there is no official organ for the defense established by the
Rome Statute—nor has one been created since by the ASP. Instead, defense issues at the court
were initially dealt with solely through the Registry. It created the Counsel Support Section in
2009, seven years after the court started operation. The CSS provides support to defendants in
relation to such issues as field investigations and acquiring legal assistance,182 manages legal aid
and the list of counsel eligible to practice before the ICC, and acts as an advocate for the defense
in the pre-trial stage of investigations before suspects have been handed over to the court.183 The
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CSS also advises the court on defense issues and may cooperate with state bar associations to
encourage legal training in relation to the ICC’s procedures.184 The CSS was created after the
statute: there is no mention of the defense in the Rome article describing the functions of the
Registry—which nonetheless required the Registry to establish a Victims and Witnesses Unit.185
The lack of structural parity between the prosecution and defense weakens the flexibility of
defense teams in pursuing a trial as they are dependent upon remuneration by the Registry. After
the end of oral submissions in the Lubanga trial the Registry informed the defense team that all
remuneration would stop except to lead counsel. The court later reinstated remuneration on the
grounds that the Registry’s action would have violated the defense’s right to full equality.186 The
defense’s autonomy in conducting research is also diminished because of its need for permission
from the Registry to investigate in the field.187
A defense office was created in 2004 by the Preparatory Commission, as the Office of Public
Counsel for the Defence.188 The OPCD operates as an independent body of the court, although it
falls within the Registry for administrative purposes.189 However, it is not an organ of the
court—its highest level of institutional body. Nevertheless, the OPCD does provide defendants
with official institutional representation within the court’s structure.190 Its other functions include
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providing support and assistance to defendants, such as legal advice, and support to defense
counsel.191
According to the ICC, the office “constitutes a major innovation in the judicial architecture
of international criminal courts,” with a mandate to “represent and protect the rights of the
Defence in order to reinforce the equality of arms and to enable a fair trial within the meaning of
the Rome Statute.”192 More modestly, according to the International Bar Association (IBA) the
OPCD’s role is similar to that of the OTP’s legal advisory section: it conducts legal research on
behalf of defendants, responding to courtroom events to provide timely assistance with legal
issues as they arise.193 The IBA has been critical of the “limited resources” provided to the
OPCD to carry out this mandate, including suffering from inadequate staffing, which would
mean that even two consecutive trials would “severely task” those resources.194 Xavier-Jean
Keïta, the head of the OPCD, acknowledges that the office has coordinated with academic
institutions and defense offices in other tribunals for legal research assistance in order to
overcome problems of limited resources. Keïta claims that the OPCD does, however, provide the
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defense at the ICC with institutional memory relating to trial process and case law, for example,
that has been lacking at the ICTY.195
While official representation for the accused at the court initially occurred solely through the
Registry it is a neutral administrative body. This continues to create a major obstacle for defense
interests in gaining an adequate voice in budgeting issues and decision-making changes by the
organs of the court.196
Human Rights Watch argues that the establishment of the OPCD for judicial functions, and
that of the CSS within the Registry for administrative functions, represents a “separation of
administrative and substantive functions [that] is advantageous for the interests of the defense
and reflects an important ‘lesson learned’ from the experience at other tribunals, like the Special
Court for Sierra Leone.”197 However, at the ICTY, defendants are represented formally by their
own body, the Association of Defence Counsel,198 while at the ICC defendants are represented in
decision-making forums not by the OPCD but by the Registry. This provides them with unequal
bargaining power in negotiations on internal rule changes due to the official neutrality of the
Registry, not enabling it to act as an advocate for defense positions while it ostensibly represents
their interests in negotiations on policy and other issues.
However, there is direct representation in the context of changes to the RPE and Elements of
Crimes. Negotiations take place within the Advisory Committee on Legal Texts, which consists
195
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of three judges, one OTP representative, one Registry representative, and one counsel chosen
from the list maintained by the Registry.199
Important structural effects of the lack of authority of the OPCD include on cooperation,
budgeting, and rules and regulations. The OPCD has no right to directly debate within the
Committee of Budget and Finance (CBF), which makes budgetary recommendations to the
ASP—only the Registry does.200 The OPCD has been advocating for structural parity within the
ICC for years, but to no avail. While there is some agreement on the need for greater structural
parity, there is an unwillingness at the court to request the ASP to provide this.201
The final issue discussed is the structural and procedural implications of trial rights for
victims. They can apply for assistance from the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims,202 and for
reparations after an individual has been convicted by the court;203 and they have a dedicated
office within the Registry, the Office of Public Counsel for Victims.204 Before and during trial
victims can also participate in proceedings by making presentations to: a pre-trial chamber
199
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during an OTP request to be permitted to open an investigation;205 the court while the OTP is
seeking a ruling on an issue of jurisdiction or admissibility;206 and “at stages of the proceedings
determined to be appropriate by the Court” where victims’ personal interests may be affected.207
Trial rights for victims at the ICC have been praised as constituting “a unique innovation” in
global legal governance,208 which implements recommendations made by the UN in relation to
the provision of assistance to victims.209
Despite judicial instruction within the rules to give primacy to the rights of defendants, the
lack of clarity in the victim participation rules in the statute and RPE, and in the hybrid
procedural model utilized by the court, provide excessive leeway to judges to determine victims’
involvement, which risks infringing the rights of defendants.210 Their participation also arguably
violates the presumption of innocence of the accused by assuming that the events and facts the
prosecution is presenting at trial occurred—before this has been established by trial.211 This
effectively means that victims do not simply play a passive role in proceedings, as is common in
liberal criminal justice proceedings,212 but may constitute, according to the head of the OPCD, a
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“second prosecutor,”213 by arguably crossing the line between being participants at the court and
being parties to the adversarial conflict between the prosecution and defense.214
Victim rights theoretically constitute a major step for the protection of human rights at
international trials, and ones that arguably should be balanced against those of defendants.
However, it should be kept in mind that “the rights of the accused are not ‘just’ human rights
guarantees; they are part and parcel of the epistemological mechanism for fact finding in
criminal proceedings.”215 Effectively establishing the truth and thereby determining the guilt or
innocence of defendants requires the protection of their fundamental trial rights. An international
trial may therefore not be the most appropriate forum for victim participation.216

Investigatory support and cooperation
The Rome Statute, and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International
Criminal Court, the latter of which came into force in July 2004,217 divided those perceived to be
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in need of international legal protection in the conduct of court business into four groups. The
first consists of judges, prosecutors, deputy prosecutors, and the registrar.218 They were provided
with the privileges and immunities provided to heads of diplomatic missions under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations219—although limited to while conducting official court
business within the territory of a state party.220
According to Phakiso Mochochoko, head of the OTP’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity and
Cooperation Division, and former chair of the Working Group on Privileges and Immunities,
which created the agreement, “[t]he legal status of this class is thus the same as that of judges of
the International Court of Justice as approved by General Assembly Resolution 90 of December
11, 1946.”221 Mochochoko, and the ASP, which agreed to this categorization, privilege the first
category as essential for the court’s functioning, including the chief prosecutor and deputies—
but not defense staff.
The categories seem to indicate a descending order of perceived importance by the ASP to
the essential functioning of the ICC. The other three groups, including defense counsel, are
mentioned in the statute,222 but their rights in this regard are solely found within the agreement.
The second group consists of “officials of the court”—deputy registrars and staff members of the
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Registry and OTP. Their immunities and privileges, while not as extensive as those of category
one, still provide them with functional immunity.223
Defense counsel and investigators constitute the third category (in the statute lumped in
together with the fourth category as a miscellaneous group of all others).224 During the drafting
of the statute, some delegations argued, unsuccessfully, that equality of arms requires defense
counsel to be provided with the same immunities and privileges in conducting official business
as afforded to the prosecution.225 Nevertheless, their immunities and privileges are very similar
to those in category two, except for certain financial advantages accruing to court officials, but
not counsel. The fourth category is a catch-all consisting of witnesses, victims, experts, and other
individuals whose presence at the court might be necessary—their immunities and privileges are
very similar to those of category three.226
According to Mochochoko, “[t]he Agreement represents a major innovative departure from
previous ones in that it recognizes the important role of, amongst others, experts, witnesses,
victims, and other persons required to be present at the seat of the Court.”227 While this is true,
and while the details of defense counsel privileges are greater than those found in the ICTY RPE,
the agreement creates a further institutional disparity between prosecution and defense. The chief
officers of the OTP are treated as “high officials” of the court, while counsel are individuals
necessary for “the good administration of justice.”228 The chief prosecutor is an officer of justice
223
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at the court and so this distinction in rights may seem appropriate from that perspective.
However, the prosecutor is also the head of the OTP, which has the function of co-equal party in
an adversarial trial system, whose competitor is defense counsel.229
The ICC, as a product of treaty negotiations among states reluctant to surrender authority to
the court, is provided with less investigatory power in relation to states than was the ICTY by the
Security Council, defining their obligations more narrowly in terms of releasing evidence to the
court, for example.230 States may deny a request for evidence on national security grounds, and
the statute emphasizes “cooperative means” of resolving disputes rather than providing powers to
the court to enforce compliance.231
A situation may be referred to the ICC—enabling a preliminary examination by the OTP, and
a full investigation with pre-trial chamber consent—in one of three ways: by a state party, by the
Security Council, or by the chief prosecutor’s own initiative, known as proprio motu power.232
An empirical analysis of situations before the court found that state cooperation with
investigations “typically tracks the ways in which cases get to the ICC in the first place,” with
state party referrals engendering more cooperation with the OTP.233
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Of the ten situations currently under investigation by the OTP,234 five have been referred to
the court by state parties.235 The situations for all three of those individuals convicted by the
court were referred by state parties, and of the four ongoing cases (involving eight individuals),
three relate to situations referred by state parties.236 This ratio looks set to change going forward,
as, of the three cases awaiting the start of trial as of July 2016, one relates to a state referral
situation, one to a Security Council referral, and one commenced with a proprio motu
investigation.237
The term “self-referral,” sometimes used in relation to states referring the situation in their
territory to the court, would be more accurately described as “opposition-referrals” as their
purpose is to remove political and military rivals.238 This has led to a dynamic where situations
referred by state parties tend to have cooperation with the court heavily skewed towards the
OTP, while those involving Security Council referrals and proprio motu investigations largely
skewed against the OTP, making arrests and the gathering of evidence far more difficult in an
234
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institutional environment dependent upon external enforcement.239 The empirical analysis of
cooperation with the OTP discussed above demonstrated a very close correlation between the
targets of investigation and level of cooperation with the court—with government opposition
figures as targets generating greater cooperation.240
The primary advantage to an ICC referral by a state party is the political elimination and
delegitimization of a rival—especially with a conviction, providing a significant incentive to
cooperate with the OTP to obstruct defense investigations: “For state incumbents, a successful
prosecution serves as a political windfall, one in which the state appears to be cooperating with
international justice institutions, thereby earning reputation benefits, and removes and
delegitimizes an immediate and likely persistent threat.”241
The OTP is clearly aware of this dynamic, and has been more likely to open cases where it
feels that state support for its investigation in a particular situation will be more forthcoming.242
While it makes practical sense for the OTP to pursue cases where prosecutions are more likely to
be successful due to access to evidence, it does mean that the nature of the ICC—dependent
upon outside support for investigations—leads to the OTP choosing cases pragmatically in ways
that likely privilege their access to evidence over that of defense counsel in trials before the
court.243
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There are, however, risks for states with cooperating with an OTP investigation as it might
unearth evidence of government involvement in crimes. Referring state parties have therefore
tended to encourage the investigation and prosecution of rivals before broader investigations on
their territory, by engaging in differential cooperation in relation to access to information on
opposition versus government actions.244
The Bemba case illustrates this dynamic. In 2002 Bemba’s Congolese rebel force, the
Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), agreed to fight in the CAR on the side of thenpresident Ange-Félix Patassé in a civil war against the former head of the CAR military,
François Bozizé. When Bozizé won the war and became president he referred the conflict to the
ICC.245 This encouraged the removal of Bemba as a potential rival for power, and sent a signal to
international donors that Bozizé’s government would protect human rights and abide by the rule
of law. The government subsequently handed the files of its own criminal investigation on
Bemba to the OTP.246
The CAR referral also interacted with that of the DRC. In the latter country, the fragile
government of Joseph Kabila also stood to gain from delegitimizing military and political
opponents. Bemba, a “millionaire businessman from a prominent [DRC] family,”247 returned
home and became vice president of the DRC between 2003 and 2006. He lost the 2006
presidential election to the incumbent Kabila. Pressure from the government led Bemba to flee
minimizing the risk of prosecution. The result is an intricate set of interactions that complicates the
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the country in 2007, and he was arrested in Belgium and handed over to the ICC the following
year.248
Another reason for state parties to cooperate with the OTP is the pressure that can be brought
to bear by IGOs and states keen to promote a human rights agenda.249 In March 2004, after
months of consultations between the OTP and the government of the DRC, the latter announced
that it was referring the conflict in the east of the country to the court. The referral had required
“mild pressure” from the OTP—eager to begin investigations250—and more significant pressure
from the European Union as a major donor to the DRC.251
Such political influences on prosecutorial decision-making are inevitable for a court largely
dependent upon external actors—state parties and the Security Council—to refer situations that
enable the OTP to begin investigations.252 The OTP undertook diplomatic negotiations with the
Ugandan government to encourage it to make the first referral. This included a meeting between
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the chief prosecutor of the ICC at the time, and President Yoweri
Museveni of Uganda in London in January 2004, and culminated in a joint press conference
where they announced the referral of the situation involving the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),
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a major Ugandan rebel group.253 The chief prosecutor of the ICC later felt it necessary to clarify
that it would not only be investigating LRA actions but also those of the government. He did not,
however, make a similar statement of prosecutorial investigatory parity in relation to the
Security’s Council’s referral of Darfur the following year.254
In the case of both the DRC and Uganda the OTP stressed to the governments that it wished
to complement and not undermine the ongoing peace processes, and in Uganda in particular the
OTP coordinated its investigatory approach with the government.255 Uganda hoped to use the
referral to increase support among ASP member states for its attempt to defeat the LRA.256 The
government later suffered domestic criticism over the referral and the inability to seize indicted
suspects or end the conflict, leading it to scale back its cooperation with the ICC.257 Similarly,
political pressure from the UN encouraged the DRC government to arrest and hand Thomas
Lubanga to the ICC after his forces were accused of attacking UN peacekeepers in February
2005.258
There is also the prominent counter-example of Kenya to the influence of the chief
prosecutor. In 2010 the prosecutor opened a proprio motu investigation into crimes committed
during post-election violence in 2007-8, including over 1,000 people killed, over 900 rapes, and
350,000 people displaced.259 Defendants Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto became the
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president and vice president of Kenya, respectively, in 2013, leading to alleged obstruction with
the OTP’s investigation, including, according to the court, “witness interference” and “political
meddling.”260 The OTP reluctantly decided to close the cases against them.261 In 2009 the
African Union also passed a resolution criticizing the actions of the Security Council and the
ICC in regard to the referral of Sudan and the subsequent OTP investigation and indictments, and
called on AU member states not to cooperate with the ICC’s arrest warrants.262
However, these cases do not suggest a form of overall “balance,” and thereby parity, between
prosecution and defense at the court, constituting an element of legal fairness. Where accused are
in power they are highly unlikely to face prosecution at the ICC, whereas those in opposition to a
state referring party are likely to be significantly disadvantaged at trial due to differential access
to evidence by the state.263 Mechanisms for compelling external actor cooperation with defense
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teams in gaining access to potential evidence are inadequate to address this problem.264 In 2008,
in Lubanga, due to lack of defense access to evidence the ICC suspended proceedings.265 While
this is very unusual, it could be a useful strategy to encourage state cooperation, as it did in this
case.

Defense parity indicator 2: Evidentiary procedures
This section analyzes the effect of documentary and witness evidence on the courtroom dynamic
between prosecution and defense at the ICC. The first section explores the procedural right of
disclosure of prosecution evidence to the defense before trial, and the problems created by the
reliance of the prosecution on external sources of information. The second section discusses
witness procedures in the rules, focusing on rules affecting cross-examination and those
permitting the introduction into the record of written witness statements.
States and the UN demonstrated little concern with due process and the rights of accused
through much of the negotiations to create the ICC. There were very few references to the
protection of defendant rights in the early drafts of the statute, including the 1994 International
Law Commission proposal, and the “Zutphen draft” agreed in February 1998.266 This only began
to change in the months leading up to the Rome Conference, and resulted in a statute whose
ICTY, defense counsel may especially encounter resistance while investigating from states with a civil
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procedures constitute a “veritable conglomeration of different legal processes,” due to the range
of legal systems represented at the conference.267 Bassiouni argues that the predominance of
common-law adversarial procedures in the statute reflects the desire of states to protect the rights
of accused, though he criticizes the “excessive formalism” in delineating rules as “counterproductive to the accused.”268 The dissertation takes issue with this position for two reasons.
First, while the rights are laid out in far greater detail than those found in the ICTY statute, this is
not a high bar, and they are not delineated in an “excessive manner” relative to those found in
liberal democratic legal systems. Second, the formalism of detailed rules provides core features
of a high level of the legality of criminal procedures: detailed and clear written rules.

Documentary evidence and disclosure
According to Schabas, the Rome Statute contains due process protections for the accused that
“go somewhat beyond the minimum requirements found in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.”269 The covenant’s requirements consist of the following rights: to be
informed of the charges; to an expeditious trial; to adequate resources and access to counsel
(paid for by the court if necessary); to present witnesses and cross-examine those of the
prosecution; and to not incriminate oneself.270
Monroe Leigh, former US State Department legal advisor and former president of the
American Society of International Law, has argued that the Rome Statute rights are more
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extensive than those found in the US Bill of Rights.271 However, as Schabas recognizes, the
rights delineated in the ICCPR—and the Bill of Rights, though Schabas does not refer to this—
by themselves constitute weak due process protections by contemporary liberal legal standards.
He clarifies that there are additional rights in the Rome Statute—including rights during the
investigation stage. Nevertheless, the central protection of disclosure as an obligation on the
prosecution to release evidence is only loosely mentioned in the statute.272
The Rome Statute makes reference to the obligation of disclosure only in relation to
exculpatory material—and with significant restrictions, discussed below.273 The RPE includes a
section with nine rules titled “Disclosure,” providing significantly more detail and clarity than
found in the ICTY RPE (which does not include a dedicated disclosure section).274 This includes
the prosecutorial obligation to disclose witness information (their names and any prior
statements) and copies of physical material—objects, written documents, and photographs,
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etc.275 Also included are restrictions on disclosure, including those relating to confidential
evidence.276
While the ICTY’s disclosure procedures initially largely mirrored those of the US criminal
justice system,277 according to Antonio Cassese et al. ICC procedures have somewhat tilted the
international hybrid adversarial-inquisitorial trial model back towards the latter.278 This includes
an obligation on the defense to disclose evidence to the prosecution, and aspects of the defense
strategy.279 As discussed in Chapter 1, in an adversarial approach, the disclosure obligation tends
to be placed solely on the prosecution, in acknowledgment of the defense’s disadvantage in
gathering evidence in such a trial system.
In the ICC’s Ruto et al. trial, in the Kenya situation, the defense team asked for a
postponement of a date for disclosure to the prosecution on the grounds that it had too few
resources to meet the disclosure deadline.280 The application was denied by the court, arguing
that the defense was merely disorganized and that certain resources were not mandated by the
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court to supply, so their lack was the defense’s problem to resolve on their own.281 Yet the court
later granted an extension on the deadline for the confirmation of charges in the case at the
Registrar’s request,282 suggesting time pressures are of greater concern to the court when only
the defense is disadvantaged.283
Most references to disclosure in the statute refer to limitations on the right of disclosure, by
providing protections for external parties which have given information to the OTP so that it will
not be released to the defense, even if it contains potentially exculpatory material.284 This is a
reflection of the acknowledgment by the Rome Conference of the need for the ICC, unlike
domestic courts, to rely on external cooperation, and of the desire by states to maintain control in
any cooperation they choose to give.
Without its own police, with limited investigatory resources, and lacking the legal authority
to secure evidence from government agencies, the OTP is reliant upon states to provide evidence,
including intelligence information that states would be unlikely to hand over without assurances
that it would remain confidential. The restrictions on disclosure were also created to protect the
identity of some victims and witnesses, generating a conflict between the necessity for their
protection and the due process rights of the accused.
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The head of the ICC’s Office of Public Counsel for the Defence argues that redactions from
confidential documents that these rules have permitted have hampered the ability of defense
teams to investigate, as well as having delayed proceedings.285 Lubanga provides a sobering
example of the problems that can be caused for the ability to present an adequate defense by the
confidentiality limitation. The United Nations in Congo had released a great deal of evidentiary
material to the OTP to aid the prosecution in that case, but only on the agreement that it be used
solely to generate further evidence which could be presented in court. The UN evidence itself
could not be presented in court or shared at the ICC outside the OTP—not even with the
judges.286 Some material was disclosed to the defense after heavy redaction, which counsel
argued left them unable to effectively defend their client.287 The International Bar Association
was also critical of the belated disclosure of redacted, possibly exculpatory evidence, which led
to delays in the proceedings.288 Larry Johnson, a legal scholar and former UN assistant secretarygeneral for legal affairs, argues that these problems with “the implementation of the cooperation
regime with the United Nations…almost derailed the whole trial.” They exposed “the tensions
between the two obligations—disclosure and confidentiality.”289
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The OTP did not disclose to the Lubanga defense team over 200 confidential documents
which the court also recognized contained “potentially exculpatory information.”290 The court
further acknowledged the damage that nondisclosure can cause to the defense and ruled that it
would only permit the admission of evidence that can be disclosed.291 It called the disclosure of
exculpatory material “a fundamental aspect of the accused’s right to a fair trial,” censured the
prosecution for misapplying confidentiality agreements to withhold information from the defense
and the trial chamber, and consequently suspended the trial, on the basis that these factors
“ruptured” the trial process “to such a degree that it is now impossible to piece together the
constituent elements of a fair trial.”292 The court criticized the prosecution in particular for
“routinely” misapplying the confidentiality restriction to disclosure, and criticized prosecutors
for a “broad and incorrect interpretation of the statute’s confidentiality requirements.”293
Accountability for lapses in relation to such important procedural matters may well aid
compliance in the future. Nevertheless, a code of ethics for the OTP has only been in force since
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September 2013—more than ten years after the opening of the court.294 It remains to be seen
whether it will make a difference to the OPT’s compliance with its disclosure obligations.295
In addition to arguable prosecutorial misconduct, a significant cause of the disclosure
problems in Lubanga was the court’s structural weakness of a “disjointed defense system.”296
The Registry appointed an ad hoc defense counsel for Lubanga during the investigatory phase,
before his transfer to the court. Pre-Trial Chamber I decided to replace this counsel with
representation through the OPCD, but refused to permit the OPCD to fulfill all the counsel’s
functions, including gaining access to prosecution evidence.297 Lubanga provides an example of
how lack of structural parity for the defense generates other parity weaknesses by limiting the
court’s ability to respond to procedural problems. Considering the likely reliance of the OTP in
future on information from states and IGOs, the tension between the obligations of disclosure to
the defense and confidentiality towards sources “will become an issue for the court again.”298
While there is insufficient space here to pursue other issues in depth, it should be noted that,
similarly to the ICTY, another significant problem with disclosure to the defense has been the
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sheer volume of material handed over, due to the nature of the crimes and the international
context. In Lubanga, for example, the prosecution notified the court that it possessed 27,500
documents, comprising 92,500 pages of material, of which it intended to hand over 20,000
documents (74,000 pages).299

Witnesses and defense cross-examination
According to legal scholar Christoph Safferling, the defense right to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses “presupposes the oral presentation of the…evidence,” yet there is “no explicit norm
stating that the trial be oral” at the ICC.300 Nevertheless, the statute expresses a preference for inperson, oral testimony.301 This represents, according to former ADC-ICTY president Colleen
Rohan, a “welcome return to the principle that witnesses should testify in person,” which has
been undermined in the practice of the ICTY.302
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Rohan argues that, to date, the ICC has largely sustained this preference, permitting the use
of written witness statements in a far narrower range of circumstances than at the ICTY.303 The
rights to an oral trial and to directly challenge one’s accusers tend to be less commonly applied
in civil law inquisitorial trial systems,304 and so the inclusion of protections within the Rome
Statute and RPE is indicative of the importance the Rome delegates and ASP placed on
maintaining the extra defense protections that an adversarial model requires.305
Safferling’s assessment agrees with Rohan’s position, arguing that the ICC has so far taken a
“relatively cautious approach” of restricting the introduction of written testimony. He speculates
that this may be due to the ICC not yet experiencing the high level of political pressure to speed
up proceedings as experienced by the ad hoc tribunals, due to the “backlog” of cases the latter
accumulated. He cautions against the ICC capitulating to similar pressure in the future in order to
maintain fair trial standards.306
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However, there are signs that there is already a move in this direction by the court. In 2013
the ASP amended307 an ICC procedural rule to enable a greater use of written witness
statements,308 with a very similar content to rule changes at the ICTY in 2000 and 2006.309 The
changes permit the introduction of a written transcript in lieu of oral testimony in situations
where the witness is not present in court, but where the defense has had the opportunity to
question the witness during the recording of their testimony; where the witness is present in court
(though the testimony is not live), and there is the opportunity to cross-examine; where the
witness has died since providing a written transcript; or where there has been witness
intimidation.
The International Bar Association supported the adoption of the changes, especially those
aspects that maintain the right of cross-examination, while urging “a cautionary approach to
[their] implementation…in recognition of fundamental fair trial guarantees.”310 The IBA “urges
the Trial Chambers to exercise caution,” and argues that the changes permitting written
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testimony without the right of cross-examination “should be evidentiary mechanisms of last
resort.”311 This development has led to increasing use of written testimony since 2014.
The changes occurred due to ASP desire to facilitate faster and cheaper trials. Such pressure
has resulted from the slow pace of trials so far. Only in March 2012—nearly ten years after the
court’s establishment—did the ICC complete its first trial.312 As of June 2016 the court has
completed four trials, with three convictions and one acquittal.313 Similarly to the ad hoc
tribunals, this has been criticized in relation to the ICC by academic and media commentators.314
The ASP, and in particular the wealthier member states that provide the majority of the court’s
funding,315 have become increasingly concerned since 2004 about the costs associated with the
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ICC.316 That year the ASP’s Committee on Budget and Finance explicitly expressed concern that
the costs not spiral as they had at the ad hoc tribunals.317 By 2015 the ICC had spent a total of $1
billion, with two convictions to show for it.318

Conclusion
At the beginning of the chapter it was noted that there has been insufficiently critical reflection
on the promise of the ICC for the fairness of prosecution within global legal governance. The
examination of the court’s rules and limited practice to date provide a cautionary assessment.
The ICC arguably constitutes an advance for the fairness of global legal governance for
defendants over the ad hoc tribunals, but with significant caveats. The legality of the court
constitutes an advancement in terms of non-retroactive enforcement of law, and especially in
terms of the clarity and specificity of legal prohibitions. There are, however, still concerns as to
the implications of the sentencing rules, which provide significant flexibility to the judges. While
the three convictions so far reveal no particular concerns, they provide a limited basis for an
assessment of legality.
Structurally there is more of an official inside voice for the accused at the ICC, but there is
not the effective equivalent of the ADC-ICTY with an external voice in decision-making forums.
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The accused and their counsel are still far from attaining structural equality as it relates to the
pre-trial and trial stages of proceedings.
Investigatory access to information is arguably worse for the defense at the ICC than at the
ICTY, due to: complementarity, whereby domestic court jurisdiction supersedes that of the ICC
(the opposite to the situation at the ICTY); control of top-level decision-making by a large and
unwieldy body with many competing political interests—the ASP; and the bias inherent in state
referrals of situations. The ICC also has similar evidentiary problems to the ICTY due to the
dependence of the court on external support and information. While it has not yet suffered from
the same level of inducement to speed up proceedings, there are signs of nascent pressure and
their impact on trials. This requires monitoring to ensure that rule changes do not weaken
defense parity to the same extent as they have been argued to at the ICTY.319
Two remaining major problems for prosecution within global legal governance are its
prosecution bias, and the structure of the system. The first issue results from the traditional
international human rights focus on victims being incorporated uncritically into the evolving
structures and procedures of international prosecution. The inadequate understanding of the role
and function of the accused and defense counsel by states, NGOs, judges, and external
commentators320 is a major obstacle to the improvement of fair trial standards.
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On the second issue, Lubanga highlights the arguably inherent conflict between the utility to
the OTP of information provided by outside sources for pursuing a prosecution, and the
requirement of disclosure. This remains unresolved and is perhaps an inevitable consequence of
an international court reliant on external cooperation. Problems with effectiveness and efficiency
have led to questioning of whether the ICC suffers from a “credibility gap,” especially in
comparison to liberal democratic state criminal justice systems.321 This may lead to pressure to
increase effectiveness at the expense of trial fairness.
A key obstacle to the legitimacy of the ICC is that while it is modeled on courts within liberal
criminal justice systems, it is not embedded within the sort of broader criminal justice
structures—such as a police force for investigations and arrests—that would enable it to be both
more effective and provide more equitable treatment to defendants. This leads to weaker
legitimacy in terms of both fair trials and efficacy. Significantly responsible for this is that the
court and its procedural rules were the outcome of a bargaining process among states, reflecting
compromises among state interests and understandings of criminal justice, and the institutional
power dynamic between the like-minded group and powerful states. As suggested in Chapter 4,
perhaps a fundamental weakness of prosecution within global legal governance as currently
constituted, is that it does not provide the best method for maintaining fair trial standards while
also effectively prosecuting those who may have committed mass atrocity crimes.

information, despite spending considerable effort on this issue in relation to the prosecution. See Bosco,
Rough Justice.
321
Makua W. Mutua, “Closing the ‘Impunity Gap’ and the Role of State Support of the ICC,” in
Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2016), 104.

352

6 Conclusion: Politics and the legitimacy of global legal governance
The narrative of the evolution of international human rights is generally told within IR as one of
increasing protections through the development of international human rights and humanitarian
law, the role of NGOs and civil society groups in promoting and protecting rights, the
development of post-conflict justice mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions,
and the movement to end impunity for mass atrocities through international criminal justice.1
In focusing on the rights of victims as heralding the achievement of greater justice through
international prosecution, political scientists have tended to underappreciate the centrality of the
rights of the accused to the legitimacy of global legal governance institutions. Consequently, the
effect of political influences on legal processes that affect defendants is underexplored within IR.
The dissertation has demonstrated that defendant rights are particularly difficult to protect in
a judicial environment characterized by: 1) the institutional power of states through the shaping
of the rules by which courts are structured and operate; 2) the reliance of courts, in the pre-trial
stage in particular, on external actors, especially states and IGOs; 3) a concern for victim rights
that has arguably generated a blind spot among states and IGOs with regards to the rights of
defendants; and 4) conflict between the political and legal goals of states in relation to
international prosecution. The influence of the political goals and preferences of state and IGO
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actors on courts shapes the legal dynamic between the prosecution and defense, to the detriment
of defendants’ rights to a fair trial.
While defendants at mass-atrocity trials are frequently referred to in international media as
war criminals, without maintaining strong standards of legal justice there is effectively no
presumption of innocence, and the process is at risk of sinking into a political show trial with the
purpose of vengeance, not justice. Nevertheless, many political and NGO actors advocate
successful international prosecution while paying inadequate attention to the legal rights of
defendants. In doing so they harm the human rights objectives of deterrence, recognition of
victim suffering, and transitional justice through prosecution.
As demonstrated in the research, weaknesses in legal legitimacy constitute miscarriages of
justice. Justice has not been served when the structural and procedural flaws in defendant rights
explored have failed to provide the accused with adequate opportunities to defend him- or
herself. Occasionally the research has been able to demonstrate prejudicial outcomes, such as the
wrongful conviction of Croatian general Tihomir Blaškić on most counts, as determined by the
ICTY appeals chamber. A broader assessment of wrongful conviction through a systematic
examination of appeals at the ICTY and ICC is outside of the scope of the dissertation and may
serve as the basis for further research. The appeals examined in the research suggest that there
are various examples of miscarriages of justice resulting from the interference of political factors
in the legal process.
The first two sections of the conclusion provide a summary of the legal fairness findings of
the research. They lay out the manner in which fairness has been shaped by the institutional
power of states, and courts’ political reliance on external actors. This includes how decisionmaking in creating legal rules is shaped by states’ political goals, including a bias towards
354

prosecution, concern to contain costs, and an underappreciation of the necessity for an active role
for defendants in criminal justice. In the final section, the chapter discusses the implications of
the project for the future of global legal governance, focusing on the effect of the inconsistency
between courts on the coherence of the international criminal justice system—indeed, whether a
disparate group of courts can constitute a system at all, and what this means for the rights of
defendants. It also examines the study’s implications for IR research.

Legality and institutional power: Amelioration despite interference
The level of adherence to the requirements of the legality of crimes and punishment has
improved enormously since the IMT at Nuremberg, while various problems remain. The
improvement is largely due to the expansion of international human rights and humanitarian
treaty law since 1945, but also the increasing level of detail on crimes incorporated within court
statutes, and the evolution of customary law. Particularly significant has been the inclusion of
sexual offenses within all three mass atrocity crimes prosecuted at the tribunals analyzed—war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Sexual offenses were introduced to international
criminal justice through the practice of the ICTY, and they were subsequently delineated in
detail in the ICC statute.
Problems remain in terms of the contextual requirements of these crimes and some
underlying offenses, with court interpretations providing a mixed picture. While sometimes
clarifying the law, and thereby enhancing legality, courts have also on occasion strayed into
creating new law, and thereby have effectively retroactively created prohibitions. Definitions of
crimes are also shaped by state political preferences—this was particularly evident in decisionmaking at the Rome Conference of the ICC.
355

The legality of punishments has attained a lower level of adherence to that of crimes. Practice
has tended to suffer from the enforcement of arguably retroactive penalties, due to insufficient
clarity and specify in sentencing guidelines within courts’ statutory documents, enabling
excessive judicial discretion. This has led at the ICTY to poor consistency in sentencing; at the
ICC more convictions will be necessary to determine if it suffers from the same malady. Such
weaknesses are a significant matter for the legitimacy of international courts as sentencing
practice goes to the heart of one of the primary purposes of legal retribution—the appropriate
punishment of offenders.
Yet adherence to the principle of legality is overall significantly less problematic within
international criminal justice than is the level of defense parity. A central reason is that there has
been less of a role for political interests shaping legality. Partly because of the Cold War
expansion of international law, there has been broader agreement as to the legal requirements
surrounding mass atrocities among states, as well as greater acceptance of expert positions on the
legality of crimes. In addition, since the early postwar period, the concept of legality has become
established as a fundamental legal principle at the domestic and international levels. There has
therefore been less flexibility in the no-longer-nascent fields of international humanitarian and
human rights law for interference by political and judicial actors through retroactive creation of
crimes.

Defense parity and bias towards prosecution: Dependence on external support
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Defense parity remains more problematic than does legality. This is partly due to the complex
nature of criminal trials: the structures, procedures, and resources available to the accused
interact in various ways, profoundly affecting the ability of the accused to experience a
satisfactory defense. This remains inadequately appreciated by states, the Security Council, and
other political actors involved in creating international courts.
Structural inequality within the institutional design of courts has left the accused and their
counsel with a weaker voice in decision-making over such issues as budgets and procedural rule
changes. This in turn has limited their ability to gain access to resources, and to be able to resist
political pressure to speed up trials in ways detrimental to the ability of the defense to challenge
the case before them. Resistance from states and IGOs reluctant to aid suspects, especially where
a state may gain from non-cooperation with the accused, weakens the ability of defense teams to
adequately investigate and locate exculpatory material.
There is little evidence of learning applied at the ICC to ameliorate the weaknesses in the
structural position of the defense at the ICTY. The continued failure of international courts to
incorporate the defense equally—along with the prosecution—into their institutional structure is
problematic for their legitimacy and the evolution of international criminal justice as a whole.
While states and IGOs have clearly seen that it is necessary to establish a separate institutional
organ for the prosecution within courts, none created a similar office for defense counsel until
the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2003, in a “novel,” “innovative,” and “unique” step.2 Only
at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon—which has yet to try any suspects—is there a Defense
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Office as an organ of the court with equal status to that of the Office of the Prosecutor.3 Without
learning lessons on the need for robust adequacy of representation, subsequent international
courts will not provide a high level of legal fairness, with all that entails for diminished
legitimacy.
The prosecution and defense counsel at all international courts are dependent upon the
cooperation of external actors to enable them to conduct pre-trial investigations and gather
evidence. States control the territory in which research is conducted and material gathered, and
so the effectiveness of investigations is especially dependent upon their cooperation. Other
important actors include such IGOs as the UN and NATO, and such NGOs as Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International, which may have access to witnesses and other sources of
evidence.
While both prosecution and defense have suffered from poor cooperation, defense teams
have tended to be much more severely hampered, as they lack the advantages of institutional
status and resources available to the prosecution; and chief prosecutors possess political and
diplomatic contacts and influence denied to defense teams, which aid in encouraging and
pressuring states to cooperate. In addition, states may perceive advantage to hindering the
investigations of defendants who are prior military or political rivals. This especially applies to
the ICC, where the mechanism of state referral of situations for investigation has been
responsible for a considerable imbalance in investigatory support between the prosecution and
defense.
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A major impediment to the legitimacy of international courts remains their creation as
standalone institutions, rather than being embedded within an authority structure similar to that
of the domestic criminal courts within liberal criminal justice systems that they are modeled on.
Lacking territorial authority, international courts are unable to guarantee parity of access to
evidence. The state creators of international courts have not provided them with adequate tools
for encouraging external cooperation, and judges have tended to insufficiently recognize that an
imbalance in access to evidence is a significant cause for concern and an issue that the courts
themselves need to address. Especially considering the adversarial nature of international
criminal trial procedure, the statutes and RPEs of existing courts do not adequately take into
account the requirements of defense counsel to conduct an effective investigation for exculpatory
material.
In terms of evidentiary procedures, the ability of defendants to acquire evidence from the
prosecution (the obligation of disclosure), and counsel’s ability to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses suffer from significant, and in some cases growing, weaknesses. Disclosure has
suffered from problems caused by the perhaps inevitably large scope of mass atrocity trials,
especially those of political and military leaders. Cross-examination has been negatively
impacted by the methods adopted to respond to UN and state pressure on courts to speed up trial
proceedings, which have involved reducing the proportion of witnesses who testify in person,
and therefore reducing opportunities to challenge the prosecution’s evidence. Cost and time
pressures have impacted the ICTY since before the end of its first decade of operation, and
similar pressures are appearing at the ICC.
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The research acknowledges that due process protections for the accused have been a factor in
the length and cost of trials at international courts, as they have been domestically.4 However, the
diminished efficiency legitimacy of tribunals, due to the widespread perception of the excessive
length of trials,5 has to be balanced against the necessity of maintaining adequate legal
protections for defendants, as this is fundamental to the legitimacy of prosecution within global
legal governance.
IR scholars demonstrate limited understanding of the importance of institutional design to the
quality of legal fairness within international criminal courts, reflecting an underappreciation of
the role of defendants as active participants in criminal trials. There is consequently little
awareness of how defendant rights are affected by the structure of a court and the level of
cooperation forthcoming from external actors. With a similarly limited understanding of criminal
procedure, IR scholars tend not to recognize how the rules established for a court, and the
political influences on changes to those rules, may impact the ability of accused to present an
adequate defense. They similarly tend not to appreciate how the distinct legal and political
relationship of each court with external actors shapes the ability to protect defendant rights. Yet a
recognition of the central place of criminal procedure in generating legal fairness, and how this is
weakened by political influences, are essential to an assessment of the legitimacy of global legal
governance that incorporates the role of the defendant, who is inadequately recognized as the key
actor in criminal trials.
4

See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, “Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of
Procedural Fairness,” Boston University Law Review 83 (2003): 485-552.
5
See, e.g., The Economist, “Justice on Trial,” February 28, 2004, www.economist.com/node/2460574;
Geoffrey Robertson, “Outstanding Questions,” Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY, ed. Richard H.
Steinberg (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), 18; and Rupert Skilbeck, “Funding Justice:
The Price of War Crimes Trials,” Human Rights Brief 15, no. 3 (2008): 6-10.
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The future of global legal governance and implications for IR research
Arguably there is no international criminal justice system per se, only a disparate group of
courts. International courts apply a reasonably coherent set of criminal laws, which has aided in
the relative consistency of legality between them, but each court also has jurisdiction over the
(somewhat differing) laws as laid down in its own statute and there is no agreement as to the
value of precedent, which would facilitate consistency in interpretation. A hierarchy between
courts, as tends to operate within domestic legal systems, would help towards achieving
coherence by requiring adherence to common standards through acceptance of authoritative
decisions from outside each court.
The problem is much greater in relation to defense parity, as each court has established its
own distinct set of structures and procedures for protecting the accused. There is no clear
learning over time within and between courts which would indicate a move towards greater
parity. Therefore there is no significant indication that standards are trending towards an
improvement for defendants, and no guarantee that those defendants facing prosecution at
different courts will achieve anything approaching equal treatment. Without a coherent justice
system characterized by consistent structures and procedural standards, and the universal
acceptance of precedent within a judicial hierarchy, there is also little prospect of an
amelioration.
At the domestic level, liberal criminal justice systems are embedded within a particular
community and evolve according to its concerns. The operation of global legal governance
assumes that common values are defended by the international community of states, justifying an
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international duty to punish offenders.6 This position is undermined by the diverse
understandings among states of the standards of justice to be applied by international courts,
which is demonstrated throughout the research by the attitudes and actions of states in creating,
maintaining, and cooperating with such courts.
IR scholarship has not adequately explored defendant rights as a source of legitimacy within
global legal governance. By analyzing these rights, this study complements the extensive and
growing body of research on other sources of legitimacy for international law and institutions,
including the content of laws; non-legal inputs, such as transparency and accountability; and
institutional outputs such as the number of court decisions.7
The project raises questions about the theoretical and empirical assumptions of IR research
on global governance, and expands scholarship in the theoretical exploration of the legitimacy of
international criminal justice institutions by demonstrating the value of applying legal theory to
the analysis of legitimacy and incorporating an active role for defendants. While such institutions
are extensively analyzed within IR, the study of legal justice is underdeveloped.
The research highlights the dangers of IR scholars and other public commentators claiming
that trials are fair without an adequate understanding of what fairness towards defendants
consists of, and without effectively exploring these issues in relation to the rules and practice of

6

Thomas Margueritte, “International Criminal Law and Human Rights,” in Routledge Handbook of
International Criminal Law, ed. Schabas and Bernaz, 435.
7
E.g. Jens Steffek, “The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach,” European
Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2 (2003): 249-75; Jan Wouters and Nicolas Hachez,
“Transitional Societies and the Rule of Law: A Benchmarks Approach,” Working Paper No. 47, Leuven
Centre for Global Governance Studies, Catholic University Leuven, March 2010; and Jason Ralph,
“Anarchy is What Criminal Lawyers and Other Actors Make of It: International Criminal Justice as an
Institution of International and World Society,” in Governance, Order, and the International Criminal
Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court, ed. Steven C. Roach (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 133-53.
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tribunals. The study contributes to a more complete understanding of global legal governance by
demonstrating that the legitimacy of legal institutions can only be understood if it is recognized
that law is a distinctive social process, and that it is shaped at the international level by the
influence of political actors on the principles underlying law’s legitimacy.
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Appendix: List of interviews
Behar, Eliott, former prosecutor, ICTY, San Francisco, Calif., January 30, 2016.
Goldstone, Richard, former chief prosecutor, ICTY, New York, October 17, 2014.
Guy-Smith, Gregor, defense attorney, ICTY, and former ADC-ICTY president, San Francisco,
Calif., August 12, 2015.
Robinson, Peter, defense attorney, ICTY and ICTR, and former ADC-ICTY Executive Board
member, San Francisco, Calif., August 27, 2015.
Rohan, Colleen, defense attorney, ICTY, and former ADC-ICTY president, Berkeley, Calif.,
November 12, 2015.
Various former prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other anonymous legal experts who have
either worked at or closely observed the ICTY and ICC, San Francisco, Calif., London,
and The Hague, The Netherlands, August 2015–January 2016.
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